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137 13 THE IMPACT OF A MOTIVATED TACTICIAN On the opening to China Zbigniew Brzezinski employed all the tactics of a motivated tactician delineated in the management literature.1 We have seen how he employed salami tactics to get to Beijing. Then he set the agenda, introduced decision rules, and controlled access to the decision making process in ways that furthered his objectives . To bolster the desired option, he sought allies on the presidential staff and elsewhere , and in all probability he permitted NSC leaks in an effort to influence public responses. But he did more than that. Brzezinski also framed issues in ways that would have the most impact on his president and the public—providing historical and other material arguments to bolster the perceived value of the desired option. Along the way he was careful to maintain a good relationship with Carter, publicly extolling his policies, complimenting the president on the choices he made.2 As early as the spring of 1978, for example, Brzezinski had argued that the Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa could best be countered by playing the China card. Typical was his statement on March 3, 1978: If the Soviets do not conclude that we are prepared to stand up to them, you can only anticipate worsening difficulties in the years ahead....[Their] greatest area of sensitivity is China....The development of cooperation with the Chinese in science and technology and the encouragement of west European arms sales to China would give the U.S. needed leverage. The Chinese are worried about the Middle East and the African Horn, and they could even help us more directly. In any case, the Soviets are willing to operate on several levels in their dealings with us; we should not be unduly sensitive to Soviet concerns and similarly operate on several levels towards them.3 Any moves he might make to fashion a new relationship to China Brzezinski assured the president was not so much the result of the United States playing the China card as a response to Soviet actions.They had“so frightened the Chinese that they [the Chinese] turned to us.”4 The shift away from equal to preferential treatment was also introduced gradually . As Oksenberg warned Brzezinski on January 26, 1979, “A sudden move toward the word ‘balance’ from our previous and less adequate ‘evenhandedness’ formulation would attract immediate press attention, would be taken as an indication of a change in policy, and would be the lead story.” He added that Brzezinski should, in the 138 MIDTERM ACHIEVEMENTS “transition period,” employ both phrases, saying,“We intend to pursue an evenhanded, or balanced, policy toward China and the Soviet Union.”5 Brzezinski himself, in a letter to Carter on December 25, 1958, even framed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a Soviet threat. This was the“third time a country which has concluded a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union has shortly thereafter engaged in a recourse to arms.” Earlier, the Indians had done this to Pakistan; and the Ethiopians had done it to Somalia and Eritrea.6 But the Chinese invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, was due to the situation in Southeast Asia, a situation in which Vietnam and its supporters shared responsibility.“Present circumstances require wisdom and restraint by our governments to prevent any widening of this conflict and to restore peace in Indochina,”noted Brzezinski.“To achieve this most important and urgent goal, it is essential that all foreign forces withdraw from both Kampuchea and Vietnam.”7 Brzezinski also complimented Carter on his intellectual skills, comparing him on one occasion to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. “Your statement on the Shanghai Communiqué [showed U.S. commitment],” he wrote the president,“as Vance tried to do in his Asia speech.”8 Opposition to his policies could be dismissed as reflections of turf and personal consideration.9 Brzezinski also suggested that sharing information and policy debates with the Department of State could lead to leaks. Even consultation with the State Department on technical matters, such as the handling of the treaty with Taiwan, should be limited. The danger in this case was evident in the fact that journalist Strobe Talbott knew about Secretary Vance’s meetings with former Attorney General Herbert Brownell on that matter. Brzezinski suggested that the leak was due to the inclusion of the Far East desk, over his protest, in the recent talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Han Hsu.10 Carter not only...

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