The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

6. China Postpones the Invasion of Taiwan

IN 1950, THE UNITED STATES DETERRED CHINA from invading Taiwan as China sought to conclude its civil war. Doctrinal-difference theory predicts that when two adversaries practice similar doctrines, deterrence is facilitated because signals are more likely to be clearly understood and assessments of the balance of power are more likely to be consistent. Both of these elements are seen in the U.S.-Chinese confrontation over the Taiwan Strait in 1950. There, a primarily symbolic deterrent threat was suf- ficiently clear to both sides to forestall Beijing’s plans. historical background In April 1949, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, the critical strategic geography in continental China that divides the north from the south. The resistance from their opponents, the Kuomintang (KMT), rapidly crumbled in the south. Immediately thereafter, Mao began to turn his attention to the KMT’s last redoubt on the island of Taiwan. Taiwan was the central Communist Chinese concern for both offensive and defensive reasons. The KMT military on Taiwan was regularly attacking Shanghai from the air at the time, and Chinese air defense forces were having only limited success checking these attacks.1 1 刘少奇、“转呈华东局关于敌机狂炸上海情况电报的批语”、1950年二月七日《建国以来刘 少奇文稿》 、第一册:7/1949–3/1950(北京:中央文献出版社、 1998) [Liu Shaoqi, “Telegram to 6 china postpones the invasion of taiwan 170 THE MILITARY LENS Plans were gathering momentum to take Taiwan by mid-1950; most analysts , then and since, viewed the KMT’s situations as hopeless. More than thirty thousand soldiers had been transferred to reinforce the Chinese Communist navy.2 The Chinese Communists’ military preparations had advanced quite substantially: By spring 1950, the Communists had assembled a motley armada of 5,000 vessels for the invasion by commandeering freighters, motorized junks, and sampans and [by] refloating [naval warships] that had been sunk in the Yangtze River. Further, they gathered and trained over 30,000 fishermen and other sailors to man the flotilla.3 The 1950 Chinese New Year’s proclamation by the official Xinhua news agency asserted that Taiwan would be attacked that year.4 American sources also thought the invasion was imminent. The CIA predicted in March that Mao’s forces “are estimated to possess the capability of carrying out their frequently expressed intention of seizing Taiwan during 1950, and will probably do so during the period June–December.”5 According to American weekly intelligence digests prepared by the Far East Command in July and August 1950, the Chinese planned to start probing operations in July; the main assault was expected to follow in early August.6 While the status of the actual Chinese timetable for invasion during late June 1950 was Mao Presenting Notes on the East China Bureau’s Report on the Situation Surrounding the Unrestrained Bombing of Shanghai (February 7, 1950),” in Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998)]. 2 刘少奇、“关于调四个师到倾倒演习海军的电报”、1950年二月十日《建国以来刘少奇 文稿》 、第一册:7/1949–3/1950(北京:中央文献出版社、 1998) [Liu Shaoqi, “Telegram Regarding the Transfer of 4 Divisions to Qingdao for Naval Training (February 10, 1950),” in Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1998)]. 3 Edward John Marolda, “The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945–52” (PhD diss., George Washington University, 1990), 139. 4 The Chinese New Year in 1950 fell on February 17 on the Western calendar. Later in the year, Mao chastised the head of Xinhua for this broadcast. See 毛泽东、“关于在宣传中不说 打台湾,西藏的时间给胡乔木的信”、1950年九月二十九日《建国以来毛泽东文稿》 、第一册: 9/1949–12/1950 (北京:中央文献出版社、 1987) [Mao Zedong, “Letter to Hu Qiaomu Regarding Not Mentioning the Time for the Attacks on Taiwan and Tibet in Propaganda Broadcasts (September 29, 1950),” in Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Beijing: Central Party Documents Publishers, 1987)]. 5 “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State (April 17, 1950),” in FRUS, 1950, vol. VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1976), 330. 6 David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Epping, U.K.: Bowker, 1983), 16–7. Wenzhou Xinmen Kao-hsiung Pescadores Jinmen Island Mazu Island Fuzhou TAIWAN GUANGDONG FUJIAN JIANGXI ZHEJIANG EAST CHINA SEA SOUTH CHINA SEA PHILIPPINE SEA T A I W A N S T R A I T mountain ranges Shantou Taipei 0 0 100 150 km 50 50 100 mi C H I N A Figure 6.1. The Taiwan Strait area. 172 THE MILITARY LENS unclear, scholars today generally all agree that it...