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327 CHAPTER 18 Brazil, South American Regionalism and Re-defining the ‘Atlantic Space’ Oliver Stuenkel1 INTRODUCTION Brazil’s economic rise over the past two decades has caused the country’s foreign policy-making elite to seek a more prominent role for Brazil in the international community. On a global scale, it has sought to assume more responsibility and engage in international institutions, often criticising established powers for not providing it with the status it deserves. Brazil’s newfound status has also caused Brazilian governments to reassess its regional role, although Brazil remains ambivalent about which strategy to adopt in South America. There is clearly a gap between Brazil’s global ambitions and its reluctance to adopt a more assertive role in its region. The country’s strategy in the region remains indecisive, combining restrained support for Mercosur, the creation of the Union of South American States (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (CSD) with a growing notion that a clearer vision is necessary to mitigate neighbour’s fears of a rising Brazil. Brazilian policy makers disagree on how they should characterise and understand their region – some see it as a source of problems, some as a shield against globalisation and some as a launching pad for global power.2 Brazil’s self-perception as a ‘BRICS country’ has fuelled worries that it will pay little attention to regional matters (given that its trade interdependence with the region is far lower, percentage-wise, than that of its neighbours), causing critics of Brazil’s global focus to call it a ‘leader without followers’. While Brazil has kept UNASUR relatively toothless, its decision to exclude Central America and Mexico from this institution is a clear sign that policy makers in Brasilia have defined South America as Brazil’s immediate sphere of influence. With the majority of the continent’s landmass, population and economic output, and Venezuela’s faltering attempts to turn into a second pole, it is largely up to Brazil to define and design ‘South American 328 Regionalism’. Brazil thus in theory holds a key coordinating role regarding important regional challenges, ranging from China’s growing economic importance , poverty, inequality, integrating the economy and security threats such as drug trafficking and smuggling. Analogous to Brazil’s growing role on the continent, it is bound to play a larger role in the South Atlantic (at times called ‘Blue Amazon’ in Brazil), and it has resisted attempts made by Europe and the United States (US) to create one single Atlantic Space. Both Brazil’s and South Africa’s rise and also West Africa’s and Angola’s increasingly prominent role as energy providers will increase the South Atlantic’s strategic significance. Conscious of this shift, Brazil is interested in defining a separate South Atlantic Security Space. It has chosen Africa as a strategic priority, and it is developing a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. As ever-larger ships can no longer pass through the Suez Canal, one can expect to see a revival of the Cape of Good Hope route, which could be controlled by Brazil and South Africa, but they still lack the capacity to control the area. At the same time, piracy has turned into a global problem that requires a concerted effort. As a consequence , security has emerged as a topic during IBSA summits, largely in the context of large-scale oil findings off the Brazilian coast, thus causing Brazil to increasingly regard control and defence of the South Atlantic Space as its national interest. This chapter will elaborate on how Brazil thinks about South America and the South Atlantic Space, how it will seek to shape the creation of a South American and a South Atlantic identity and how this may affect the geopolitical dynamics in the region. BRAZIL, REGIONAL HEGEMON? Given its dominant role, it is no exaggeration to argue that Brazil seems destined to lead South America. The truth, however, is more complex. Brazil paid little attention to its neighbours during most of the Cold War, and severe domestic problems kept the country from adopting a more assertive international role. In the 1980s, Brazilian foreign policy makers perceived the necessity to engage with its neighbours, principally its rival Argentina, a trend that continued and strengthened throughout the 1990s. At the beginning of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s first term, the president began to articulate a vision that fundamentally diverged from Brazil’s traditional perspective – a vision that identified ‘South America’ as a top priority.3 This trend has...

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