NATO's Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Emergence of a Global NATO

17 Horace Campbell The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Emergence of a Global NATO Historically, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose – in this case, halting the spread of communism – that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1991, it was the expectation of those who considered this period as one of a ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, adding new members seven times, and now comprising 28 nations. Joining the original signatories were Greece and Turkey (1952); West Germany (1955; from 1990 as Germany); Spain (1982); the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); and Albania and Croatia (2009). Most of the new members after 1991 were former members of the Warsaw Pact nations, with President George W. Bush pushing for NATO to expand further east to include Georgia and Ukraine. The same George W. Bush mobilised NATO to fight wars in Afghanistan as Operation Enduring Freedom and in Iraq as Operation Iraqi Freedom, where member states of NATO worked as a ‘coalition of the willing’.35 Protecting finance capital Russia opposed the expansion of NATO, claiming that this was a military alliance to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact.36 Even within the foreign policy establishment there were foreign service officers who believed that the expansion was a policy error of historic importance.37 What these officers did not grasp, however, was that in the post-cold war era the defence of the tripartite alliance at the apex of the US economy required a transnational military force capable of intervening in any part of the world to protect ‘investments’ and ‘free markets’. Deregulation is a concept that flowed from this post-cold war world, one that girded the neo-liberal push and purported that the least regulated market is the benchmark for a highly democratic society. 18 Africa Institute of South Africa NATO’s failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa NATO expanded under President Clinton to protect a ‘globalised’ capital, and it was in this period of expansion that NATO jumped from twelve members to sixteen, then to nineteen, then to 26 by 2004 and to 28 members by 2009. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO.38 The leaders of NATO slowly built up relations with Australia in the Pacific, and in the Middle East established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group (ICIG ). This brought in the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – as allies of the US after the start of the war against the people of Iraq.39 This military agreement of 2004 cemented the links to the countries of this region, strengthening the 1994 agreement that had been termed the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative.40 The initiative involved seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to NATO itself, the Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation. Vijay Prashad termed the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council ‘the Arab NATO’.41 Africa remained outside the orbit of this globalised NATO because the memories of the anti-apartheid struggles had been too fresh in Africa, especially Southern Africa. Soon after the end of apartheid, the government of the US proposed an African Crisis Response Initiative. Nelson Mandela was among the first to vigorously oppose this planned military force in Africa. For the next eight years, US diplomatic efforts were geared towards ensnaring individual states into a military network dominated by the US. Hiding behind the guise of humanitarian relief, in 2004 the US announced the formation of the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The ostensive purpose of ACOTA was to train military trainers and equip African national militaries to conduct peace support operations. Less than four years later, the US launched a new initiative, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). This new military force for Africa was rejected by even the most servile allies of the US. There was only one society that, in public, promised basing privileges for AFRICOM. This was Liberia. The sentiment at the popular level in Africa restrained the political leaders from publicly entering the kind of ‘political dialogue and practical cooperation...