Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction

CHAPTER THREE: Ethics and Metaphysics

Another discussion this essay joins, as chapter 2 makes clear, is the discussion of the relation between ethics and metaphysics for Aristotle. Among recent commentators, that discussion has centered on whether Aristotle’s ethics has or does not have a metaphysical foundation. Foundationalism , in recent philosophic terminology, has to do with epistemology , specifically, with justification. The recent discussion regarding the supposed metaphysical foundation of Aristotle’s ethics centers on Terence Irwin’s claim that the argument of the ethics requires for its justification appeal to principles outside ethics, principles found in metaphysics , physics, and psychology. A group of commentators, including Timothy Roche, Sherwin Klein, and Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, have argued that it does not. They claim, instead, that the ethics is dialectically grounded, pointing to arguments in the ethics and showing that their premises are reputable opinions, requiring no extra-ethical supplementation . These commentators’ arguments are persuasive (Gomez-Lobo 1989; Irwin 1978, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1988; Klein 1988; Roche 1988). Still, this essay makes extra-ethical principles, principles discussed and argued for in metaphysics, physics, and psychology, crucial to Aristotle ’s ethics. For example, telos and energeia, Aristotle’s most fundamental metaphysical principles, are featured in this essay though they are neither argued for nor much discussed in the ethics. Someone might object to this and maintain that a principle such as the metaphysical principles telos or energeia cannot be crucial to Aristotle’s ethics nor awareness of them to ethical virtue. For, as just mentioned, such principles are 61 CHAPTER THREE Ethics and Metaphysics neither argued for nor much discussed in the ethics. Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes ethics from metaphysics. Ethics is imprecise, according to Aristotle (NE 1.3, 1.7, 2.2) where by ‘precise’ he means ‘prior’ or ‘fundamental ’ (not resting on something underlying) (Pr.An. 1.27 87a31–33). Metaphysics, by contrast, is first philosophy (Met. 11.4 1061b19). It is precise and deals most with what is prior (Met. 1.2 982a25–26). The most prior or fundamental principles, telos and energeia, from the most prior or fundamental study, metaphysics, cannot be crucial to Aristotle’s ethics if ethics is to remain an imprecise branch of study. Moreover, the objection might continue, in this essay you bring in metaphysical principles when Aristotle, to the contrary, shies away from them. For example, according to the argument of this essay, the central cognitive component of ethical virtue for Aristotle is awareness of the value of particulars where ‘value’ denotes the good and the beautiful both of which, according to this essay, are understood by Aristotle in terms of telos and energeia. In contrast, whenever Aristotle begins to approach a metaphysical principle or topic (or principles from other precise branches of study, e.g., physics or psychology), he redirects his discussion on the grounds that discussion of such principles is not needed for ethics’s practical goal. Roche makes this objection against Irwin’s foundationalist interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics. He points out that whenever the argument of the ethics approaches an issue that falls within the sphere of another science, Aristotle redirects the course of the discussion on the grounds that such questions are not appropriate to the argument. This essay, then, reverses Aristotle’s procedure, rather than representing it. For it adduces metaphysical principles where Aristotle explicitly shies away from them.1 Though the objections do not hold up, there is an element of truth in them. For though the argument of the ethics does not require for its justification appeal to extra-ethical principles, the argument of the ethics does require appeal to such principles for a different reason. I want to steer a path between the two poles of the recent discussion of the connection between Aristotle’s ethics and his metaphysics, physics, and psychology. One pole is the pole according to which the argument of the ethics requires appeal to metaphysical, physical, and psychological principles for its justification. The other is the pole according to which because the argument of the ethics is dialectical, appeal to principles found in metaphysics, physics, or psychology is not required by it. I want to maintain that the argument of the ethics requires appeal to metaphysical, physical, and psychological principles (and topics and arguments) not for its justification but for its full elucidation or articulation. 62 COGNITION OF VALUE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS Charles Taylor has said, recently, that “Ontological accounts have the status of articulations...