Kant on Causation: On the Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation

Chapter Five: Objects of Representations

Chapter Five Objects of Representations In the last two chapters we have seen that proponents of each of the first four possible interpretations of the strategy utilized by Kant in his proof for the causal principle have run into serious problems. In addition to the textual and/ or internal problems each of these first four strategies runs into, none of these strategies adequately accounts for the emphasis Kant places on the notion of an “object of representations.” Both ordinary physical objects, such as a house or a rock, and successions of appearances (events), such as a ship floating down a river or water freezing, are objects of representations. The truth of the causal principle hinges not on the requirements for our being able to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perceptions, nor on the requirements for our being able to apply the concepts of an objective change and an objective coexistence, nor on the requirements for our being able to temporally order events in relation to each other, nor on the requirements for our being able to justify the judgment that a particular event has occurred. Instead, the truth of the causal principle hinges on the requirements for an event’s being an object of representations. Kant argues that the causal principle must be true (that is, the causal principle must apply to all events), because no event that fails to meet the specifications of the causal principle would be a possible object of representations. This is the basic position of the Object of Experience Strategy interpretation of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. Once again I will represent this strategy schematically this way: 1. If the causal principle is false, then there could be some succession of appearances (some event) that is not subject to a rule. 2. Successions of appearances (events) are objects of experience. 103 104 KANT ON CAUSATION 3. A succession of appearances that is not subject to a rule is not a possible object of experience. 4. So, there cannot be any succession of appearances that is not subject to a rule. Therefore, the causal principle is true. In this chapter I will turn to a detailed exposition and defense of the Object of Experience Strategy. This exposition and defense must begin with a closer look at the causal principle itself. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SECOND ANALOGY In the second edition Kant states the principle he will prove this way: “All alterations [Veränderungen] take place in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B232). In the first edition the principle is stated as follows: “Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule” (A189). There are two differences between the A and B formulations of the principle. The first change Kant made in the B formulation was to replace the phrase “everything that happens (begins to be)” with the phrase “all alterations.” The second change is the replacement of the phrase “presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule,” with the phrase “take place in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.” Although, as I argued above in chapter 2, the two versions have the same meaning, it may be that the expectations created by the second edition version are different than the expectations created by the first edition version. The changes made in the second edition allow the B version of the principle to have the advantage of expressing more clearly the connection between the Second Analogy and the First Analogy as well as between the Second Analogy and the Transcendental Deduction. Using the word alterations clearly alludes to Kant’s discussion of alterations in the last section of the First Analogy (A187ff./B230ff.). Using the unanalyzed phrase “the law of the connection of cause and effect’” has the advantage of reminding the reader that there is supposed to be a connection between the principle of the Second Analogy and the pure concept of cause and effect. These two advantages, however, come at a price. The price is that, in the B formulation of the principle, the connection between the Second Analogy and the Schematism is not clearly expressed. The A version of the principle neither alludes to the discussion of the First Analogy nor does it leave any reminder that the Second Analogy is somehow connected with the pure concept of cause and effect. The A version [3.141.31.209] Project MUSE...