In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Chapter 6 The Concept of Free Will A PRELIMINARY SKETCH Free will, in the sense that is relevant to our inquiry, is a complex and learned ability—the ability to exercise rational control over one’s volitions. I shall draw upon and adapt the analysis of this ability as developed by Professors Timothy Duggan and Bermard Gert. According to Duggan and Gert, an act of free will must be uncoerced, intentional, and voluntary.1 Since this ability is complex and, as we shall see, a matter of degree, it is not surprising that there are certain mental acts that have often been regarded as acts of free will but fail to fully exemplify the ability that exists and is essential to the free will defense. For example, the mental act of intentionally choosing X rather than Y, when there is no compelling reason, motive, or incentive to choose either and when the choice is uncoerced, has often been regarded as an act of free will. I have no objection to this. I choose brussels sprouts rather than cabbage to go along with my veal cutlet, or I choose my brown jacket rather than my blue to wear to the picnic. But the sort of free will that is essential to the free will defense is, in addition, morally significant. It is the sort of action for which one may appropriately be praised or blamed. Essential to the traditional free will defense is the claim that evils came into the world, and continue to do so, because of the wrongful (sinful) choices of free rational agents (angels and humans). So, while I do not wish to exclude what might from a moral point of view be called insignificant acts of free will, my discussion focuses 47 on what might be called morally significant acts of free will, or more simply , the moral free will. We must also take note of another aspect or level, if we are to characterize the concept of free will in the most developed sense requisite for citizenship in the Kingdom of God. In addition to the necessary conditions mentioned above, such a will must be autonomous. An act performed by an autonomous will is one in which the agent reacts to antecedent causes in a selective, novel, and unpredictable way, and the principle of selectivity is internal to the psyche of the agent in the very moment of choice and no antecedent cause or cases function as sufficient cause for the choice.2 This addition is necessary because there is no way to cope with the attack upon the free will defense made by Mackie and Flew (as noted in chapter 3) if we accept their doctrine of compatibilism, and there is no good reason why compatibilists cannot accept the view that acts of free will must be intentional, uncoerced, and voluntary. The claim that persons exercising the fullest and highest form of free will act with autonomy is not strictly provable but it is necessary to the free will defense, and it is, when properly formulated, a reasonable claim (see chapter 8). The addition of this condition is not, however, simply an ad hoc maneuver to meet the challenge of Mackie and Flew. A crucial point in the analysis of this chapter arises over the question of whether intentionality, which is a necessary condition for free will, must rise to the level of deliberation between alternatives. I maintain such deliberation is crucial to free will in the fullest sense of the term, in the sense which is required, and for people who are fit to become citizens of the Kingdom of God. But many philosophers have maintained that deliberation is not essential that acts of genuine free will may be spontaneous. Here I rely on the contention that free will is a matter of degree, and my analysis will bear this out. Again, I have no objection to labeling spontaneous acts (so long as they are also uncoerced, intentional, and voluntary) as acts of free will, but I maintain they do not exemplify the highest or fullest type of free will. They do not rise to the level of that sort of rational control that enables a person to alter habitual or spontaneous actions in the light of new circumstances or new evidence. Rational control implies the ability to remain flexible in one’s actions and to choose what one really wants to choose in the light of an up-to-theminute awareness of conditions...

Share