Cultures of Order: Leadership, Language, and Social Reconstruction in Germany and Japan

Notes

Notes CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1. Louis Hartz (1955) was one of the first and most trenchant observers of this cyclic tendency in American politics. 2. Hook 1943. 3. Giants in the postwar study of leadership and public responses to it include Adorno et al (1950) and Lasswell (1948, 1960). 4. Examples of the genre include Runyan (1982) and, in political science , Rustow (1970). A more self-consciously scientific work from this era, when few social scientists attempted serious psychological examinations of leadership, is Hermann (1977). 5. Samuels 2003. 6. Ibid., 23. 7. Patton 1999. 8. Kratochwil 1989, Onuf 1989, Wendt 1987. 9. Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Wendt 1999. 10. Risse-Kappen 1994. 11. As Kenneth Waltz (1979, 89) put it, “the problem is this: how to conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking.” 12. Onuf 2001; Kowert 2001. 13. Kellermann 1957, 57. 14. Doering-Manteuffel 1983, 41. 15. See Schwarz (1981) for a wide-ranging discussion of the domestic interests at stake in postwar Germany. 16. Patton 1999, 1. Patton (1999, 157, note 1) cites four textbooks on German or European politics in support of this claim. 17. Hancock (1989) refers to this tendency in Germany as “democratic corporatism,” whereas Lembruch (1979) calls it “ liberal corporatism.” Hardach (1980) focuses primarily on its economic aspects and sees it as a cartel-like arrangement. Also, see Schmitter’s (1974) classic article on the “century of corporatism.” On Bad Godesberg, also see Patton 1999, 58. 18. Kreile (1977) links Germany’s economic success, for example, to a policy of selective competitiveness through strategic investment in sectors where Germany has a comparative advantage, while “compensating the losers ” to prevent too much social disruption. 157 158 Notes to Chapter 1 19. Hanrieder 1989, 331. 20. Ibid., 333. 21. Katzenstein 1997, 2. In an earlier work, Katzenstein (1987) provides an important statement on the web of constraints within German state-society relations that acts as a check on German policy making. An excellent reexamination of this phenomenon is Green and Paterson 2005. 22. Bulmer 1997, 79. 23. Anderson 1997, 85. 24. Doering-Manteuffel 1983, 36. 25. Ibid., 161. 26. McAdams 1993, 31; Doering-Manteuffel 1983; and Artner 1985. 27. Artner 1985, 3. 28. Drummond 1982, 11, 99. 29. Ibid., 86. 30. Lipset and Rokkan 1967. 31. Mannheim 1951, 32; cited in Linz 1967, 316. 32. On the notion of international society, see Finnemore 1996a; Linklater 1998; a good related discussion of “security communities” is Adler and Barnett 1998. 33. Onuf 1989. 34. Adler 1997. 35. Kratochwil 1989. 36. Wendt 1999. 37. Wendt 1992. 38. Wendt 1991. 39. Wendt 1999, 371. 40. Finnemore 1996a, 69–88; 1996b. Also see Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. 41. Tannenwald 1999. 42. Price 1997. 43. Klotz 1995. Also see Lumsdaine 1993. 44. Ruggie 1998. 45. Wendt 1994; also see Legro 1996 for another statement on the desirability of theories of state identity in international relations. 46. Wendt 1999, 251–259. Wendt relies heavily on sociological theories of symbolic interaction; see McCall and Simmons 1978, Stryker 1980. 47. For a discussion of these two aspects of state identity, see Kowert 1998/99. Although many constructivists in international relations have emphasized the character or roles of the state, several important works have also taken up the emergence and salience of the nation-state form itself. Hall (1999) gives a general, historically nuanced account of this process over the span of several centuries. Reus-Smit (1999) examines other institutional forms on which state identity relies. And Spruyt (1994) explores the way the state resisted threats from its chief institutional competitors. 48. Hopf 2002. 49. Neumann 1999. 159 Notes to Chapter 2 50. Ringmar 1996. 51. Boulding 1956, 6–7. 52. Ibid., 109–110. 53. Kissinger 1957, esp. ch. 10; Cottam 1977, ch. 2. See also Jervis’ (1970) work on The Logic of Images in International Relations. And, on status quo versus revisionist states, see Morgenthau’s (1948) discussion of three national motives: status quo, imperialism, and prestige. 54. Bronfenbrenner 1961; Holt and Silverstein 1989; White 1984. 55. See, particularly, Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995. 56. The objective of German sovereignty was not accepted, of course, by many other policy makers in Europe. France, in particular, sought constraints on German autonomy. 57. Patton 1999, 9. 58. A note about Japanese names: throughout this book, we have followed the convention of many Japanese writers who...