Between Actor and Presence: The European Union and the Future for the Transatlantic Relationship

Chapter 8. European Security and Defence and NATO: Moving from Influence to Activity

8 European Security and Defence and NATO: Moving from Influence toActivity ALEXANDER MOENS Introduction NATO, like it or not, is the key to all security reform in Europe. The tasks it politically accepts and militarilyprepares to undertake define almost the entire realm of securityactivitiesto be assumed by the EU, Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). European security reform has experienced false starts time and again whenever it tried to give the key to another interest, ideal, or organization. Creating one vastsecurity umbrella under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was one such false start. Elevating a European security identity by tying together the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and a revitalized WEUwasanother. The notion that these organizations could interlock their functionsand thus build a structure of organizational security stronger than the sum total of the national interests of the countries involved was an illusion. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, EU states agreed to add security and defence to the Union, including a military planning capacity and a crisis response force. But again, the key question remains how such a force will relate to American capacity through NATO's command and control and defence planning system, and how and when it can draw upon NATO assets should the Americans decide not to send forces. The chief challenge in NATOreform since the end of the Cold War has remained the same: its long-term relationship with the European Union. Nothing is so fundamental to understanding the complex business of European security than that the friendly allies in 170 BETWEEN ACTOR AND PRESENCE NATO and the EU have, besides all their common concerns and goals, different interests and pursue these by means of these two grand organizations. Neither of them is a unified rational actor, but in NATO, American interests are represented as a primus inter pares, while in the EU, French-led Europeanist interests enjoy enough support to claim that status in the political realm. From the perspective of French-led "Europeanism" (greatpower concert for a strong Europe), the quest is to push the EU from a mere influence in European security and defence to a lead actor, with its own decision, planning, and military resources. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was in essence only a political influence, a quest for more "say and do." It was left weak by the fact that its political mandate lay in the EU, while its military capacity remained firmly embedded in NATO. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aims to be an actor that can define its own purpose, prepare for its own activities, and thus become a real player in European military affairs. Britain's decisive move to join France's quest for European "say and do" at Saint-Malo in 1998 was strengthened even more by European resolve in the fall of 1999 not to be entirely dependent on the United States in crises such as Kosovo. However, the military relationship with NATO, as well as formidable challenges in Europe to rationalize and modernize its armed forces, will make ESDP's quest at best a long-term possibility. Every NATO summit and most European Council meetings since 1993 have heralded some form of perfect harmony between these two interests. NATO increasingly has embraced European initiatives in security and defence, and the EU has emphasized its desire for good transatlantic relations. The WEU wasportrayed as the bridge between these twointerests. The demands put on the WEUby the EU and NATOwere never easy to reconcile. EU interests have been most visible in the numerous efforts to construct a European defence identity ever since the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, which formed part of the Maastricht Treaty. The NATO Summit in Brussels in early 1994 endorsed this concept in doctrine, and the Alliance's Ministerial in Berlin in 1996 agreed to begin practical arrangements. The ESDI was to be created by Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) derived from NATO under political control by the WEU. The intent was to make the WEUa more autonomous and meaningful organization and not EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE AND NATO 171 at all in conflict with NATO. CJTF is a straightforward military concept . The objective is to have instead of a static defence posture a mix-and-match force that can be adapted to suit different challenges. "Combined" means assembled task groups...