U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

1. Mimics at War

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'--.Å'.*. I think “Regulations for the Infantry of the United States” will be sufficient.—George Washington to Baron von Steuben, The Writings of George Washington Since English colonization of North America commenced in the early 1600s, the colonists fought wars in the absence of doctrine. While capable of defeating the indigenous population in local engagements, the colonists’ informal practice was less effective when facing well-drilled, conventional European armies. Having rebelled against Britain in 1775, the American Congress and army leadership needed a tactical doctrine capable of forming a cohesive army from among the diverse state militias. For two years, informal battlefield practice contributed far more often to defeat than victory. By mid-1777, the Army had been tactically unable to bludgeon their British opponents into acquiescence. By October, the Army leadership’s inability to regulate the Continental Army’s performance in battle had contributed to the British occupation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the rebel capital. While many Americans believed their rebellion was doomed, a troubled Major General George Washington withdrew a dispirited Continental Army to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. As the winter intensified, a bloodied army licked its wounds and struggled to rebuild. Volunteers arrived at an encampment filled with hardship and despair. Despondency permeated not only Washington’s camp but the thirteen states, as well. Civilians and soldiers alike who had supported the rebellion were growing increasingly pessimistic about their future and the coming campaign season of 1778. Toward an American Army Doctrine On 8 January 1778, Major General George Washington learned of the pending arrival of Frederich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin von Steuben, an experienced Prussian military officer turned opportunistic MIMICS AT WAR : 17 mercenary. This news broke at a time when seasoned officers capable of forging an army were in short supply. After writing a letter of welcome to Steuben, Washington admitted to Brigadier General George Weedon, “I can see clearly that instead of having the proper Officers to assist in arranging, training, and fitting the Troops for the field against the next campaign, that we shall be plunged into it as we were last year heels over head without availing ourselves of the advantages which might be derived from our present situation and prospects.” Steuben’s pending arrival notwithstanding , Washington envisioned the forthcoming campaign season to be no better than the previous.1 Steuben’s advent at Valley Forge on 23 February 1778 provoked mixed reactions from the encampment’s inhabitants. Already present was Thomas-Antoine, Chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis, a veteran of the Battle of Germantown and a respected drill instructor who, perhaps, saw a rival in Steuben. Some, including Colonel Timothy Pickering, distrusted yet another European professional soldier and a Prussian automaton in particular. Familiar with Prussian doctrine, Pickering believed it held no value for American military culture, claiming, “Tis the boast of some that their men are mere machines, but God forbid that my countrymen should ever be thus degraded.” Congress had allowed Steuben access to Washington, so he listened as the Prussian pled his case in French with John Laurens, Washington’s aide, acting as translator. During the course of the conversation, Steuben offered his assistance in any capacity.2 Washington contemplated Steuben’s potential value. Given Prussian Army success on the European continent from 1756 to 1760, having an of- ficer intimate with the inner workings of that army was indeed fortuitous. During early March 1778, in an attempt to rejuvenate an inadequate winter training regimen, Washington decided to appoint Steuben as the Army ’s inspector general. This choice spawned immediate complaints from American officers that foreigners were overly ambitious and that Steuben ’s appointment denigrated those who had served Washington from the beginning. Officers also voiced that their enlisted soldiers might balk at taking instruction from a foreign drillmaster (although the Frenchman Thomas-Antoine had in all probability provided some drill instruction advice). There was also uncertainty over how Steuben might handle an American army composed of partially trained officers and noncommissioned officers leading a multiethnic rabble of transient Whites (both native and newcomer), African Americans, and Indians. More troubling still was that Major General Thomas Conway already served as the inspector 18 : CHAPTER ONE general. But Conway had complained to Horatio Gates that Washington proved to be a weak commander and should be replaced. When the grumblings reached...