U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

Introduction. U.S. Army Doctrine in Historical Perspective

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bWdebWUf[hW It is only analytical that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.—Carl von Clausewitz in On War Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity?—Antoine Henri de Jomini in The Art of War Contemporaries in life, the nineteenth-century Prussian master Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss theorist Antoine Henri de Jomini both wrote about war. While they agreed in many ways, they differed significantly in others. For Clausewitz, war is a dynamic process beyond absolute control and enduring principles. An army operates in the realm of chaos. Its leaders must cope with the intrinsic pandemonium and unique nature of each conflict. To Jomini, methods change in war, but principles endure; the fundamentals of war are simple enough for those with the genius to comprehend it. Despite their differences, both men have nonetheless shaped the perceptions and approaches of U.S. Army leaders toward armed conflict. Clausewitz has held sufficient sway to warrant a cenotaph at the U.S. Army War College. Many discussions of war within the halls of the service ’s Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies consider him. Jomini’s precepts are also present within the Army’s educational institutions, for one cannot deliberate the nuances of campaign design without considering him. 2 : INTRODUCTION Clausewitz and Jomini’s ideas about war illustrate a quandary that has bedeviled army leaders for centuries: How does one reconcile the polar absolutes of chaos and order to achieve national objectives in peace and war? In attempting to answer this important question, the Army has published doctrine. Doctrinal manuals seek to impose a system of equipment , training, organization, and procedure upon the Army, to create a common understanding of individual and unit actions to be undertaken when necessary, and to produce a cohesive force capable of succeeding despite the inherent mayhem of military conflict. Carl von Clausewitz (Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, New York) INTRODUCTION : 3 Given doctrine’s authority in shaping the Army’s preparation and behavior during hostilities and in peacetime, it is not surprising that scholars have produced an immense body of literature dedicated to explaining doctrine’s purpose and effect. While A. J. Bacevich, Andrew J. Birtle, Christopher C. S. Cheng, Robert A. Doughty, Kenneth Finlayson, Paul H. Herbert, L. D. Holder, Jonathan House, William O. Odom, John L. Romjue, and John P. Rose have focused on army doctrinal developments primarily within the twentieth century, Birtle has produced a two-volume series on counterinsurgency doctrine from 1860 to 1941 and 1942 Antoine Henri de Jomini (Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, New York) 4 : INTRODUCTION to 1976. Stephen Ambrose, Harry P. Ball, T. R. Brereton, Archer Jones, Brian McAllister Linn, David R. Mets, Timothy Nenninger, Carol A. Reardon , Roger Spiller, William B. Skelton, and Harold R. Winton explore institutional nuances that have influenced doctrine. Focusing on tactical application in peace and war are Donald E. Graves, Paddy Griffith, Earl J. Hess, Perry D. Jamieson, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., Jay Luvaas, Grady McWhitney, Allan Millett, Steven T. Ross, Robert H. Scales, Ingo Trauschweizer, and Robert M. Utley. Doctrinal implications regarding an “American way of war” and service culture are addressed by John Grenier, Adrian R. Lewis, Linn, and Russell Weigley. Robert M. Citino, R. Clayton Newell, and Michael D. Krause examine the Army’s search for an operational -level doctrine during the twentieth century. Creating doctrine through an examination of intellectual process rests with Noel K. Evans, Herbert, and Romjue.1 Noticeably absent from the existing literature is an overview of U.S. Army doctrine as a singular body of evolving work. Although valuable studies devoted to army doctrine have been produced, none traces the progression of the service’s doctrine by means of the Army’s “keystone” publications, which I define as the dominant manuals that have shaped army operations for over two centuries. This book attempts to address that deficiency. By examining...