Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise

Notes

notes Preface 1. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See at 30–39 for a discussion of the “hands-off” doctrine. 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 3. See Edward Rubin and Malcolm M. Feeley, “Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,” UCLA Law Review 41:903 (1994). 4. See, e.g., Michael Greve, Real Federalism: Why It Matters and How It Could Happen (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999); Robert Nagel, The Implosion of American Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vicki Jackson, “Federalism and the Uses and Limits of the Law: Printz and Principle?” Harvard Law Review 111:2180 (1998); David Sandler and David Schoenbrun, Democracy by Decree : What Happens When Courts Run Government? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 5. We are not alone. There is a marked resurgence of theoretical interest in nationalism and federalism. For a discussion of this literature, see Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), viii–xviii, 73–94. Introduction 1. Daniel Elazar, Federal Systems of the World, 2nd ed. (London: Longman Current Affairs, 1994), xv. 2. Samuel Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge: Belknap, 1993), 386–88; William Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), 7–10; Geoffrey Miller, “Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory,” Social Philosophy and Policy 8:196 (1991), at 205–9. 3. See, e.g., Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich , 1972); Charles Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy 64:416 (1956); Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld, “A Federalist Constitution for an Imperfect World: Lessons from the United States,” in Federalism: Studies in History, Law, and Policy, ed. Harry Scheiber (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Relations, 1988), 74, 84–86; John Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism,” Publius 25:29 (1995). 4. Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld, “The Political Economy of Federalism,” in Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook, ed. Dennis Mueller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 73; Therese J. McGuire, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Social Welfare Policy,” in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, 155 ed. Ronald Fisher (Boston: Kluwer, 1997), 173; Daniel Rubinfeld, “The Economics of the Local Public Sector,” in Handbook of Public Economics, ed. Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987), 2:571; David Wildasin, ed., Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 5. Elazar, supra note 1, at 22–23. 6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, “Rehabilitating Federalism,” Michigan Law Review 92:1333 (1994), at 1334–36. 7. William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signi‹cance (Boston: Little , Brown, 1964). 8. David McKay, “William Riker on Federalism: Sometimes Wrong but More Right than Anyone Else” (paper presented at the Conference on Constitutions, Voting , and Democracy, Center for New Institutional Social Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, December 7–8, 2001), 3–4. See also David McKay, Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 9. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1971). 10. Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda (New York: Crown, 1993); Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Amitai Etzioni, Next: The Road to the Good Society (New York: Basic Books, 2001). 11. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 12. John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 13. Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 67. 14. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). 15. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven Democracies, 1945–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 16. See Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 17. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 22–78; Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of...