Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 1 Introduction Although important studies of the effects of human capital in the market sector can be expected, I anticipate that the excitement will be generated by studies of its effects in the nonmarket sector. —Gary S. Becker, Human Capital As the subtitle suggests, this book concerns the marketability of political skills, where marketability refers to the speed and ease with which securities can be sold and securities represent instruments indicative of ownership or rights to ownership. Applied to politics, then, our inquiry deals with how political skills (or securities) acquired through elected of‹ce translate into salable commodities after politicians leave of‹ce—or, put more simply, the economic value political skill sets (politicians’“human capital”) command in the marketplace. These types of questions do not normally preoccupy political scientists, although economists, particularly labor economists, are no doubt quite familiar with such topics. Yet we have fashioned this inquiry to be more than a ‹rst shot at an economic analysis of the labor market for politicians. It would be more accurate to say that this book concerns the connection of what politicians do in of‹ce to what they do after they leave of‹ce and how political institutions operate in this regard. We demonstrate that the acquisition of marketable human capital through institutional service is relevant if not essential for a broader understanding of politics. The acquisition of human capital within political institutions provides more than just another useful perspective from which to view the actions of politicians while on the job. Of greater signi‹cance is the extent to which this approach yields fresh insights into the operations of institutions and the motivations and behavior of politicians, raising imaginative questions about how and why elected of‹ceholders acquire political skills, the economic effects of doing so, and political institutions’ role in that endeavor. In the process, we touch on important issues about Congress and the legislative process, such as the economic imprint of specialized and general training in congressional politics, the allure of lobbying, the effects of special interest money in legislatures , and the impact of generational changes in congressional membership. We hope that readers expecting a simple account of what happens to legislators after they leave Congress will be pleasantly surprised. Understandably, our analysis supplies different versions of conventional conclusions about politicians, especially legislators; we think of it as only “picking up the other end of the stick” (Kuhn 1996, 85)—that is, expanding the purview of normal or routine inquiry beyond the here and now of politics (for example, elections) to include the postelective careers of of‹ceholders as well. We recognize that theories are merely instruments of inquiry, and other theories may also explain the same set of facts about the postelective employment of legislators. Nonetheless, we are con‹dent that none of these theories can account for the range and diversity of facts, or their interconnectedness, with the degree of simplicity found in applying our set of human capital propositions. One ‹nal point, lest our intentions be misconstrued: we are not attempting to undermine the reelection assumption or any other motivation, for that matter. Nor are we, in the end, hoping to justify the grooming of legislators for lobbying. Ours is merely an earnest desire to better understand why politicians behave in the manner they do and how political institutions shape their actions.We recognize that these are timeless issues in political analysis, but we do not offer our human capital interpretation as the ‹nal word on these matters ; we expect, however, deservedly or not, that our approach will stir substantial controversy, leading to new questions to explore and revisiting old answers , which is always healthy for inquiry. Human Capital in Politics One of the dilemmas tormenting political scientists and economists is trying to explain why candidates literally spend millions of dollars to obtain public of‹ces that provide compensation that amounts to only a fraction of these costs. This paradox has provided fodder for attacks on the blatant corruption of political of‹cials and likewise for assaults on politicians’rationality. The arguments are straightforward: the only reason rational politicians would spend more to obtain public of‹ce than they receive in remuneration is either because they collect quasi-legal pay under the table in addition to their salaries, or because they behave less strategically than rationality would dictate . We believe another explanation exists: political of‹ce represents investments that are expected to accrue value, like any other security. Whereas doctors and...