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37. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), argued No. 05-5104-cv (2d Cir. June 7, 2006). 38. Ibid., 272 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278). 39. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, *48 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). But see In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 40. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *22–23. 41. Ibid., *48. 42. Ibid., *47–48. 43. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550–51 (2001). 44. But see McGraw ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., Civ. A. No. 94-C-1707, 1995 WL 569618, *2 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 6, 1995) (holding that “the Attorney General . . . possesses no common law authority or power” and thus lacks standing to institute or prosecute claims based on unjust enrichment, public nuisance, fraud, conspiracy , and other common-law claims). 45. See M. Elizabeth Magill, “The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law,” Virginia Law Review 86 (2000): 1149 (quoting Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989)). 46. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. II, § 3; Ill. Const. art. II, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX; Mich. Const. art. III, § 2; N.J. Const. art. III, § 1; Va. Const. art. I, § 5. 47. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 161; Jim Rossi, “Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederal Separation of Powers Ideals in the States,” Vanderbilt Law Review 52 (1999): 1191. 48. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Foundation Press, 2000), 133–34. See also Michael C. Dorf, “The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers,” Roger Williams University Law Review 4 (1998): 54–56, 59. But see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (holding that “the concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not mandatory in state governments”); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (“Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate . . . is for the determination of the State.”). 49. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4; see Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 133. In addition , the Seventeenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution refers to both state legislatures and executives. 50. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 16. 51. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995); Harold H. Bruff, “Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution,” Texas Law Review 68 (1990): 1348. 52. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 134. 274 Notes to Pages 203–6 53. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 54. Compare Sanford Levinson, “The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion,” in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 202 (characterizing Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown as “the most truly intellectually satisfying . . . opinion in our two-hundred-year constitutional history”), with Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 273–75 (arguing that the nonjudicial branches of government should be left alone to work out their own differences); Patricia L. Bellia, “Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows,” Constitutional Commentary 19 (2002): 91 (asserting that “the lessons that the case . . . offers . . . are less clear and less helpful than is often believed”). 55. See Rebecca L. Brown, “Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991): 1523. Scholarly analyses of separation of powers typically characterized as “formalist” include Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary,” Harvard Law Review 105 (1992): 1153; Stephen L. Carter, “Constitutional Improprieties: Re›ections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government,” University of Chicago Law Review 57 (1990): 364–76. 56. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582, 588–89. 57. Ibid., 585. 58. Ibid., 586. 59. See Brown, “Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty,” 1527–28; Magill, “Real Separation,” 1142–43. For a functionalist scholarly perspective, see, e...

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