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173 7 The Les­ sons of Third-Party Inter­ ven­ tion? The Cu­ ri­ ous Case of the ­ United ­ States in North­ ern Ire­ land Mary-Alice C. ­ Clancy Since the sign­ ing of the Bel­ fast, or Good Fri­ day, Agree- ­ ment in 1998, a ver­ i­ ta­ ble cot­ tage in­ dus­ try has ­ emerged seek­ ing to ex­ port North­ ern ­ Ireland’s “les­ sons.” One of the most fre­ quently cited les­ sons is the role of “inter­ na­ tion­ al­ iza­ tion”1 in con­ flict res­ o­ lu­ tion and the im­ por­ tance of align­ ing inter­ na­ tional in­ flu­ ence.2 The ­ lesson’s im­ port, how­ ever, is open to dis­ pute. On the one hand, the inter­ na­ tional di­ men­ sion is li­ able to be dis­ torted by those seek­ ing to se­ cure their own leg­ acy in North­ ern Ire­ land.3 On the other hand, some have ­ sought to down­ play its im­ por­ tance, ar­ guing that Brit­ ish, Irish, and ­ American ­ officials’ dis­ putes are care­ fully choreo­ graphed ruses.4 This the­ sis, how­ ever, is under­ mined by a lack of pri­ mary ev­ i­ dence, and those au­ thors who have en­ gaged in field re­ search on this ques­ tion draw op­ po­ site con­ clu­ sions.5 Fo­ cus­ ing on the ­ United ­ States, this chap­ ter aims to pro­ vide a nu­ anced as­ sess­ ment of the inter­ na­ tion­ al­ iza­ tion of North­ ern ­ Ireland’s peace and po­ lit­ i­ cal pro­ cesses.6 It be­ gins with a brief re­ as­ sess­ ment of the Clin­ ton­ administration’s role in North­ ern Ire­ land, ar­ guing that its ten­ dency to side with Dub­ lin when dis­ putes arose ­ between the Irish and ­ United King­ dom (UK) govern­ ments de­ creased the neg­ a­ tive con­ se­ quences as­ so­ ciated with the Irish Re­ pub­ li­ can ­ Army’s (IRA)’s con­ tin­ ued fail­ ure to dis­ arm. This par­ tially ex­ pe­ dited the en­ er­ va­ tion of North­ ern ­ Ireland’s po­ lit­ i­ cal cen­ ter ­ ground by al­ low­ ing the po­ lit­ i­ cal ex­ tremes of un­ ion­ ism and na­ tion­ al­ ism—the 174 Mary-Alice C. Clancy Dem­ o­ cratic Un­ ion­ ist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, re­ spec­ tively—to cap­ i­ tal­ ize on their “eth­ nic trib­ une” ap­ peals.7 Ex­ am­ in­ ing the Bush ­ administration’s role, this chap­ ter dem­ on­ strates that al­ though US pres­ sure was vital in se­ cur­ ing the IRA’s first act of de­ com­ mis­ sion­ ing, the emer­ gence of a pat­ tern sim­ i­ lar to that which ­ emerged in the Clin­ ton ad­ min­ is­ tra­ tion par­ tially ex­ plains the tri­ umph of Sinn Féin and the DUP in the 2003 North­ ern Ire­ land As­ sem­ bly elec­ tions. The ar­ ri­ val of Mitch­ ell Reiss as US spe­ cial envoy al­ tered this pat­ tern be­ cause his de­ ci­ sion to bar Sinn Féin of­ fi­ cials from the White House dur­ ing 2005–6 and re­ strict the ­ party’s abil­ ity to ­ fund-raise in the ­ United ­ States in­ centi­ vized the re­ pub­ li­ can ­ movement’s de­ ci­ sion to de­ com­ mis­ sion in 2005 and to­ endorse po­ lic­ ing in 2007, thus pav­ ing the way for the ­ power-sharing deal in May 2007. While a cur­ sory read­ ing might sug­ gest that UK of­ fi­ cials wel­ comed ­ Reiss’s ac­ tions, a ­ closer ex­ am­ ina­ tion re­ veals that they did not sup­ port ­ Reiss’s wield­ ing of the “stick.” De­ spite the im­ por­ tance of Brit­ ain to the ­ US-led “War on Ter­ ror,” re­ la­ tions ­ between US and UK of­ fi­ cials­ vis-à-vis North­ ern Ire­ land were “nasty.”8 Reiss ad­ mit­ ted that Brit­ ish of­ fi­ cials “weren’t re­ luc­ tant to share their anger” with him.9 The chap­ ter then ­ argues that the var­ i­ ous cri­ ses in the Bel­ fast ­ Agreement’s im­ ple­ men­ ta­ tion ­ stemmed from a cred­ ible com­ mit­ ment prob­ lem en­ gen­ dered by the in­ ap...

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