Korea's Future and the Great Powers

12. Assessing Interests and Objectives of Major Actors in the Korean Drama / Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings

12 Assessing Interests and Objectives of Major Actors in the Korean Drama Nicholas Eberstadt andRichardJ. Ellings In this concluding chapter, we focus on "national interests" of the major state actors in today's unfinished Korean drama, some ofthe possible strategies by which they might attempt to advance their respective positions in the years ahead, and the implications ofsuch interactions for the United States. The Korean Peninsula's eventual political future-in terms of both internal domestic arrangements and the sort of regional order in which Korea finds itself embedded-remains at this juncture highly uncertain. Dramatically different scenarios can be plausibly spun out today-some of them full of promise, others almost unspeakably tragic. Momentous stakes are on the table-and not only for Koreans. For each ofthe great powers ofthe Pacific, the nature of the ending that ultimately unfolds for Korea's long "Cold War" could either promote their country's prosperity, national security, and international influence-or alternatively could compromise these quantities, quite possibly severely. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the outcomes and scenarios most pleasing to American sensibilities will be considered optimal by the other major actors who share an intimate concern with Korea's future. 315 316 NICHOLAS EBERSTADT AND RICHARD J. ELLINGS At the end of the twentieth century, the prospects for great power cooperation in East Asia are more favorable than at almost any point in the past hundred years. On the other hand, we must also recognize that nowhere on earth is there more potential for great power conflict in the new century than in East Asia. The major schisms in this part of the world derive from unresolved issues from World War II and the Cold War (and more broadly from an unfortunate history that permeates the region with deep mistrust) and from the rise ofa dissatisfied China enamored with the notion ofreplacing the United States as the preeminent power in East Asia (or again more broadly: from the varying levels, rates and directions of political and economic development that have been altering the relative capabilities of state actors within the region). Statesmen attempting to craft an effective national strategy for their country's engagement in East Asia must perforce contend with the swirling mix of these factors-and in their calculations, as so many times in the past, will find Korea at the vortex. The pivotal question on the Korean Peninsula itself, of course, is the future of the DPRK. Economically failing and politically calcified, the longterm viability of the present North Korean polity is open to serious doubtand under the pressure of events, systemic changes in North Korea in the years to come may wen be radical and discontinuous rather than gradual and evolutionary. A fundamental alteration of the Korean equation at this date presupposes major changes in the North rather than the South. The ultimate disposition of the DPRK will shape, and possibly recast, the entire East Asian regional order-and the disposition of this troublesome, failing state lies in the hands of South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. Factors within North Korea may be consequential in determining, for example, whether the process of systemic change is inclined to be orderly and peaceful or wracked by violence, yet the ROK and the great powers will ultimately determine the DPRK's future and its place in history through their complex relations and unilateral actions. Today North Korea is, quite obviously, strategically important because ofthe danger its armed forces pose to peace in the region and because hostilities that it might provoke could lead to great power conflict. Yet ironically, North Korea's strategic importance also derives from the fact that it has ASSESSING INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 317 served (albeit inadvertently) as a buffer between wary states that have a modem history of warfare with one another. North Korea forms a buffer between South Korea and its erstwhile Korean War enemy China, and between China and its World War II enemy Japan. The country's military power and location, therefore, dominate strategic thinking regarding North Korea in all capitals of Northeast Asia-aside from modest mineral deposits and a potential pool of disciplined low-wage labor, there is really little else in the country at present to attract foreign interest. As long-term strategic thinkers in these capitals contemplate the related effects that dramatic transformation in North Korea could have on the balance of...