Korea's Future and the Great Powers

10. Negotiating Korean Unification: Options for an International Framework / Robert L. Gallucci

10 Negotiating Korean Unification: Options for an International Framework RobertL. Gallucci In 1997 the topic of an international framework for Korean unification would have entailed an examination of the four-party talks, perhaps with a focus on whether they should be expanded to six or more, or turned into a bilateral engagement. A second fundamental question would have concerned the future of the Agreed Framework-whether it needed to be subsumed into a broader deal or allowed to stand as is. Also among the principal concerns would have been the future of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to ask if this specialized international organization could be the vehicle to carry a substantial burden on the road to reunification. Three years ago, when the Agreed Framework was three years old, the situation was quite different from today. Compliance with theAgreed Framework on nuclear matters was good: the International Atomic Energy Agency was generally satisfied with its inspections; the spent fuel was in the process ofbeing re-canned; ground had been broken for the light water reactor project; heavy fuel oil was being delivered; and KEDO was managing to stay funded and to complete negotiations ofcritical documents. The concern about North 297 298 ROBERT L. GALLUCCI Korean development and export of medium-range ballistic missiles, not explicitly mentioned in the Agreed Framework, was the subject ofU.S.-DPRK negotiations. And perhaps most significantly, the United States was hard at work calculating the virtues and routes to various varieties of "hard" and "soft" landings for North Korea, none doubting that the only question was when, not whether there would be a landing. There were then three questions that seemed particularly relevant. First, would the Republic of Korea do what was necessary with respect to its own domestic economic and financial situation so that when the collapse of the DPRK came, South Korea would be in a position to provide sufficient support for the people in the North to avoid massive flows of refugees south? Second, what role might Japan play, particularly with respect to the reparations that had been contemplated? And finally, would the passing of thenSouth Korean President Kim Young Sam from the scene fundamentally change the atmosphere between North and South? Now, six years after the signing of the Agreed Framework, a series of developments have fundamentally redefined the situation. While most of what has happened is hardly helpful to advocates of near-term, peaceful reunification , one development clearly falls into the good news category: the election of Kim Dae Jung as president and his dogged commitment to the so-called "sunshine policy" toward the North. Yet for advocates ofpeaceful reunification, three negatives stand out. The first is the nuclear issue. After it was revealed that there was at least one underground site in North Korea where construction apparently was under way related to a secret nuclear program, advocates ofthe Agreed Framework had to contend with the real possibility that the North was cheating on its commitments. The news raised questions about whether the North Koreans ever intended to give up their nuclear weapons program and exactly how far along they were in regenerating it. Now that the North has been persuaded to accept an on-site inspection, KEDO remains viable, as does the Agreed Framework. What we learned is just how quickly we could be driven back to "June 1994," when the imposition of UN sanctions had Washington preparing to enhance the U.S. military posture in Northeast Asia to deal with a possible DPRK military reaction to sanctions. Whatever happens in NEGOTIATING KOREAN UNIFICATION 299 the coming months and years, it is clear that ifconcern about a secret nuclear program rises again, financing for the light water reactors and heavy fuel oil will be in deep trouble and KEDO's survival will be at stake. A second issue is the development and export of medium-range ballistic missiles. The West regretted the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. But these tests were made all the more threatening to stability on the Asian subcontinent by Pakistan's test of a medium-range ballistic missile , developed with assistance from North Korea and actually very similar to the DPRK's No Dong missile. Later, another medium-range ballistic missile was tested, this time by Iran. It was also very similar to a No Dong, following assistance supplied to Iran by the North Koreans. Finally, to...