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7 / Who Will Defend British Columbia? Unity of Command on the West Coast, 1934–42 galen roger perras Autonomy in the face of centralizing forces emanating from the United States has long been a vital theme in Canadian history, but one strand inparticularhasattractedCanadianintellectualsandnationalists.Giving“critical emphasis to Canada’s lack of domestic and socio-economic and external political independence from the United States and the world centred upon it,”1 the peripheral independence school is unique in that its adherents range across the political spectrum—from Donald Creighton’s and George Grant’s bemoaning of the decline of the British connection to the Marxist/neocolonialist musings of John Warnock and Gerard S. Vano.2 Common to all is the view that Canada has long been an American handmaiden, unable or unwilling to resist Washington’s biddings. Peripheral dependence, however, has not gone unchallenged. Many prominent historians maintain that the Canada–United States relationship, far from being that of master and slave, is best described as an asymmetrical partnership dominated by ambivalence and periods of convergence and divergence. West Coast unity of command is an issue that demonstrates that these differing viewpoints need not be mutually exclusive. Concerned Canada was not doing enough to protect its vulnerable West Coast, from 1934 until 1942 the United States explored ways to integrate British Columbia into an Americanled system of unified command. But the much more powerful United States did not prevail against the weaker Canada, a Canada that was unconvinced of the threat to the eastern Pacific, united by a desire to preserve national sovereignty in the face of perceived U.S. imperialism, and confronted by an 181 ambivalent ally that could not duplicate Canadian unanimity nor convince President Franklin Roosevelt to intervene personally. Ironically, Canada’s victory may have proved, in fact, its military dependence. The air power prophet William Mitchell was the first American to advocate integrating western Canada into the American strategic system. Testifying before a presidential aeronautical board in 1925, the former army air service o‹cer wanted to transform Alaska into an aerodrome from which waves of bombers could sally forth against Japan in a future conflict. Pointing out that Canadian aid would be vital to make this dream reality, Mitchell was convinced such assistance would be forthcoming as Canada was “as much exposed to this danger [Japanese attack] as we are ourselves and Canada looks to this country for protection in an eventuality of this kind, rather than to Great Britain.”3 Mitchell was a man before his time. Not only did much of the U.S. military reject his air power notions, but it was slow as well to view Canada as anything but a potential adversary at the side of a hostile Anglo-Japanese coalition ; well into the 1930s U.S. o‹cers continued to formulate “Red” plans to deal with a war with Britain, plans that emphasized invasions of Canada.4 But by 1934, facing considerable public criticism for its disastrous attempt to deliver the mail, the army air corps was very eager to demonstrate that its new aircraft were capable of long-distance operations, and Canadian assistance was required. Therefore, in May 1934 the War Department asked Canada to allow twelve bombers to fly to Alaska across western Canada, arguing that the mission was designed “to further friendly diplomatic relations with Canada and to conduct a goodwill flight to Alaska.”5 Precedent favored the United States. Canada had agreed in 1932 to an overflight agreement, but that pact applied only to the eastern half of North America because the Canadian military, citing concerns about security and sovereignty,hadadvisedagainstallowingU.S.militaryaircrafttoflyoverwestern Canada.6 But Chief of the General Staff A. G. L. McNaughton feared setting quite a different precedent. McNaughton had long been concerned that the previous one hundred years of history had demonstrated a pattern of consistent U.S. imperialism and hegemony in the western hemisphere. In 1931, McNaughton had formed a special joint services subcommittee to study the possibility of Canadian neutrality in a war between Japan and the United States.Thesubcommitteewarnedthatif CanadacouldnotpreventJapanfrom operatingnearBritishColumbia,theU.S.militarymightseizeCanadianbases. Furthermore, expecting that American planes would overfly British Columbia to and from Alaska, the subcommittee concluded that “it would doubtless 182 galen roger perras commend itself to the Canadian government to exercise great forbearance to the United States in this matter so long as it could convince Japan that it was not deliberately conniving at unneutral service.” Intent on preventing the United States from gaining...

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