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1 / The Spirit of Sino–Iranian Relations: Civilization and Power the bitter “humiliation” of the non-west W hen delving into Sino-Iranian relations, one quickly encounters an abundance of rhetoric about ancient civilizations, millennia of friendly interactions, common oppression at Western hands, and so on. One also encounters expressions of esteem for the other’s influence. What is one to make of this rhetoric? Should it be set aside, and relations explained entirely in terms of concrete interests? It is clear there existed such interests underpinning Sino-Iranian cooperation in various periods: containing the Soviet Union in the 1970s, countering u.s. hegemonism in the 1990s, developing the economies and military forces in their own countries, supplying and consuming energy, and so on. It also quickly becomes apparent that it was these interests, and not free-floating civilizational solidarities, that primarily motivated Beijing and Tehran to cooperate. And yet the two sides fell back repeatedly to this civilizational rhetoric, as though it reflected a basic meeting of the minds, a deep kinship. The more prominent the interaction , or the more di‹cult the situation facing the two powers, the greater theuseof thiscivilizationalrhetoric.Atcriticaljunctures—openingorrepairing relations, initiating new areas of cooperation, and addressing questions of war and peace—the two sides typically resorted to this rhetoric. Rhetoric of civilizationalsolidarityseemedtobeasortof emotionalbondingthatplayed a significant role in the relationship. The rhetoric seemed to be useful. It seemed to lubricate the process of Sino-Iranian cooperation. In thinking through this problem, I concluded that this civilizational solidarity constitutes a sort of spirit of Sino-Iranian relations, a worldview and 3 state of mind used to frame relationships. Civilizational rhetoric functions as symbols used to evoke underlying value-laden beliefs related to the modern histories of the two nations. The spirit of Sino-Iranian relations arises, I believe, from the fact that both were among the most accomplished, powerful , and durable kingdoms created by humankind since the beginning of urban settlement—and that these rich and proud kingdoms were brought low and stripped of their earlier high status by Western powers during the modern era. At least, this is the belief shared by Iranian and Chinese nationalist narratives. There is a tendency to dismiss Chinese and Iranian civilizational rhetoric as unimportant boilerplate, opening lines, gong clanging, or atmospheric music. I take a diªerent view. I believe this rhetoric provides symbols reflecting and linked to belief systems that in turn trigger certain emotional and normative responses. For both China and Iran this rhetoric is linked to beliefs about what happened over the past several centuries, along with corollary resentments, hatreds, and sympathies for others. What is involved is the constructionof self andgroupidentity—beliefsaboutwhooneis,whatoneaspires to, and about whom others are and their aspirations. Reference to a similar American civilizational spirit may clarify my argument . A sense that America has a mission to advance liberty in the world has run like a red line throughout its history. That idea has taken many different forms, from a “city on the hill” in colonial Massachusetts, to an “empire of liberty” in the early nineteenth century, to the anti-Communist crusade of the Cold War, to the neoconservative argument for intervention in Iraq in 2003. That American self-identity of mission of liberty did not translate always and everywhere into u.s. foreign policy; when it did, that translation was not necessarily direct or simple. Nor does reference to this American civilizational spirit rule out reference to self-interest or self-aggrandizement. United States foreign policy was often a complex mix of idealistic mission and crass self-interest. Chinese relations with Iran are similar, I have concluded . Proper understanding requires appreciation of both beliefs and interests. I do not mean to suggest that Iran looms as large in the Chinese spirit as “freedom” does in the American. Few Chinese know or think much about Iran.1 The Chinese spiritual equivalent of “liberty” in American civilization is the deep sense of victimization and grievance associated with China’s “century of national humiliation.” But when the Chinese foreign policy elite does think about Iran, they tend to do so in terms of China’s fall via national humiliation from ancient greatness. They tend to see in Iran’s modern fall from greatness confirmation of their beliefs about China’s national humiliation, 4 sino-iranian relations [3.22.119.251] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 08:08 GMT) and China’s modern relation with Iran is seen...

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