Amchitka and the Bomb: Nuclear Testing in Alaska

4. Nuclear Alaska

4 / NUCLEAR ALASKA I have caught a bear. 'Bring it here: It won't let me. -from Native lore The predicament of the human and the bear-the trapper and the trapped-is a fitting symbol of the nuclear age. "We" had the bomb, but it just as surely had "us:'Which one really dominated, the man or the bomb, was difficult to know. In Native lore, the uneasy relationship between man and bear taught a lesson in humility. But having the ultimate weapon engendered little humility in the man, especially in Alaska. As previously noted, the Territory was identified for a role in atomic development in the eady 1950S when the Aleutian Islands were being investigated for test sites. An Anchorage Daily Times editorial, "Atomic Diplomacy in Alaska," hailed this development as an enhancement of national security. Alaska's "atomic playground" was surely selected for its proximity to the Soviet Union. Even if open to observation of atomic tests by Russian submarines , the editor mused, the United States should now be "ready to give the Kremlin some sort of peek into what happens when this nation plays with atoms:' He went on to point out that the state ofAlaska actually could offer the United States military an even better spot than the western Aleutians for such display of power. Perhaps "Uncle Sam" could have Little Diomede Island in the northwest Bering Strait. "the rock that is separated from Russia by only two miles of water." Possibly, the United States government could even arrange for "some ofthe debris ofthe blast to fall on Russian soil" and impress them by shaking "the shingles off their rooftopS."l To the extent that this editorial musing was written with "tongue in cheek." the 103 Inupiat (Eskinto) people of Little Diomede village most likely failed to see the humor. In a more serious vein, the editorial went on to argue that picking Alaska for atomic testing demonstrated "realistic thinking" on 40 NUCLEAR ALASKA 41 the part ofWashington, D.C., strategists. An atomic presence in Alaska would counter military installations on Russia's Chukchi Peninsula only fifty miles away from Alaska's Seward Peninsula. From Chukchi Peninsula, after all, atomic bombs could be launched against the United States. If further justification were needed, the editor reminded his readers that this type ofAlaskan atomic diplomacy would be similar to President Theodore Roosevelt's show ofstrength by sending battleships around the world in 1907. What the editor failed to mention was that now, in 1951, the implications of power demonstrations were clearly more dangerous.2 The editor's boosterism and baiting of the Soviet Bear represented more than just journalistic bluster. It underscored the fact that Alaska occupied a vulnerable position in the weapons race spawned by the Cold War, which in turn precipitated immediate concerns about civilian defense. Reflecting this awareness, Territorial Governor Ernest Gruening and Congressional Delegate Bob Bartlett testified in a 1951 United States Senate armed services subcommittee hearing that Alaska needed underground bomb shelters but could not afford the estimated five million dollars it would cost to build them. The shelters should hold 22,000 people each and would double as hospitals in emergencies. The two pointed out that fully 67 percent of Alaska residents lived in possible target areas. In a further plea for civilian defense planning, a Federal Civil Defense Administration official also testified before Congress that over 90 percent ofAlaskans lived in framed housing that would provide no protection from the bomb. This vulnerability, coupled with an attack in winter, would surely create great suffering from exposure to the elements. «Quite possibly;' he predicted, "the Territory would be the first to suffer under an enemy attack."3 The Defense Department had, in fact, anticipated possible Russian attacks on the interior of Alaska and the Aleutians in order to neutralize United States military bases located there. Given the discouraging course taken by the Cold War in the late 1940S and early 1950S, it is hardly surprising that the Defense Department had made plans during this time to secure the protection of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. One of the earliest of these defense plans, Operation Dropshot, was premised on the possibility that the Soviets might at some future time decide to bomb Alaska in order to safeguard their Siberian military installations. With this prospect in mind, the Defense Department , beginning in 1949, directed increasinglylarge appropriations to secure Alaska and the Aleutian Chain against a preemptive strike. For the next five years...