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3/ Taiwan's "Pragmatic Diplomacy" In one sense, Beijing's military intimidation of 1996 was directed at the intellectual and political trends described in the last chapter. Those trends had given rise, however, to particular diplomatic activities on the part of Taiwan-aimed at securing for Taiwan protection of the legal norms of the international community-that provided the proximate targets for Beijing's protests and threats. The specific actions that offended Beijing can be subsumed under the term "pragmatic diplomacy./1 The starting point was the ROC decision to no longer contest the legitimacy of the PRC'S rule of the mainland. When Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as Taiwan's paramount leader in January 1988, the formal position of the ROC was that it constituted the legitimate government of all of China, including the mainiand . Taiwan was indeed a province of China-that is, the ROC, whose territory included mainland China as well as Taiwan-and China's legal government happened to reside in Taiwan. That traditional position began to change in the 1990s, driven by the expansion of economic relations with the mainland and intensifying political competition within Taiwan. In April 1991 Lee's government terminated the 1948 National Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion, which had provided the legal basis for the KMT'S authoritarian rule over Taiwan. This action ended, at least from Taipei's perspective , the civil war that had existed across the Strait for four decades. The month before the 1948 law was terminated, the Mainland Mfairs Council, an organ of TaIwan's government set up to handle expanding relations with the mainland, issued new Guidelines for National Unification . After elaboration in the following months, those guidelines formally abandoned the ROC'S claim to sovereign jurisdiction over the mainland and recognized the jurisdiction of the PRe there. They spoke of "one China" defined by common historical, geographical. cultural, and ethnic factors. Within that "one China," however, there existed "two political entities," between which the eventual political unification of China would be achieved on the basis of "parity." 27 28 Taiwan's "Pragmatic Diplomacy" Beijing was disturbed by the assertion of "two political entities" in Taipei's new guidelines. But at least the guidelines spoke of "one China" and of the objective of "national unification." The most troubling aspect from Beijing's perspective was the demand for "parity." Two "political entities" with distinct territorial jurisdictions could conceivably be fit into the framework of "one country, two systems" advocated by Beijing. "Panty," however, contradicted the subordination implicit in the "one country, two systems" doctrine. Most important at the time the guidelines were issued in 1991 was the fact that, by recognizing PRe jurisdiction on the mainland, the guidelines paved the way for increased crossStrait economic cooperation. The guidelines provided the political-legal basis for Taiwan's establishment of the SEP, and that organ in turn handled the host of mundane problems arising from the new and expanding economic and cultural relationship, making possible the blossomIng of cross-Strait economic relations. More disturbing was the redefinition of "one China" implicit in Tai· pei's new thinking. Under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, "one China" had referred to a state organization, the Republic of China, which, the Chiangs insisted, exercised sovereignty over the entire mainland . Ironically, this claim was acceptable to Mao Zedong, perhaps in part because of its very implausibility. Under Lee Teng-hul, "one China" referred no longer to state organization, but instead to a set of shared characteristics that create a sense of Chinese ethnicity: language, history , customs and rituals, and so on. Emphasis on these factors coin· cided with the cultural nationalism that emerged in China after the Beijing massacre and differed sharply from the symbols of Taiwanese distinctness advocated by the DPP, and for these reasons was not entirely unacceptable to Beijing. It had the drawback, however, of making possible the embrace of multiple state organizations within the framework of I'one China." Throughout 1992 the SEF and ARATS discussed the concept of "one China" in preparation for a meeting of their respective heads to conclude agreements dealing with matters such as repatriation of illegal migrants, verification of documents, compensation for lost mail, and so on. Since these matters required contact between official organs of the two Sides, they inevitably raised the question of the nature of contact. Would interaction be between a local government and a central government , or between two equal governments? Beijing's "one country...

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