Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness

Conclusion: Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness

conclusion best practices Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau I ntelligence reform will undoubtedly continue to be an extremely important issue, and sometime dilemma, for every democratic nation . For those countries that are (or will be) on the path toward democratic consolidation, restructuring intelligence organizations is, as the authors have made clear throughout this book, an exceptionally difficult task, with many pitfalls and no clear road map. It is also obvious that democratic consolidation cannot occur without establishing effective democratic civilian control of the intelligence apparatus.The chapters on the U.S., British, and French intelligence communities highlight the fact that reforming intelligence can also be complex in established democracies. Moreover, the older democracies show that intelligence reform is not a one-time event but, like democracy itself, requires consistent attention, oversight, and institutional engineering if intelligence is to be effective. Just as establishing control in new democracies is a critical step in democratic consolidation, the everpresent threat of global terrorism requires that countries review their respective intelligence communities to ensure effectiveness. advancing democratic control and effectiveness Our intent here is to aggregate some of the lessons learned in this book, as well as through our experiences, in order to provide some of the best practices for restructuring intelligence to support both democratic control and effectiveness, two of the three components of the trinity we established in the introduction. We cannot begin to capture the richness of concepts and data from the ten individual case studies but seek rather to highlight the most relevant themes for scholars and policymakers. steven c. boraz and thomas c. bruneau table 13.1 summary of control mechanisms of the countries examined Level of development of control mechanism Country Executive Legislative Judicial Internal External United States High High Medium High Medium to high United Kingdom High Low to medium Low High Medium France Medium Low Low Medium High Brazil High Low Medium Medium Medium Taiwan High Low Low Medium Medium Argentina High Medium Low Medium Medium Romania High Medium Low Medium High South Africa High Medium Medium Medium Medium Russia Medium Low Low Medium Low Philippines Medium Low Low Low Low It seems obvious that the requirements for asserting democratic control over intelligence resemble those for establishing civilian authority over military institutions. The executive branch should provide the overarching direction for an intelligence community by de- fining its missions; the legislative branch should ensure adherence to organizational, management, personnel, and budgetary structures that are supported in national laws; the judiciary should ensure that intelligence operations are legal and that citizens’ rights are upheld; the IC should organize so that no one agency has all the power, and it should work to instill a professional ethos; and external organizations , such as the media and NGOs, should take their watchdog role seriously. These are fundamental requirements that should be met as minimum standards for democratic control. Table 13.1 summarizes how these five control factors, as illustrated to a greater or lesser degree in each chapter, might be evaluated for each of the countries examined in this book. Effectiveness—except by its absence, as in an intelligence failure— is all but impossible to prove. After all, intelligence is at its most effective when nobody but those directly involved are even aware of it. Yet we believe we can safely assert that effective intelligence depends on a minimal set of requirements. These include a culture that supports the legitimate role of intelligence in a democracy, civilians who are in332 best practices formed and engaged, an interagency process both to coordinate the different intelligence organizations and to challenge assumptions and conclusions, and a cadre of professional civilian and military intelligence officers. Those leaders whowant to exert democratic civilian control and improve the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus must undertake several tasks that, once begun, will continue. They are not necessarily prioritized and should be pursued simultaneously. And although these recommendations might be criticized as U.S.-centric, they are so only because there is much more data available pertaining to the U.S. intelligence community from which we can draw lessons: 1. Raise public interest and pressure. 2. Increase civilian awareness and competence. 3. Institutionalize processes that support transparency and effectiveness. 4. Foster in society and within the intelligence community a political culture that supports the need for intelligence...