In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

129 inTroduCTion 1. Sen. Dial. 1.2.1: quare multa bonis viris adversa eveniunt? 2. Sen. Dial. 1.4.6: calamitas virtutis occasio est. 3. Groh 1987. 4. Pigden 1995, 5. See also Coady 2006a, 1, who nuances the definition but keeps the two essentials, secrecy and plurality. 5. Coady 2006a, 1; cf. Keeley 1999, 116: “A conspiracy of one is no conspiracy at all.” This is in sharp contrast to Roisman’s “notion of a single conspirator, a semantic oxymoron , [who] posed no difficulties for the Athenians” (2006, 158). A semantic oxymoron may in fact be the misapplication of the term, for just as the repetition of the prefix in the word co-conspirator is a tautology, so a single conspirator runs counter to the very etymology of the word in Greek, Latin, and English, with its recurrent prefix syn and con denoting togetherness that assumes more than one agent. However, if we accept Roisman’s “notion of a single conspirator,” then he has identified an abiding difference between Athenian and Roman conspiracy. For Keeley 2007, 140, the regular definition of a conspiracy as composed of a “group of agents” is restrictive and relativized to “non-omnipotent” agents—that is, humans; an omnipotent agent (such as God) has no need to conspire with others to bring about his plans. 6. On the strategies of containment and deterrence, see Pagán 2004, 6, 16, 22–23, 40, 56, 61, 88, 90, 98–99, 124, 129. Phillips 2006, 293, objects that the strategy of containment is not sufficiently proved in the Roman historians’ accounts of conspiracies; however , Roisman 2006, 7, 158–159, discerns similar attempts at containment and deterrence at work in the corpus of Attic orators. 7. Pagán 2004, 6. 8. Keeley 1999, 116. Mandik 2007, 206, synthesizes Keeley 1999 (accepted by Clarke 2002) and the revisions of Coady 2006b, 116–117. 9. Pigden 1995, 20. 10. Moscovici 1987, 154. 11. Moscovici 1987, 162. 12. Tac. Ann. 15.38.1: sequitur clades, forte an dolo principis incertum (nam utrumque auctores prodidere) . . . 13. Tac. Ann. 15.44.2: quin iussum incendium crederetur, “. . . but that it was believed that the arson had been ordered.” noTes noTes to pages 4–7 130 14. Tac. Ann. 15.44.4: deinde indicio eorum multitudo ingens haud proinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis, “then, on their information, a great host was convicted not so much on the charge of arson as for hatred of the human race.” See also Moscovici 1987, 157–158. Tacitus’ text presents significant interpretive obstacles. Does he describe Roman attitudes toward Christians under Nero, or does he import the attitudes of his own time into his account of the fire? What exactly were the Christians charged with? See Bodinger 2002, who asserts that there was no persecution of the Christians under Nero; the persecutions did not take place until the ’70s of the second century c.e. As usual, we must be content to learn more about the historian than the history he records. 15. Louis Blanc,The History of TenYears, 1830–1840,Vol. II, trans.W. K. Kelley (Philadelphia , Lea & Blanchard, 1848), p. 416. Cf. Popper 1966, 95: “Conspirators rarely consumate their conspiracy,” and Pipes 1997, 39: “Familiarity with the past shows that most conspiracies fail.” 16. For the term “refining historians,” see Pigden 1995, 11, citing Lord John Hervey, Lord Hervey’s Memoirs, edited by Romney Sedgwick (London, William Kimber, 1952). At the brink of epistemological uncertainty, historians make plausible connections. “Refining historians” attribute causality in the face of what may simply be accident. Such refining historians are in a sense guardians of history; by asserting causality at critical moments of epistemological uncertainty, they ensure logical explanations impervious to (other) conspiracy theories. To question and probe the refining historians’ assertions of causality are to exhibit a degree of distrust in the sources, their credibility, integrity, and sincerity, and any warrant for such distrust must be justified. 17. This is not to be confused with the cock-up theory, Pigden 1995, 7: “A cock-up is a situation in which an event X is explained by a plan (or perhaps a conspiracy) to bring about Y that somehow goes astray.” 18. Graumann 1987, 247; Groh 1987, 7; Kruglanski 1987; Moscovici 1987, 152–153; Roisman 2006, 157. 19. Girardet 1986, 61. 20. Lincoln 1989, 23–26. 21. E.g.,Tiffen 2005: “Felt’s . . . public identification . . . confirmed that ‘DeepThroat’ existed as they had said, and was not, as some had...

Share