Rousseau on Education, Freedom, and Judgment

4. Judgment and Pity

From the bosom of so many diverse passions I see opinion raising an unshakable throne, and stupid mortals, subjected to its empire, basing their own existence on the judgments of others. (E, 215; 4:494) The first half of Emile’s education is concerned primarily with bodies in motion. First, the practical child-rearing advice of book I focuses on freeing the infant’s limbs from swaddling blankets, shoes, and other unnaturally debilitating constraints. In book II, Emile learns to run and to sharpen his senses. The scientific inquiries undertaken in book III are launched by the question, “Why did this stone fall?” As he approaches adolescence, Emile has learned a thing or two about bodies in motion, and he is little more than a body in motion. “He has a healthy body, agile limbs, a precise and unprejudiced mind, a heart that is free and without passions” (208; 4:488). What he lacks is a soul. References to the soul are noticeably absent in book III; the soul is mentioned only in the course of Rousseau’s advice to avoid any activity that might engage it.1 But the soul (particularly the motion of the soul) takes center stage in book IV. A revolution, no less than a “second birth,” takes place at the beginning of book IV. This second birth refers specifically to the awakening of Emile’s sexuality but more broadly to the birth of his soul. It is the birth of eros in its most expansive sense. Were he to lack all passion, Emile would wither as a human 4 judgment and pity I 86 L Rousseau on Education, Freedom, and Judgment being. “I do not see how someone who loves nothing can be happy,” Rousseau states. It is only with this “second” birth that Emile is “truly born to life” (212; 4:490) and becomes fully human. Emile develops the capacities for attachment, affection, pity, taste, spirituality, passion, and love. In other words, the birth of the soul is the birth of vulnerability. To have a soul is to have the capacity to be moved, whether by pity, gratitude, love, beauty, or reverence—all themes explored in book IV. To this point, Emile has never been moved by anything more significant than cake, having experienced only physical needs. Rousseau sets out to turn Emile into a sensitive being, into a fully human being capable of being moved in a new way that is potentially threatening to Emile’s selfsufficiency and independence. The question now becomes: can Emile be moved by something (or someone) outside himself without being dislodged from himself andbecomingdependentonothers’opinions?Canhesomehowdevelop the passions that make him vulnerable, yet remain invulnerable to his own vulnerability ? In other words, can he allow himself to be moved, yet remain free? In establishing this paradoxical requirement, Rousseau suggests that the source of the soul’s motion must be somehow simultaneously intrinsic and extrinsic to it. His understanding of the soul thus runs parallel to his theory of the social contract, in which he attempts to understand human freedom such that its source is somehow simultaneously inside (expressed in and through the popular sovereignty of the general will) and outside (insofar as the general will is guided by a godlike legislator). Rousseau’s basic goal, then, is to find a way to reconcile Emile’s healthy self-love (amour de soi) with some degree of human interdependence—both erotic and social. He makes the social primary, delaying Emile’s nascent erotic sensibility in order first to develop a more generalized sensibility that can be the foundation of a healthy sociality. The cornerstone of this development is Emile’s education in pity. Throughout his works, Rousseau emphasizes the importance of mutual sympathy and fellow feeling, rather than rationality, as the essential ingredient of social cohesion. The discussion of pity in the first part of book IV of Emile is generally interpreted in this light.2 Since, as Rousseau acknowledges, Emile cannot remain alone forever, the stimulation of his capacity for pity is the necessary first step in forging a healthy connection between him and the rest of humanity. Only then might a natural education be made compatible with civil society. By teaching Emile that he has semblables, or fellows, and by disposing him to experience good will toward these others, Rousseau seeks to reconcile our natural self-love with the requirements of social order. Our natural capacity for pity is what [3.138.125.2] Project MUSE (2024-04...