Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications

Chapter 4: Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World State

The central thesis of Kant’s political philosophy is that rational agents living side by side undermine one another’s freedom so long as they remain in a state of nature. The claim is primarily intended as an account of the legitimacy of existing states: it entails that a state is justified in imposing the rule of law on individuals sharing a territory, because doing so amounts to preventing them from undermining one another’s freedom. But, as Kant noticed , the point also has implications for international relations. A state puts an end to the state of nature among those living on a given territory; but if a plurality of states do so on different territories, then they remain in a state of nature with respect to one another. In such a situation, Kant’s thesis seems to entail that imposing the rule of law upon states, so as to prevent them from undermining one another’s freedom, would be justi- fied. In short, the ideal of universal freedom seems to demand nothing less than the establishment of a world state.1 My aim in what follows is to argue that this radical conclusion does indeed follow from the principles of Kant’s political philosophy. More precisely, I Earlier versions of this paper were presented in the Harvard University Workshop on Moral and Political Philosophy, in the University of Toronto Workshop in Ethical and Political Philosophy , and in the Queen’s University Political Philosophy Reading Group. Shorter versions were presented at the Annual Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association at the University of Western Ontario, and at the Tenth International Kant Congress in São Paulo. The final version of this paper was submitted in 2008. I am grateful to the audiences on all these occasions for their questions and comments. I also wish to thank Christine Korsgaard, T. M. Scanlon, and Arthur Ripstein for invaluable advice and suggestions. 4 realizing external freedom: the kantian argument for a world state Louis-Philippe Hodgson 102 kant’s political theory want to present a detailed Kantian argument for the thesis that states have a duty of right to form a world state—which means, as Kant uses the phrase, that they could justifiably be forced to do so.1 Although I believe that there is much to be said for the Kantian principles I invoke along the way, I do not attempt to defend them here. In that sense, I am putting forward a conditional claim: I argue that if we accept Kant’s starting point, then we find ourselves committed to the ideal of a world state. The claim remains important, however, both because it fleshes out an important consequence of Kant’s political philosophy, and because the consequence is one about which Kant himself had serious misgivings. That said, I should stress that it is not my goal here to elucidate Kant’s cryptic remarks on world government. I state briefly at two points (in sections 2 and 6) why his main qualms about a world state seem to me ill founded; otherwise, my focus is on the positive Kantian argument that can be constructed in defense of a world state rather than on Kant’s own elusive treatment of the issue.2 One might question the point of arguing that states have a duty of right to form a world state, given that any attempt to establish a world state through force would lead to chaos and destruction. But the claim’s importance lies elsewhere. For one thing, it means that we should strive to establish a world state, at least if we follow Kant in thinking that there is a moral requirement to do what right requires (MM, 6:394). What is more, it means that an established world state would be justified in imposing coercive laws on all states—rogue states as well as willing members. In other words, although using force to establish a world state from scratch would be unwise, the fact that doing so is in principle justifiable shows that the legitimacy of a world state would not depend on the actual agreement of states—just as the legitimacy of existing states does not depend on the actual agreement of their citizens. I proceed as follows. I begin in section 1 with an account of Kant’s argument for the state in the case of individuals living side by side. I then explain in section 2 how the problem...