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8 abstraction and heterogeneity Given that we have a rough fix on how Berkeley treated ideas and of the significant philosophical benefit this reading provides to our understanding of Berkeley’s theory of divine ideas, we are now in a position to take note of other important developments in the ontology of ideas as they culminate in Berkeley. If I am right that Berkeley treats ideas as individual quasi substances , then we ought to expect some additional ‘‘fallout’’ from that view. That is, my interpretation should make a difference more broadly in his philosophical system given the centrality of ideas within it. Indeed it does. Here I highlight two additional areas where his ontology of ideas impacts his thinking. The first concerns abstraction, which I will consider initially, and the second his odd belief in the heterogeneity of ideas (best captured by his claim that we do not see the numerically same objects which we touch). I want to emphasize again that it is not my intent to defend Berkeley’s views on abstraction and heterogeneity but rather to provide a more compelling explanation than has hithertofore been offered for why he endorsed such unusual, radical claims. If it also turns out that Berkeley’s positions are also more philosophically respectable, so much the better. 8.1 Abstract Ideas Berkeley thinks ordinary folk make a serious mistake when they unreflectively suppose that commonsense material objects exist independently of their being perceived and understood. He even diagnoses the error: ‘‘If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their abstraction and heterogeneity 219 being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?’’ (PHK 5). Berkeley takes this issue to be of such importance that he devotes nearly the entire introduction of the Principles and considerable space elsewhere to attacking abstract ideas. The topic of abstraction is relevant to my argument for two primary reasons. First, as I endeavor to demonstrate, at least part of what drives Berkeley to reject the conceivability of abstract ideas is his conception of ideas generally as quasi-substantial things. I will out of necessity need to rehash some well-worn ground about the debate between Berkeley and Locke, but my purpose in so doing is to highlight how Berkeley’s thinking about ideas influences his philosophical position on abstraction. Second, what Berkeley has to say about abstract ideas is relevant to the more important discussion of heterogeneity. As a result, we need to be clear about why Berkeley rejects abstract ideas before we can fully understand why he also thinks that ideas are radically heterogeneous. As a final aside, one might argue that any serious treatment of ideas in Berkeley cannot omit reference to abstraction.1 I am not certain that the supposition is correct, but those who hold that opinion will not be disappointed here. 8.2 Kinds of Abstraction Various commentators have identified as many as four different kinds of abstract ideas in Berkeley. Most scholars, following an influential article by E. J. Craig (1968, 425–29), identify three: (1) single quality abstract ideas, where the idea is an individual property separated from its particularities, (2) common quality abstract ideas, where one property seen in many instances is isolated and attended to selectively (determinables, such as color in general), and (3) full representation abstract ideas, where the idea somehow manages to contain the content of every possible instance of a selected property.2 To these three initial types, George Pappas adds a fourth, namely (4) highly generalized ideas of fundamental concepts, like being or existence (2000, 44). My aim here is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 1. George Pappas, for instance, argues at book length that Berkeley’s attack on abstraction is crucial to understanding the esse is percipi principle and the rest of Berkeley’s metaphysics (2000, esp. ch. 2). The arguments of this chapter do not directly engage or contest Pappas’s core claims, as the centrality of abstraction is of less importance to this study than the impact of Berkeley’s ontology of ideas on his abstraction doctrine. 2. Pappas is more specific, arguing that type 3 abstract ideas are general ideas of bodies rather than qualities (2000, 43). [3.138.124.40] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 08:04 GMT...

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