The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia

Notes

— 177 Notes Preface The epigraphs are from R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 39, and H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 429. 1. CPA 11: “Quot autem modis contingat variari analogiam et quomodo, nunc quum summarie loquimur, silentio pertransibimus, specialem de hoc tractatum , si Deo placuerit, cito confecturi.” 2. “Difficultates de analogia, quae satis metaphysicae sunt, ita copiose et subtiliter a Caietano disputate sunt opusc. de Analogia nominum, ut nobis locum non reliquerit quidquam aliud excogitandi.”Ars Logica, p. 2, q. 13, a. 2 (481b30–35). 3. A brief biography of Cajetan, with further references, is in James A. Weisheipl, “Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio),” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. Bernard L. Marthaler et al. (Detroit: Gale/Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 852–55. Introduction 1. A recent suggestion of the ubiquity of metaphor in everyday discourse is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). The authors apparently don’t realize that their thesis is not new, and could be attributed to Aristotle: see Mary Hesse, “Aristotle’s Logic of Analogy,” Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1965): 328–40. 2. There is no comprehensive study of the history of analogy. One reason is that there are diverse phenomena to be taken into account besides the two highlighted here, such as the related but arguably distinct issue of analogy as a form of reasoning or argument (cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966] and Mary Hesse, Models and Analogy in Science [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966]). Second, a history would have to cover the many logical, epistemological, and metaphysical issues that arise in connection with analogy in different fields of thought, from the natural sciences to politics and theology. (Consider how the issues raised in the works by Lloyd and Hesse just referenced would differ from the relevant topics in works on analogical reasoning in jurisprudence or political history, not to mention the topics treated along with analogy in works on natural theology and divine naming ). Moreover, the very approach to analogy itself varies according to the methods and conventions of the various disciplines that have taken an interest in it: in addition to logic, metaphysics, and theology, there is linguistics, epistemology, cognitive psychology, legal theory, social and political philosophy, philosophy of science, etc. The history traced briefly here is that typically thought essential for understanding scholastic considerations of analogy in logic, metaphysics, and theology; a longer version of such a history (although with some important gaps, e.g., Boethius) has recently been traced by Joël Lonfat, “Archéologie de la notion d’analogie d’Aristote à saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 71 (2004): 35–107. A more thorough history is in the third volume of Jacobus M. Ramirez, De analogia, tom. 2 of his Opera omnia (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia “Luis Vives,” 1970). 3. Thepointiswellestablished,butseeG.L.Muskens,Devocisb " obmph( jb< significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem (Groningen: Wolters, 1943) and Pierre Aubenque, “Les origines de la doctrine de l’analogie de l’être: Sur l’histoire d’un contresens,” Les Études Philosophiques 33 (1978): 3–12. 4. On nongeneric likeness in Aristotle, see M.-D. Philippe, “Analogon and Analogia in the Philosophy of Aristotle,” The Thomist 33 (1969): 1–74. On associated meaning, see Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 5. C. Luna, “Paronymie, homonymie qsa p< A fo et analogie: A propos d’un article de J. Hirschberger,” app. 2 in Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories , ed. Ilsetraut Hadot, Philosophia Antiqua 51, fasc. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 153–59. 6. For discussion see Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics”: A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), 118–25. 7. On focal meaning, see G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle,” in Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century, ed. Ingemar Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia , 1960), 163–90. 8. See Philippe, “Analogon and Analogia in the Philosophy of Aristotle,” and Muskens, De vocis b " obmph( jb< significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem. Even Leszl, who insisted on treating analogy as a function of terms (a “logical device”) like focal meaning, conceded that “what Aristotle himself normally means by b " obmph( jb is not the logical device itself, but only the proportion [of things] on which it is based.” Walter Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle: Aristotle’s Treatment of Types of Equivocity and Its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1970), 126–27. 178  — Notes to Pages 4–5 9. Typically analogia was taken to describe quantities in a geometric harmony (e.g., 2:3::6:9), although it seems that even in a mathematical context analogia was a somewhat flexible notion that could apply to other sorts of relationships , such as succession (2:3::8:9) or the relation of a number to its square (2:4::8:64). 10. This extension of the technical mathematical term analogia to other uses is itself a result of discerning nongeneric likeness: qualitative comparison is somehow like quantitative comparison; strict analogia is to relationships of numerical quantity as analogia more broadly speaking is to nonmathematical relationships. So, as a word that gets extended to a new context, the case of analogia in Greek is also an instance of a term becoming subject to diverse but associated meanings. But with this observation we are getting somewhat ahead of ourselves. 11. Simplicius, Ammonius, and Porphyry each take Aristotle’s discussion of equivocation or homonymy as an occasion to distinguish between deliberate and chance homonyms, and then further distinguish homonyms “according to analogy” as a subdivision of deliberate homonyms. On Simplicius’s treatment of analogy in the context of equivocation in Aristotle’s Categories, see Lonfat, “Archéologie,” 63–68. 12. Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor (PL, vol. 64), 166. 13. See the commentary in Jean-Yves Guillaumin’s edition and translation of Boethius, Institution arithmétique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995), 215–16. 14. Given the schema X:Y::Y:Z, Y is the mean of an arithmetic proportion if Y-X = Z-Y. Y is the mean of a geometric proportion if X/Y = Y/Z. Y is the mean of a harmonic proportion if Z/X = (Z-Y)/(Y-X). 15. For instance, see Avicenna, Metaphysica, in Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, ed. S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1977, 1980), I.5, p. 40, and V.5, p. 272. For secondary literature, in addition to some of the historical studies already mentioned, see the work of E.J. Ashworth, for instance: “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 1999 ed. (URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win1999/ entries/analogy-medieval/); “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 399–413, esp. 401; and “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 94–135, esp. 102–3. On especially the Arabic influence, see H.A. Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy, and Maimonides,” Harvard Theological Review 31 (1938): 151–73. On the development of analogy theories in the Middle Ages also see Lonfat, “Archéologie,”; Alain de Libera, “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être,” Les Études Philosophiques (1989): 319–45; and Jean-François Courtine, Inventio analogiae: Métaphysique et ontothéologie (Paris: Vrin, 2005). 16. Compare the two articles by Philip L. Reynolds, “Bonaventure’s Theory of Resemblance,” Traditio 58 (2003): 219–55, and “Analogy of Names in Bona­venture,” Mediaeval Studies 65 (2003): 117–62. 17. Two studies of analogy outside of the more common fields of logic, metaphysics, and theology are Richard Padovan, Proportion: Science, Philosophy , Architecture (London: Spon, 1999), and John E. Murdoch, “The Medieval Notes to Pages 5–9  — 179 Language of Proportions: Elements of the Interaction with Greek Foundations and the Development of New Mathematical Techniques,” in Scientific Change: Historical Studies in the Intellectual, Social and Technical Conditions for Scientific Discovery and Technical Invention, from Antiquity to the Present, ed. A.C. Crombie (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 237–71. 18. Anne Moyer, The Philosopher’s Game: Rithmomachia in Medieval and Renaissance Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 19. One could cite numerous works on analogy in the theology of St. Thomas, but two recent studies are Seung-Chan Park, Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie (Leiden: Brill, 1999), and Gregory Philip Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004). 20. Compare for instance the logical emphasis in Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), with the metaphysical emphasis in James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis: Herder, 1949). A recent entry in this ongoing debate is Laurence Dewan, “St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician,” in Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, ed. R.E. Houser (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 132–45. 21. Cf. George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960). Chapter One 1. M.T.-L. Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1931), 143n2: “En réalité Cajetan ne prétendait aucunement innover, mais restituer la théorie aristotélico-thomiste. . . . Il ne veut pas innover mais restaurer.” 2. Ibid., 35–36. 3. Aloys Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie; Ihr Verhältnis zu Thomas von Aquin (Speyer a. Rh.: Pilger-Druckerei, 1938). 4. I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1: “aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse. . . . Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem. . . . Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse.” 5. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, La synthèse Thomiste, nov. ed. (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer and Cie., 1950), 144–55; Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas’ Theological Summa, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1943), 396–400; Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, 2 vols., trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1934/1936), vol. 1, 214, 224–27; vol. 2, 203–21. 6. Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 418–21 180 — Notes to Pages 9–18 (“Appendix 2: Analogy”). (Maritain called De Nominum Analogia “authentically Thomistic”; 420.) 7. Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941). 8. Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 135–71 (reprinted from New Scholasticism 34 [1960]: 1–42). But note that Burrell portrays Simon as departing from the Cajetanian tradition . Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 202–9; Burrell, “A Note on Analogy,” New Scholasticism 36 (1962): 225–32. The position of Simon and the interpretation of Burrell are considered in chaps. 3 and 8 below. 9. James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis: Herder, 1949); Anderson, Reflections on the Analogy of Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); Anderson, “Some Basic Propositions Concerning Metaphysical Analogy” (with comments and responses), Review of Metaphysics 5 (1952): 465–72; Anderson, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy in St. Thomas,” Thomist 3 (1941): 564–79; Anderson, “Bases of Metaphysical Analogy,” Downside Review 66 (1948): 38–47. 10. Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren, trans., The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being, by Cajetan (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), ix, 7. 11. Jacobus M. Ramirez, “De analogia secundum doctrinam AristotelicoThomisticam ,” in Ciencia Tomista 24 (1921): 20–40, 195–214, 337–57; 25 (1922): 17–38. 12. Jacobus M. Ramirez, “En torno a un famoso texto de Santo Tomas sobre analogia,” reprinted as an appendix to Ramirez, De analogia, in Ramirez, Opera omnia, tom. 2 (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia “Luis Vives,” 1970), vol. 4, 1811–50. (The article originally appeared in Sapientia 8 [1953]: 166–92.) 13. Ramirez, De analogia, 1400–17. 14. George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960). 15. Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’étre d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/BéatriceNauwelaerts , 1963). There is now an English edition, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee : Marquette University Press, 2004). 16. P. Pedro Descoqs, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, 2: 758ff. Descoqs, Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis, vol. 1, 262–71. 17. Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Upp­ sala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktrycheri AB, 1952). 18. E.J. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background,” Vivarium 33 (1995): 57; Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 401; Ashworth , “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Notes to Pages 18–20 — 181 Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 128; Ashworth, “Language, Renaissance Philosophy of,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (New York: Routledge , 1998), 411–15, §4. 19. Edward P. Mahoney, “Cajetan (Thomas De Vio),” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 171–75, §2. 20. Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes: Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 88, 92. 21. Ralph J. Masiello, “The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman 35 (1958): 91–105. 22. Copleston denies that Aquinas “ever abandoned analogy of proportionality ”; Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 2, Medieval, part 2, Albert the Great to Duns Scotus (Garden City, N.Y.: Image, 1962), 74. But Copleston also says, “I venture to doubt whether [Cajetan’s teaching on analogy] represents the view of St. Thomas”; A History of Philosophy, vol. 3, Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, part 2, “The Revival of Platonism to Suarez” (Garden City, N.Y.: Image, 1963), 158. 23. Ramirez, “En torno a un famoso texto de Santo Tomas sobre analogia.” Cf. Ramirez, De analogia, 1473, 1482–88. 24. Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae, vol. 2 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), disp. 28, sect. 3, nn. 14, 17; disp. 32, sect. 2, n. 14, pp. 17, 19, 323. 25. Descoqs, Institutiones metaphysicae generalis, vol. 1, 260–69; Descoqs, Praelectiones theologiae naturalis, vol. 2, 765ff. On Descoqs’ “slightly modified Suarezianism” see Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 238–40. Descoqs discusses Suarez at Praelectiones theologiae naturalis 2: 768. 26. George P. Klubertanz, “Analogy,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 462–63. 27. Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961); McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington , D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). McInerny’s criticism of Cajetan is addressed below in chap. 6. 28. For references to Gilson and those who have followed him, see chap. 3 below where this criticism is addressed. For another discussion of this issue see Gregory Philip Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 154–95. 29. David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Cf. Burrell, “A Note on Analogy,” New Scholasticism 36 (1962): 225–32; Burrell, “Beyond the Theory of Analogy,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 46 (1972): 114–21. 30. Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 36. 31. Ibid., 40. 32. Ibid., 42. 33. Ibid. 182  — Notes to Pages 20–21 34. Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’étre d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 126: “La doctrine de Cajetan sur l’analogie est-elle conforme à celle de S. Thomas?” 35. Ibid., 126–27. 36. John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 73n30; 90n87. 37. Leo O’Donovan, “Methodology in Some Recent Studies of Analogy,” Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 16 (1967): 78. Cf. Michael McCanles, “Univocalism in Cajetan’s Doctrine of Analogy,” New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 18–47. 38. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 122. 39. Paul G. Kuntz, “The Analogy of Degrees of Being: A Critique of Cajetan ’s Analogy of Names,” New Scholasticism 61 (1982): 72. 40. Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Text, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 81. 41. Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 205; Edward A. Bushinski, “Introduction” to The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being, by Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, trans. Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), ix, 5; Edward Mahoney, “Cajetan,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, 171; Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 36–42; Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 11; Robert E. Meagher, “Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual Analysis,” The Thomist 34 (1970): 231, 237; James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969), 93 (this essay also appears in International Philosophical Quarterly 1 [1961]: 468–502, and in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, ed. James F. Ross [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971], 35–74); Jean-François Courtine, Inventio analogiae: Métaphysique et ontothéologie (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 163, 339. But cf. Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 24: “It is not at all clear that Cajetan in his opusculum intends to give an account of St. Thomas’s teachings on analogous naming . . .” 42. Frank R. Harrison, “The Cajetan Tradition of Analogy,” Franciscan Studies 23 (1963): 180; Ralph J. Masiello, “The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman 35 (1958): 92; Michael McCanles, “Univocalism in Cajetan’s Doctrine of Analogy,” New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 18. 43. A typical presentation is Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 35–40. 44. As already noted, Penido and Goergen invoke this claim in defense of Cajetan’s fidelity to Aquinas. The claim that Cajetan’s classification is based on the Sentences passage is made in: Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 205; Harrison, “The Cajetan Tradition of Analogy,” 182; Ralph J. Masiello , “The Analogy of Proportion,” 93, 105; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 5, 11, 12, 17; McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 2–4, 22, 80; Robert E. Meagher, Notes to Pages 21–23  — 183 “Thomas Aquinas and Analogy,” 231; George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 7; Kevin Flannery, S.J., review of McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, in Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly 20 (1997): 34; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 113; Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 42; Seung-Chan Park, Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 358, 404. The passage from Aquinas “inspired” Cajetan’s division, according to Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie, 136, and Henry Chavannes, The Analogy Between God and the World in Saint Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, trans. William Lumley (New York: Vantage Press, 1992), 52. Ian Wilks, “Aquinas on Analogy: The Distinction of Manyto -One and One-to-Another,” Modern Schoolman 75 (1997): 40n12, says that Aquinas’s text “gives rise to the Cajetanian classification in the first place.” And Cajetan “follows” Aquinas’s division, according to Vernon J. Bourke, “Cajetan, Cardinal,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 5. 45. Penido and Goergen both invoke this in defense of Cajetan’s theory, and the claim is also maintained by the now classic critics of Cajetan (Klubertanz , Montagnes, and Lyttkens) who have been followed since by McInerny, Wippel, and many others. To cite some recent works, see Courtine, Inventio analogiae, 339n3 (“C’est sur ce passage du corpus thomasien que se fonde toute la doctrine de Cajétan”), and Park, Die Rezeption, 396–97, 404. 46. On intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, see chap. 5 below; on their role in Cajetan’s theory of analogy, see chaps. 6 and 7. 47. Park, Die Rezeption, 452. 48. E.g., Anderson, who takes himself to be following Cajetan, emphasizes the metaphysical dimension of analogy. See Anderson, The Bond of Being. Marion is typical of critics of Cajetan who say that Cajetan preferred analogy of proportionality because it involves intrinsic denomination. Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 93. On the priority of proportionality, see chap. 7 below. 49. Meagher, “Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual Analysis,” 240. 50. Cajetan’s discussion of analogy in CDEE is taken up again in chap. 6 below. 51. Both Capreolus and Soncinas cited I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1 in connection with their proposed threefold divisions of analogy. Michael Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” Angelicum 70 (1993): 100–102. Fifteenthcentury Thomists apparently found the passage compatible with a threefold division of analogy made by a late thirteenth-century anonymous commentator on the Sophistici Elenchi. See Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” 59–61. Ashworth concludes that “neither Cajetan’s use of Aquinas’s Sentences commentary nor his threefold division of analogy were novel” (61). Chap. 2 will further pursue the historical background to Cajetan’s division; more will be said about the philosophical, as opposed to textual, basis of Cajetan’s threefold division in chap. 6. 184  — Notes to Pages 23–25 52. Philip L. Reynolds’s study of Bonaventure leads him to conclude that with respect to the priority of proportionality, we “should construe Cajetan’s position rather as one of several traditional options than as a misreading of Thomas.” Philip L. Reynolds, “Analogy of Names in Bonaventure,” Medieval Studies 65 (2003): 161–62. 53. This criticism is addressed in chaps. 3 and 5, below. 54. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 21, 30, 36, 46. 55. Anderson, The Bond of Being. 56. DNA §1. 57. However, I will argue in chaps. 5 and 6 below that even this is still a properly semantic and not strictly metaphysical consideration. 58. E.g., Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 418; Anderson, “Bases of Metaphysical Analogy,” and “Some Basic Propositions Concerning Metaphysical Analogy.” 59. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” 409. 60. Ibid., 399. 61. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” 94. Cf. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy and Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley, and Buridan,” in Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 1, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1991), 24. Ashworth also considers views of Dominic of Flanders, Capreolus, and Soncinas in “Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” 68–72. 62. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts, 402. 63. Ibid., 402–3. 64. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 93. 65. Tavuzzi defines the period as extending from 1444 to 1545—i.e., from the death of Capreolus to the opening of the Council of Trent. Tavuzzi, “Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance,” Doctor Communis 45 (1992): 132. 66. Franco Riva, Tommaso Claxton e l’analogia della proporzionalità (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1989). 67. Montagnes suggests that Thomas Sutton and Thomas Claxton are “precursors” of Cajetan, especially that Cajetan “developed” Claxton’s correllation of attribution with extrinsicality, and proportionality with intrinsicality. Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie, 124, 125n33. 68. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 94. 69. Michael Tavuzzi, “Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance,” Doctor Communis 45 (1992): 133–34. 70. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 94. 71. Ibid. Tavuzzi cites Luciano Gargan, Lo studio teologico e la biblioteca dei Domenicani a Padova nel tre e Quattrocento (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1971), 150–51. 72. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 99. Dominic studied under John Versorius (d. 1485), who himself discussed analogy in a Notes to Pages 26–30 — 185 work published in Cologne in 1494 (96n11). Tavuzzi notes that Dominic died in 1479 and so, contrary to the speculations of Marega (CPI xv) and Pinchard (Métaphysique et semantique [Paris: Vrin, 1987], 30, 96n11), could not have been one of Cajetan’s teachers. However, according to Tavuzzi it is likely that Dominic would have taught Soncinas. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 97. 73. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 100–102. Tavuzzi suggests that Soncinas was following Capreolus in his use of I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1. 74. Franco Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano” (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1995). See also Riva, L’analogia metaforica: Una questione logicometafisica nel tomismo (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1989); Riva, Tommaso Claxton e l’analogia della proporzionalità (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1989); Riva, “L’analogia dell’ente in Dominico di Fiandra,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica 86 (1994): 287–322; and Riva, “Il Gaetano e l’ente come «primum cognitum»,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica 85 (1993): 3–20. 75. With my overview of Cajetan’s interpreters, compare the more detailed , but also schematic and essentially compatible, overviews in Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano,” 3–17 and 343–49. 76. I will explore further what Riva describes as the polemic context of DNA in chap. 2, below. 77. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background.” 78. Duns Scotus, Librum Praedicamentorum Quaestiones, in Opera omnia, vol. 1 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968; reprint of Lyon, 1639), 129b–130b. 79. Ashworth, “Suarez,” 75, concludes by considering whether Cajetan or Suarez is “the correct interpreter of Aquinas.” 80. This is not a criticism of Riva. To the contrary, Riva’s scholarship provides much more historical detail than the present study, and the claims that will be offered here about how to interpret De Nominum Analogia could be vindicated only by the kind of thorough and nuanced research presented in Riva’s Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano.” Yet as a history, Riva’s book is more concerned with reading Cajetan in the context of his immediate contemporaries and less concerned with isolating Cajetan’s distinctive theoretical concern. Chapter Two 1. The list of expected elements in a scholastic prologue is not fixed; this one is taken from A.J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages (London: Scholar Press, 1984), 19. Compare, for instance, Cajetan’s own prologue to CPA, which, following the advice of Averroës’ Physics commentary, lists “intention, utility, order [i.e., place among other works in the same subject; alternatively, the end or purpose the work is “ordered” to], division [i.e., order of parts], proportion [i.e., the relation to other 186  — Notes to Pages 30–33 works and subjects], way of teaching [i.e., method of proceeding], name of the book, and subject of the author” (CPA 1). Other scholastic lists include such elements as the purpose or end (causa operis, finis, or causa finalis). 2. CPA 5: “si quaeratur, de vocibus an de rebus principaliter hic tractetur , respondendum est quod de rebus non absolute sed incomplexe conceptis et consequenti necessitate significatis.” While this may sound like a reversal of the Porphyrian/Boethian tradition, which held that the Categories is about “words insofar as they signify things,” Cajetan argues that his position is in fact the same. CPA 4–5: “Idem enim est tractare de rebus ut conceptis simplici apprehensione , et de vocibus ut significant illas sic conceptas, quoniam quicquid attribuitur uni, attribuitur reliquo, servata tamen proportione, quia res sic conceptae et significatae attribuitur ut rei, voci vero ut signo.” For a more extended discussion of this argument, see Joshua P. Hochschild, “Words, Concepts and Things: Cajetan on the Subject of the Categories,” Dionysius 19 (2001): 159–66. 3. DNA §31. Cf. CPA 10–11, 13, and CDEE §21. 4. Aristotle himself apparently had a somewhat different equivocation in mind: the Greek word zôon could mean both animal and picture. But the commentary tradition soon mistook the intended sense, and even sometimes replaced the example, taking anthropôs as equivocal between a picture of a man and an actual man. The misunderstanding (finding an analogy or pros hen equivocation where Aristotle probably intended only pure equivocation) does not make it any less appropriate that analogical usage be addressed in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of univocation and equivocation. In the medieval Latin tradition the notion of analogy as a mean between univocation and equivocation can be traced to Porphyry (transmitted by Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis), to Pseudo-Augustine (Categoriae Decem), and to Simplicius’s commentary on the Categories (in the translation of William of Moerbeke). 5. CPA 11: “Quot autem modis contingat variari analogiam et quomodo, nunc quum summarie loquimur, silentio pertransibimus, specialem de hoc tractatum , si Deo placuerit, cito confecturi.” 6. On translating “ratio” as “concept,” see chap. 5. 7. CPA 8. 8. CPA 11. 9. Indeed, it is the precision of Cajetan’s parallel definitions that allowed Bochenski to apply the tools of twentieth-century formal mathematical logic to articulate Thomistic notions of analogy. I.M. Bochenski, “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948): 425–77. Bochenski’s paper was reprinted with corrections in Logico-Philosophical Studies, ed. Albert Menne (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1962), and in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, ed. James F. Ross (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971), 99–122. 10. “Pour mieux situer le lecteur, si besoin est, rappelons que le présent Traité est un traité de Logique.” Hyacinthe-Marie Robillard, De l’analogie et du concept d’être de Thomas de Vio, Cajetan: Traduction, commentaires et index (Montreal : Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1963), 218. 11. Robert Meagher, “Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual Analysis ,” The Thomist 34 (April 1970): 240, 241. Notes to Pages 34–37  — 187 12. Meagher cites pages 35, 91, 93, and 98 of Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). The views articulated there appeared subsequently as well in McInerny, Studies in Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 105–6, 108; McInerny, “The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine,” in Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations (Washington , D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986); McInerny, “Saint Thomas on De hebdomadibus,” in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 90; McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1990), 238; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 11. 13. Against the exaggerated claims of Robert Meagher, see for instance McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 34, 75. McInerny’s criticism of Cajetan will be addressed in chap. 6. 14. Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren, The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), 6. 15. Not surprisingly, other commentators have described Cajetan’s concern in De Nominum Analogia as semantic. James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy, 36, says “‘being analogous’ will signify a semantical property of a term in several of its instances.” David Burrell, in “Religious Language and the Logic of Analogy : Apropos of McInerny’s Book and Ross’ Review,” International Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1962): 643, in a note to the claim that analogy is a “logical doctrine,” says: “‘Logical’ is used here in the comprehensive scholastic sense of the science of the argumentation whereby one proceeds from what is known to what is unknown. . . . As such it includes the study of words and their meanings as preliminaries to reasoning, as well as formal deductive procedures. We should say rather: ‘analogy is a semantic doctrine.’” See also Bruno Pinchard, L’Analogie des Noms, in Metaphysique et semantique: La signification analogiques des termes dans les Principes Metaphysiques (Paris: Vrin, 1987), although Pinchard’s approach to “semantics” is itself idiosyncratic. For the point that medieval logic in general is closer to what we today call semantics than to the mathematical formalism often associated with modern logic, cf., e.g., E.J. Ashworth, “Logic, Medieval,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1998), §4: “The purpose of logic had nothing to do with the setting up of formal systems or the metalogical analysis of formal structures. Instead, it had a straightforwardly cognitive orientation.” Cf. also Ernest A. Moody, “The Medieval Contribution to Logic,” Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic: Collected Papers, 1933–1969 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 387–90: “The historical significance of medieval logic seems to lie in the part it played in disclosing the insecure semantical presuppositions of the Aristotelian logic of terms. . . . What medieval logic has to contribute, to the further development and enrichment of modern logic, is [a] semantical bridge between the abstract, axiomatically derived, formal system of modern mathematical logic, and the concrete, empirically oriented forms in which natural languages exhibit the rational structure of experience on its phenomenological level.” 188  — Notes to Pages 37–39 16. CDEE §21: “Univocata sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est eadem simpliciter. Pura aequivocata sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est diversa simpliciter. Analogata sunt quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est aliquo modo eadem, et aliquo modo diversa seu secundum quid eadem, et secundum quid diversa. . . . Unde analogum est medium inter purum aequivocum et univocum, sicut inter idem simpliciter et diversum simpliciter cadit medium idem secundum quid et diversum secundum quid.” It is worth remarking that, although he has replaced Aristotle’s “dicuntur” with “sunt” in rephrasing the definitions of univocals and equivocals, Cajetan should not thereby be assumed to have ignored or failed to appreciate the import of Aristotle’s wording. Cf. CPA 9: “Signantur quoque dixit «dicuntur» et non dixit «sunt», quia rebus non convenit aequivocari ut sunt in rerum natura, sed ut sunt in vocibus nostris. Aequivocari enim praesupponit vocari, quod rebus ex nobis accidit.” 17. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 403. 18. Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, lib. I (PL, vol. 64, 166b–c); PseudoAugustine , Categoriae Decem, §17 (PL, vol. 32, 1421–22). 19. I.M. Bochenski, “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948): §16. 20. See chap. 4 for a discussion of what Aquinas has to offer on this matter. 21. The influence of Scotus’s arguments on the development of Thomistic theories of analogy, including Cajetan’s, has been widely noted. See, e.g., Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1963), 125, 154; Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes: Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 79ff.; Joseph J. Przezdziecki, “Thomas of Sutton’s Critique of the Doctrine of Univocity,” in An Etienne Gilson Tribute, ed. Charles J. O’Neil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), 189; Patrick J. Sherry, “Analogy Today,” Philosophy 51 (1976): 443; E.J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,” in Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 1, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1991), 25; Aloys Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie; Ihr Verhältnis zu Thomas von Aquin (Speyer a. Rh.: Pilger-Druckerei, 1938), 31–32; Michael Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” Angelicum 70 (1993): 93–94; Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 121. The influence on Cajetan of some particular followers of Scotus is considered by Franco Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano” (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1995), 25–36, 89; see also Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 401, and Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 1999 ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win1999/entries/analogy=medieval/, §7. 22. Accordingly most other attempts to give historical context to Cajetan’s treatise emphasize the controversy over the concept of being. Cf., e.g., Montagnes , La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 150ff. Notes to Pages 39–42  — 189 23. Robert Prentice, “Univocity and Analogy According to Scotus’s Super Libros Elenchorum Aristotelis,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 35 (1968): 42–47. 24. Duns Scotus, Commentaria Oxoniensia, I, d. 3, qq. 1 & 2, a. 4, ¶346, ed. Marianus Fernandez Garcia (Florence: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1912), 309: “conceptum univocum dico qui ita est unus, quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem: sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri.” 25. As Franco Riva has noted, Trombetta’s Scotistic defense of univocity rests in part on the denial that a nonunivocal concept can be the subject of a science. Franco Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano,” 32: “La difesa dell’univocità da parte di Antonio Trombetta si lascia cogliere secondo . . . la negazione che un concetto non univoco possa essere soggetto di scienza.” 26. Duns Scotus, In Librum Praedicamentorum Quaestiones, q. 1: “ubi est idem conceptus, ibi est univocatio.” Cf. In Libros Elenchorum Quaestiones, 2 (Paris: Vives, 1891), 20a–25a. For more references and discussion see Prentice, “Univocity and Analogy According to Scotus’s Super Libros Elenchorum Aristotelis ,” 39–64. 27. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic,” 25. Cf. Burrell, “A Note on Analogy,” 226: “Any concept, in so far as it is one concept, is univocal.” 28. Ross, Portraying Analogy. 29. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language. 30. Actually, as suggested in the previous chapter, the polemic context is more complicated. As Riva has shown, Cajetan is responding not only to Scotus but to other Thomists. But Cajetan (implicitly) criticizes the alternative “attributionistic ” Thomistic school because he finds the analogy of attribution insufficient to satisfy Scotus’s semantic challenge. 31. For citations and excerpts of texts, see Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy.” Tavuzzi also cites Soncinas, Super artem veterem (f. 19 r–v), published in 1499—the year after Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia —which explictly addresses the fallacy of equivocation. On Dominic, see Franco Riva, “L’analogia dell’ente in Dominico di Fiandra,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica 86 (1994): 287–322, and Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano,” 140–46, 154–59, 344. 32. Thomas Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 33 (5th objection and reply), ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften , 1977), 911, 929. 33. CDEE §21: “quod cum talis unitas apud Aristotelem (IV Metaph. [6], text. com. II) sufficiat ad objectum scientiae, ens non oportet poni univocum ad hoc quod passiones habeat et contradictionem fundet, et reliqua hujusmodi habeant sibi convenientia.” 34. Cajetan’s remarks on analogy in CDEE are discussed at greater length in chap. 6. 35. Cf. DNA chap. 10, esp. §§104, 106, 113. Bochenski noticed the importance of this issue in De Nominum Analogia and in considerations of analogy 190 — Notes to Pages 42–44 generally, and concluded his application of modern methods of formal analy­ sis to the issue of analogy by evaluating different conceptions of analogy on the basis of whether they allow for the validity of syllogisms with analogical middle terms. Bochenski, “On Analogy,” §§12, 14–19. Among those others who have noted that Cajetan was interested in avoiding the fallacy of equivocation are Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 3, part 2 (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1963), 158, and James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), 260. 36. Patrick J. Sherry seems to have missed the connection between the motivation to respond to Scotistic arguments and the necessity of characterizing the unity of the analogical concept. After noting, in more detail than most scholars, that Cajetan specifically wanted to respond to Scotus’s argument that nonunivocal concepts cause the fallacy of equivocation, Sherry immediately says that Cajetan’s “promising logical approach is marred by Cajetan’s ‘ideational’ theory of meaning, which leads him to devote a disproportionate amount of time to explaining how there can be a single analogical concept.” Sherry, “Analogy Today,” 443. 37. Robillard is sensitive to the semantic concerns of De Nominum Analogia , noting that the text is organized to treat analogy with respect to all three parts of medieval logic: simple apprehension (DNA chaps. 3–5), judgment (chaps. 6–9), and reasoning (chap. 10). Robillard, De l’analogie et du concept d’être de Thomas de Vio, Cajetan, 253. Among the few others who have already read Cajetan in light of the explicit semantic concerns described here are Bochenski (“On Analogy”) and Ross (“Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language”). However, Bochenski’s article “On Analogy” did not so much argue for a particular interpretation of Cajetan as formalize some of Cajetan’s conclusions . Furthermore, though the article has been reprinted a few times, it remains somewhat inaccessible: a compressed style, obscure symbolic language, and apparently parochial Thomistic interests have reduced the exposure of Bochenski’s important analysis. Ross’s article also formalizes a Cajetanian theory of analogy, with results similar to Bochenski, but he frames it as a particular issue regarding religious language; and Ross’s later criticisms of the Cajetanian tradition have undoubtedly diminished the authority of what he accomplished in this article. In any case, in neither article would it be apparent to the average reader that what is being offered is a particular interpretation of Cajetan’s theory of analogy, viz., as a theory addressing the semantic puzzles described above. Chapter Three 1. E.J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,” Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 1, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1991), 28. Ashworth makes similar observations in Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in ThirteenthCentury Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 45–46; Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in ThirteenthNotes to Pages 45–48  — 191 Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 107; and Ashworth , “Language, Renaissance Philosophy of,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in which she writes that in the period she considers “there was little discussion in logic texts of how words relate to each other in propositional contexts” (411). 2. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic,” 42–43. 3. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in ThirteenthCentury Logic,” 67. 4. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 400. 5. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth-Century Authors,” in Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, ed. John Marenbon (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), 246–47. 6. James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 7. Ibid., ix. 8. Ibid. 9. Josef Stern makes similar observations on the limitations of Ross’s book in his review in Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 392–97. 10. Armand Maurer, “St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus,” New Scholasticism 29 (April 1955): 143. Maurer’s claims are considered in Michael P. Slattery , “Concerning Two Recent Studies in Analogy,” New Scholasticism 31 (1957): 237–46. 11. Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1982), 351. 12. Patrick J. Sherry, “Analogy Today,” Philosophy 51 (1976): 443. 13. Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952), 101–2: “La doctrine thomiste de l’analogie est avant tout une doctrine du jugement d’analogie. C’est en effet grâce au jugement de proportion que, sans en altérer la nature, on peut faire du concept un usage tantôt équivoque, tantôt analogique, tantôt univoque. . . . L’analogie à laquelle pense Duns Scot est beaucoup plutôt une analogie du concept . Or, sur le plan du concept et de la représentation, l’analogie se confond pratiquement avec la ressemblance. Il ne s’agit plus alors de savoir si deux terms jouent un rôle analogue dans un jugement de proportion, mais si le concept désign é par un terme est ou n’est pas le même que le concept désigné par l’autre.” Gilson advances this interpretation of Thomistic analogy in terms of judgment versus concepts elsewhere as well: Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956), 106–9. Gilson, Le Thomisme: Introduction a la philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 5th ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1944): “Sur le plan du concept, il n’y a pas de milieu entre l’univoque et l’equivoque” (155; the word ‘concept’ is translated as ‘quiddity’ in the English translation by L.K. Shook). See also Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), 190–215. 14. In addition to Maurer, Sherry, and Ross, already mentioned, Gilson’s interpretation on this point is followed by: George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas 192  — Notes to Pages 49–53 Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 116 (“Analogy is primarily an affair of judgment rather than concept”); Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: P.J. Kennedy and Sons, 1960), 201; cf. E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London: Longmans, Green, 1949), 116–21; Gregory Philip Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004). Battista Mondin has dissented from Gilson’s interpretation, arguing for the compatibility of judgment and concept. Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 58n2; 60n2. Rocca also admits the compatibility of emphasizing judgment and concept (165–73). For a summary of the history of the emphasis on analogy as judgment, see Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 154–59. 15. David Burrell, “From Analogy of ‘Being’ to the Analogy of Being,” in Recovering Nature: Essays in Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph P. McInerny, ed. Thomas Hibbs and John O’Callaghan (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 259–60. Cf. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 204. 16. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 5. 17. Burrell has in mind specifically Bochenski, “On Analogy,” and James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language”; this latter was written before Ross’s own rejection of such approaches in Portraying Analogy. 18. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 15. 19. Philip A. Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God (Atlanta : Scholars Press, 1993), 101. 20. David Burrell, review of James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy, in New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 349. 21. Ibid., 347. In a footnote Burrell clarifies that he is speaking of “Peter Geach’s observations in Mental Acts . . . regarding abstraction, together with Lonergan ’s comprehensive review of the matter in Verbum, explicitly designed to correct the vaguely Scotistic accounts which had paraded as standard Thomistic epistemology.” 22. Bernard Lonergan does seem to be under the specific impression that Cajetan’s view of concepts has been unduly influenced by Scotus; see Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David Burrell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 25n122. But cf. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 3rd ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970), 368–71. 23. Cf. Michael McCanles, who has argued that “once . . . analogy is dealt with on the level of concepts, the pressure seems of necessity to push esse toward a univocal concept, as both Scotus and Ockham show. Cajetan’s analogical concept cannot maintain its integrity.” McCanles, “Univocalism in Cajetan’s Doctrine of Analogy,” New Scholasticism 42 (Winter 1968): 47. McCanles thus describes what he sees as the problem of a semantic analysis of analogy which makes reference to the analogical concept: “[Cajetan’s] method of treating the problem is at odds with itself, and to a very large extent undercuts the very doctrine he is overtly trying to refine” (19). Unfortunately McCanles’s argument is Notes to Pages 53–54  — 193 complicated by a confusion; McCanles does not sufficiently distinguish the issue of analogical signification in general (which is Cajetan’s main concern in De Nominum Analogia) from the metaphysical issue of describing “the analogy of being.” 24. Yves R. Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 135–71; originally in New Scholasticism 34 (1960): 1–42. 25. Ibid., 140. 26. As an example of one tempted by this naive assumption: “The suggestion here proposed is that, in order to employ analogical predication . . . we must hold that any two entities standing in an analogical relation to each other . . . must have a minimum of one property in common.” Paul C. Hayner, “Analogical Predication,” Journal of Philosophy 55 (1958): 860. 27. Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 145. 28. Ibid., 143. 29. Ibid., 145. 30. Ibid., 156. 31. Burrell, “A Note on Analogy,” New Scholasticism 36 (1962): 226. 32. Ibid., 225; cf. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 203. 33. Burrell’s emphasis on use is the most obvious manifestation of his (acknowledged ) debt to Wittgenstein. Cf. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language , 17, 122, 123. 34. Perhaps it could be argued that to insist on such a distinction is already to grant Cajetan too much, to separate analogy from the “context” of particular theological and metaphysical judgments. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of analogical signification does take place outside of theology and metaphysics, and it is reasonable to insist on the logical distinction between considering the phenomenon of analogical signification in general, and considering particular terms, such as ‘being’ or divine names, which can exhibit analogical signification. 35. CDEE §67: “res intelligitur quando ejus conceptum formamus. . . . conceptus formatio est factio rei extra actu intellectae.” 36. Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae, I.13.1, n. 3: “voces significant res non nisi media conceptione intellectus; igitur significatio causatur ex conceptione.” 37. Actually the “concept” discussed in this paragraph—that by which something is signified and understood—is by Cajetan and other Thomists in some contexts called by a more technical name, the formal concept, to distinguish it from the objective concept; cf., e.g., CDEE §14. Cf. Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), app. 1, “The Concept,” 387–417. So, as will be discussed in chap. 5, Cajetan’s use of conceptus thus does not always imply a mental act, but often (more like ratio) implies the intelligible content of a thing that might be conceived by a mental act. 38. Gabriel Nuchelmans offers as the standard definition of “significare” for late-scholastic philosophers: “representing some thing or some things or in some way to the cognitive faculty.” Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist 194  — Notes to Pages 54–57 Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1980), 14. Paul Vincent Spade makes a similar point when he notes that “signification is a psychologicocausal property of terms” which is traced back to Boethius’s claim that “‘to signify’ something was ‘to establish an understanding of it.’” P.V. Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 188–98, 188. Cf. Paul Vincent Spade, Thoughts Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory, version 1.0, chap. 3: the interpretation of significare as “to establish an understanding” (from Boethius, “constituere intellectum”) is “the predominant one throughout the Middle Ages.” Cf. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 44: “to signify is to establish an understanding (significare est intellectum constituere).” 39. Cajetan is also thus far consistent with Geach, cited above by Burrell as an important corrective to “Thomistic” epistemology: like Cajetan, Geach understood “concepts” to be “mental capacities” the possession of which are “presupposed by acts of judgment,” and the “abstractionism” criticized by Geach is in no way implied in Cajetan’s understanding of concepts sketched here. Peter Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 14 and passim. 40. Indeed, this medieval notion of the “conceptus” can easily be traced to the Greek tradition, as Sten Ebbesen has done, noting the connection between the classification of different kinds of equivocation (including analogy) on the one hand, and concept formation on the other. The Greek logical tradition’s classification of different kinds of equivocals “can be understood as a classification of the reasons for choosing the same word to signify different concepts and things, deriving this classification from one that shows in how many ways concepts are formed.” Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Sophistici Elenchi”: A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, vol. 1, The Greek Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 190. In this endeavor, the role of judgment (“reasons for choosing the same word to signify different concepts and things”) is undeniable. 41. Nuchelmans clarifies that there are actually two senses of judgment one can consider: there is a kind of judging that is really an apprehension that forms a mental proposition (the “apprehensive proposition”), and there is a kind of judging that is the act of knowing, believing, or opining that this mental proposition is (or is not) true. Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, 74–76. But since the latter judgment requires the former apprehensive proposition, which in turn implies an apprehension of the terms of the apprehensive proposition, Nuchelmans’s analysis only confirms that judgment is not opposed to, but rather presupposes, semantic considerations. As he puts it: “In general questions concerning acts of judging, knowing, and believing , and concerning objects of knowledge and belief, were treated by scholastic philosophers for other reasons than sheer curiosity about the semantics of declarative sentences. . . . But in dealing with the psychological and epistemological issues which were forced upon them by their theological interests or the pursuit of wider inquiries of a similar type, they were unavoidably faced with Notes to Page 57  — 195 problems which have a predominantly semantical character” (103). On the latescholastic Thomist understanding of apprehensive propositions and the object of judgment, see 99–102, 111–12. 42. Cf. Étienne Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy: An Essay on the Philosophical Constants of Language, trans. John Lyon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 75–78, 187n25. 43. Cf. Étienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York: New American Library, 1963), 250. 44. “Les interlocuteurs ne parlent pas la même langue. . . . lorsqu’il rencontre l’analogie thomiste, on ne peut pas dire exactement que Duns Scot le réfute, on dirai plutôt qu’il ne peut pas y croire. . . . Évidement, ce serait perdre son temps que do vouloir concilier les deux doctrines et, tout autant, de réfuter l’une par l’autre.” Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 101–2. 45. Simon’s article assumes, and never dissents from, Cajetan’s treatment of analogy. Simon makes it clear he is using Cajetan’s classification of analogous modes, and Cajetan’s terminology for that classification (Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 137); he agrees with Cajetan that “in [analogy of] attribution . . . the object signified by the analogical term exists intrinsically in only one” of the analogates (137); like Cajetan, Simon regards analogy of proper proportionality as the most genuine form of analogy (138ff.), and, as in Cajetan’s theory, this is connected to the fact that in analogy of proportionality “the form designated by the analogical term exists intrinsically in each and every one of the analogates” (138; cf. 140); Simon defends Cajetan against the criticisms of F.A. Blanche (165–67n27); and he cites approvingly other unabashed Cajetanians (John of St. Thomas and James Anderson). 46. Simon might also be benefiting from John of St. Thomas’s own reflections on this part of Cajetan’s theory, in Ars Logica, p. 2, q. 13, a. 5, “Utrum in analogis detur unus conceptus ab inferioribus praecisus” (491a40–500b47). Simon was the chief translator of sections of the Secunda Pars of the Ars Logica, published (five years before Simon’s “On Order in Analogical Sets”) as The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). At one point the translation renders the phrase “Analoga attributionis et analoga metaphorica” (491b21–22, literally: “analogues of attribution and metaphorical analogues”) as “The terms of an analogous set, in analogy of attribution or of metaphor” (168, emphasis added). 47. Contra Burrell (Analogy and Philosophical Language, 203), Simon does take analogy of proper proportionality as the “normal form” or genuine kind of analogy. 48. All of this is why, in the previous chapter of De Nominum Analogia, Cajetan had already acknowledged that one must qualify the sense in which one may speak of an analogical concept (DNA §§36–37). 49. In this regard, we might say that Cajetan’s treatment of analogy corroborates Gadamer’s judgment: “The merit of semantic analysis, it seems to me, is that it has brought the structural totality of language to our attention and thereby has pointed out the limitations of the false ideal of unambiguous signs or symbols and of the potential of language for logical formalization.” HansGeorg Gadamer, “Semantics and Hermeneutics,” trans. P. Christopher Smith, 196  — Notes to Pages 58–59 in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 83. 50. Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 139. From his papers archived in the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame, we learn that Simon planned to take up just this question in a book on analogy with the working title “The Science of the Unknown,” of which the paper “On Order in Analogical Sets” would constitute one chapter. Yves R. Simon Papers, 1920–1959, University of Notre Dame, box 2, folder 18. 51. L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, vol. 1, On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962), 22: “In the course of the present study it will become evident that the frequent occurrence of fallacies is not just a concomitant—as a reader of the Summulae might think—, but that the doctrine of fallacy forms the basis of terminist logic. For this logic developed as a result of the fact that, to a much greater extent than it had been done by Abailard and his contemporaries, the proposition was beginning to be subjected to a strictly linguistic analysis.” However, elsewhere de Rijk does indicate that he believes that “the contextual approach” to language and “the doctrine of signification” are in tension; vide L.M. de Rijk, “The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 161–73. 52. Alexander Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 8–9. 53. Norman Kretzmann, “Semantics, History of,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 7, 371. Cf. Ashworth , “Logic, Medieval,” §4: “Indeed, the avoidance of fallacy is at the heart of all new types of logical writing.” 54. DNA §125: “Unde si quis falli non vult, solerter sermonis causam coniectet , et extremorum conditiones medio applicaturum se recolat; sic enim facile erit omnia sane exponere, et veritatem assequi.” 55. The phenomenon really is ubiquitous, but one example of Cajetan’s careful clarification of terms with respect to the role they play in the context of particular arguments is his commentary on ST Ia, q. 3, a. 3, which is discussed in Joshua P. Hochschild, “A Note on Cajetan’s Theological Semantics,” Sapientia 54 (1999): 367–76. Chapter Four 1. Some examples, already cited in chap. 2: from Aquinas: Whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual; all things are brought into being by God; therefore, God is actual (DPD III.7.7, corpus, cited below, n. 5). From Cajetan: Every simple perfection is in God; wisdom is a simple perfection; therefore wisdom is in God (DNA §105). From Bochenski: Every being is good; God is a being; therefore God is good (“On Analogy,” The Thomist [1948]: §16). 2. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 399–413. Notes to Pages 60–66  — 197 3. Several scholars have noted Aquinas’s concern that analogy avoid the fallacy of equivocation: James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, ed. James F. Ross, Contributions in Philosophy, no. 4 (Westport , Conn.: Greenwood, 1971), 37; Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktrycheri AB, 1952), 204; Patrick J. Sherry, “Analogy Today,” Philosophy 51 (1976): 443; Ralph McInerny , “Scotus and Univocity,” in Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 161; Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 139; Vernon J. Bourke, “Cajetan, Cardinal,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 5–6. Cf. Michael P. Slattery , “Concerning Two Recent Studies of Analogy,” New Scholasticism 31 (1957): 238. Garrigou-Lagrange also recognizes the importance of analogical terms in syllogisms, in God: His Existence and Nature, vol. 1, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1934, 1936), 224–27; he provides his own account of how this is possible in vol. 2, 203–21. 4. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia.13.5.c: “Sed nec etiam [nomen de Deo et creaturis praedicatur] pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis.” 5. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei III.7.7.c: “. . . cum omnis cognitio nostra de Deo ex creaturis sumatur, si non erit convenientia nisi in nomine tantum, nihil de Deo sciremus nisi nomina tantum vana, quibus res non subesset. Sequeretur etiam quod omnes demonstrationes a philosophis datae de Deo, essent sophisticae; verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per ens actu, et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per ipsum omnia in esse educantur; erit fallacia aequivocationis ; et sic de omnibus aliis.” 6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.33: “Quando unum de pluribus, secundum puram aequivocationem, praedicatur, ex uno eorum non possumus duci in cognitionem alterius. Nam cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex ratione nominis. Ex his autem, quae in rebus aliis inveniuntur, in divinorum cognitionem pervenimus, ut ex dictis (c. 30 et 31) patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem dicuntur hujusmodi attributa de Deo et aliis rebus. . . . Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit. Si igitur nihil diceretur de Deo et creaturis, nisi pure aequivoce, nulla argumentatio fieri posset, procedendo de creaturis ad Deum.” 7. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate 2.11.c: “. . . nec tamen potest dici quod omnino aequivoce praedicaetur quidquid de Deo et creatura dicitur; quia si non esset aliqua convenientia creaturae ad Deum secundum rem, sua essentia non esset creaturarum similitudo; et ita cognoscendo essentiam suam non cognosceret creaturas. Similiter etiam nec nos ex rebus creatis in cognitionem Dei pervenire possemus; nec nominum quae creaturis 198  — Notes to Pages 66–67 aptantur, unum magis de eo dicendum esset quam aliud; quia ex aequivocis non differt quodcumque nomen imponatur, ex quo nulla rei convenientia attenditur.” 8. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio IV, lect. 3 (§568 Cathala): “Non enim sequitur, quod si aliquid dicitur multipliciter, quod propter hoc sit alterius scientiae vel diversae. Diversa enim significata si neque dicuntur «secundum unum», idest secundum unam rationem, scilicet univoce, nec ratione diversa referuntur ad unum, sicut est in analogicis: tunc sequitur, quod sit alterius, idest diversae scientiae de his considerare, vel ad minus unius per accidens. . . . Haec autem omni referuntur ad unum principium. Sicut enim quae significantur per hoc nomen Unum, licet sint diversa, reducuntur tamen in unum primum significatum; similiter est dicendum de his nominibus, idem, diversum, contrarium, et hujusmodi.” 9. Thomas Aquinas, Scripta super libros Sententiarum prol., q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2: “. . . una scientia est unius generis, sicut dicit Philosophus in I Posteriorum. Sed Deus et creatura, de quibus in divina doctrina tractatur, non reducuntur in unum genus, neque univoce, neque analogice. Ergo divina scientia non est una . . .”; ibid., ad. 2: “. . . dicendum quod Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae.” 10. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio, ed. Raymundi M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1955), book 2, lectio 17, n. 4: “. . . ostendit investigare propter quid reducendo ad aliquod commune analogum; et dicit quod alius modus investigandi propter quid est eligere commune secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Contingit enim unum accipere analogum quod non est idem secundum speciem vel genus; sicut os sepiarum, quod vocatur sepion, et spina piscium, et ossa animalium terrestrium. Omnia enim ista conveniunt secundum proportionem, quia eodem modo se habent spinae ad pisces sicut ossa ad terrestria animalia.” Aristotle’s example of the analogical relationship between bone, spine, and pounce will be invoked by Cajetan at DNA §§109, 117, and De Conceptu Entis §3, and Cajetan obviously finds it useful for answering questions about the role of analogical notions in scientific reasoning. Interestingly, Aquinas’s comment on Aristotle quoted here is not among the texts collected by Klubertanz in St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), although Klubertanz’s catalogue of texts does include another passage from later in the Posterior Analytics commentary (book 2, lectio 19, n. 3). 11. The De fallaciis describes three species of the fallacy of equivocation, and briefly mentions analogy in connection with the second: “secunda species est quando unum nomen principaliter unum significat, et aliud metaphorice sive transumptive. . . . et ad hanc speciam reducitur muliplicitas nominum analogorum quae dicuuntur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius.” De fallaciis, in Opuscula philosophica, ed. Raymundi M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1954), c. 6. There is some doubt about whether Aquinas authored De fallaciis, but the text’s teaching is such that the attribution to Aquinas is plausible. On this point about analogy and fallacy it is consistent with, and doesn’t add anything to, Aquinas’s remarks elsewhere. Notes to Page 67  — 199 12. In Met. IV, lect. 1, §535; XI, lect. 3, §2197; cf. Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 55–56. 13. Cf. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 38: “Analogous intelligibles are neither exactly the same nor completely different; they are halfway between the two extremes. Though this is not an especially revealing description, it provides us with a minimum meaning which can be applied to all analogies.” 14. Ibid., 37. 15. There are fifty-eight occurrences of the phrase in twenty-one works listed in Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 301. Klubertanz also notes several occasions of other terminology that also expresses priority and posteriority , p. 65. Aquinas was not the first to describe analogy as signification per prius et posterius; the scholastic use of the phrase is traced to the twelfth-century Latin translation of Avicenna. For some citations of this phrase in authors before Aquinas, cf. E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 107–8; Alain de Libera, “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être,” Les Études Philosophiques (1989): 333; and H.A. Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy, and Maimonides,” Harvard Theological Review 31 (1938): 151–73. 16. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” 125, and Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 50; cf. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington , D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 70–74. 17. SCG I.32: “Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univocum non praedicari.” 18. E.g., ST I.5.6, ad 3. 19. Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 79. Cf. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 98: an analogous term “signifies a plurality of rationes which are related per prius et posterius . . .” 20. Klubertanz notes that Aquinas sometimes seems to deny that the per prius et posterius rule applies to analogy between God and creatures (St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 29–30), yet later he discusses the rule as a “doctrinal constant ” in Aquinas (64–69). 21. Yves Simon recognized the inadequacy of the “per prius et posterius” rule. Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 148. 22. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 13.6.c: “in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omni dicantur per respectum ad unum; et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium.” Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 13.10: “in analogicis vero oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum ponatur in definitione ejusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti.” Cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.32: “Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et 200 — Notes to Pages 68–70 posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari: nam prius in definitione posterioris includitur.” 23. Silvestro Mazzolini, Conflatum ex S. Thoma: “regula decisiva totius quaestionis,” quoted in Michael Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” Angelicum 70 (1993): 110. 24. “. . . ad mentem Sancti Thomae, quod in omni modo analogiae verum est quod prius ponitur in definitione posterioris, inquantum analogice consideratur et significatur” (from Silvestri’s commentary on Summa Contra Gentiles, quoted in Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 226n7). For discussion see Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 225–28, and Klubertanz , St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 10–11. 25. E.g., McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 98; Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 53; Ian Wilks, “Aquinas on Analogy: The Distinction of Many-to-One and One-to-Another,” Modern Schoolman 75 (1997): 37. 26. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 32–34. 27. Cf. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics ”: A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), 118–23. 28. G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle,” in Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century, ed. Ingemar Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 1960). Cf. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 40: “What Owen calls focal meaning—a common predicate’s having different but connected definitions in its different uses, the connection being provided by its primary sense on which the others depend—answers to what Thomas Aquinas calls an analogous name.” 29. Cf., e.g., Aquinas, De principiis naturae 6: “Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus, quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur alicui uni eidem.” 30. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” 50. Yves Simon agrees, saying that in analogy of proper proportionality, “no first analogate needs to be included in the definition of the secondary analogates.” Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 138–39. Both Ross and Simon here are in agreement with Cajetan. 31. Aquinas himself raises this point at De Veritate 2.11., obj. 6. Nor is this point unique to De Veritate. In a parallel case, Aquinas denies that a term as predicated of God can be defined in terms of the meaning of that term as it refers to creatures (“God is good” cannot be taken to mean only that “God is the cause of good things,” nor can it mean that “God is the cause of [creaturely] goodness”); Summa Theologiae I.13.2.c. When Aquinas does give a working defi­ nition of Divine goodness, it does make reference to creaturely goodness, but not as something other than God to which God is related, rather as something that itself pre-exists in a higher manner in God (“Cum igitur dicitur Deus est bonus, non est sensus Deus est causa bonitatis . . . , sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem”). Aquinas’s point is that it is not essential to the goodness of God that Notes to Pages 70–71  — 201 it be understood in terms of some other goodness (“non sequitur Deus competat esse bonum, inquantum causat bonitatem; sed potius, e converse, quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit”). 32. Cajetan, CDEE §21: “. . . analogata primo modo [i.e., analogy of attribution ] ita se habent, quod posterius secundum nomen analogum diffinitur per suum prius: puta accidens, inquantum ens per substantiam. Analogata vero secundo modo [i.e., analogy of proportionality] non: creatura enim inquantum ens non diffinitur per Deum.” 33. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, 16.6.c: “. . . quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur . . .” 34. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.32 : “Nam prius in diffinitione posterioris includitur.” Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.13.6: “Et quia ratio quam significat nomen est definitio, ut dicitur, necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum.” 35. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 98. We should note that the rubric “per prius et posterius” does not have to be given the interpretation McInerny here gives it, as involving multiple rationes ordered to one. Signifying “per prius et posterius ” could alternatively describe a common ratio that is unequally participated by its several analogates. 36. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 114. 37. E.g., McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 78: “The analogous name names one thing primarily, and others insofar as they relate in some way to what it principally names. The rationes of the secondary analogates will express their reference to the thing which perfectly saves the ratio propria of the word.” 38. McInerny, Studies in Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 75; McInerny, “The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine,” in Being and Predication , 285; McInerny, “Scotus and Univocity,” in Being and Predication, 162; McInerny , Aquinas and Analogy, 99. 39. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 99–100; McInerny, “Can God Be Named by Us?” in Being and Predication, 274–75; McInerny, “Scotus and Univocity ,” 162–64. 40. McInerny, “The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine,” 283: “St. Thomas will say that a term used analogously signifies the same res significata but has different modi significandi.”; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 103–4: “In a pithy text, Thomas compares univocals, equivocals and analogously named things. . . . Univocal terms have the same res significata and the same way of signifying it in all relevant uses; equivocal terms have different res significatae; things are named analogously when their common name has the same res significata , which is signified in different ways in each of the accounts.” 41. I Sent. 22.1.3 ad 2: “dicendum quod aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum. Aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas , univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos. Unde cum ens praedicetur analogice de 202  — Notes to Pages 71–74 decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. Unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus praedicandi.” 42. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying,” 60. 43. E.g., I Sent. 25.1.2 c: “Dicendum quod persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis non univoce nec aequivoce sed secundum analogiam; et quantum ad rem significatam per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed quantum ad modum significandi est e converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus aliis nominibus quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur.” 44. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying,” 60. 45. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 122. Cf. Ashworth, review of McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, in Speculum 74 (1999): 216. Cf. also Irène Rosier, “Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications d’une distinction médievale ,” Sprachteorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), 152–57. See also Seung-Chan Park, Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 128–67, 267–307. 46. In addition to McInerny, the view can be found in Mascall (Analogy and Existence [London: Longmans, Green, 1949], 100, 120), and is common in Copleston, although the latter’s comments are always made in the context of a discussion of religious language. Cf. Fredrick Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 196–97; Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), 129–35; and Copleston, A History of Philosophy , vol. 2, Mediaeval Philosophy, part 2, “Albert the Great to Duns Scotus” (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1962), 70. Before his more recent criticisms of the “classical” approach to analogy (in James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981]), Ross apparently agreed that having one res significata and multiple modi significandi is a feature of analogy. Cf. Ross, “A Critical Analysis of the Theory of Analogy of St. Thomas Aquinas ” (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1958), 102; Ross, review of McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, in International Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1962): 635; and Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” 55–57. But Ross regarded this as only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for language about God; to it Ross added the stipulation that there be “proportional similarity” of properties (Ross, “Analogy as Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” 62–63). Burrell appears to take a similar view, agreeing that the distinction between res significata and modus significandi is a part of Aquinas’s analysis of analogy, at least with respect to religious language, but adding that the distinction is insufficient without the further stipulation that all predicates said analogously of God and creatures must be perfections. Cf. David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 136. For that matter, McInerny also says that having a single res significata and diverse modi significandi is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of a term’s being analogous (McInerny , Aquinas and Analogy, 104). Lyttkens is also willing to consider the role of res significata and modi significandi in Aquinas’s understanding of analogy, though like Copleston, Ross, and Burrell he does so only in the context of discussion Notes to Pages 74–75  — 203 about predicates said analogously of God and creatures (Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 374–82, 468–71). 47. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying,” 56–57, 61. 48. McInerny, “Scotus and Univocity,” 163. Cf. McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 104. 49. This attempted reconstruction of McInerny’s analysis of analogy as involving one res significata and several modi significandi probably does not exhibit a Thomistic use of modi significandi. Being a cause of something and being a sign of something are not modi significandi in Thomas’s sense, and a Thomistic analysis of the various senses of “healthy” would rather assign a different res significata to each sense of “healthy”: animal health, cause of animal health, and sign of animal health. 50. Lyttkens observed, “We have no direct evidence of St. Thomas’ own attitude to the question of the unity of the concept in the analogy of proportionality .” Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 471. Wilks frames the semantic issue felicitously: “For a word to retain the same meaning through successive uses is for it to remain linked to exactly the same ratio in each case. This is how univocity is to be understood; non-univocity will, conversely, involve successive uses with linkage to different rationes. Whether that non-univocity amounts to analogy or equivocation depends on the conceptual space that exists between the two rationes; the difference between them is capable of being greater or less, and if sufficiently less then the usage is said to be analogical.” Then, Wilks says, “Aquinas gives us no theoretically comprehensive way of explaining what constitutes closeness of ratio.” Of the rule that Wilks considers, viz., “that in each case one ratio constitutes part of another,” he admits, “we cannot get a rigorous semantic account of analogy from this.” Wilks, “Aquinas on Analogy,” 37. 51. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts”; Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation ,” 126. 52. DNA §7. 53. DNA §§14, 20. Elsewhere Cajetan says that this is not a rule for analogy as such, but a rule for determining of which thing a term is said prius (CST I.13.6, nn. i–ii), and Cajetan rejects it as a universal rule for analogy (CST I.13.6, n. iii: “dicit non esse verum universaliter quod primum analogatum poni debeat in rationibus aliorum analogatorum,” citing Aquinas, DV 2.11). 54. CST I.16.6, n. vi: “illa regula de analogo tradita in littera, non est universalis de omni analogiae modo.” Cf. John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica, p. 2, q. 13, a. 4 (490b28–491a22): “. . . respondetur, quod in illa universali loquitur S. Thomas non de omnibus analogis absolute, sed restrictive de analogis attributionis tantum. . . . In loco autem ex q. 16 non loquitur universaliter de omnibus analogis . . .” While it may seem bold for an interpreter to reject as universal rules what clearly appear to be formulated universally, there appear to be genuine inconsistencies in Aquinas; we must remember Klubertanz’s inescapable conclusion about Aquinas’s formulation of analogy rules, that “not every discussion that appears to be a general description applicable to all analogies is such 204  — Notes to Pages 75–77 in actual fact.” Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 37. Also, note that Cajetan will describe a way in which, even in analogy of proportionality, we can understand that the ratio of the analogue is wholly saved in one of the analogates but imperfectly in the others—yet he warns that this rule must be taken with a grain of salt. DNA §§100–101: “. . . in uno eorum, tota ratio divisi salvari dicatur; in alio autem imperfecte et secundum quid. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi analogum habeat unam rationem, quae tota salvetur in uno, et pars eius salvetur in alio. Sed cum totum idem sit quod perfectum, et analogo nomine multae importentur rationes, quarum una simpliciter et perfecte constituit tale secundum illud nomen, et aliae imperfecte et secundum quid: ideo dicitur, quod analogum sic dividitur, quod non tota ratio eius in omnibus analogatis salvatur, nec aequaliter participant analogi rationem, sed secundum prius et posterius. Cum grano tamen salis accipiendum est, analogum simpliciter salvari in uno et secundum quid in alio.” 55. DNA §1. The same three theories are listed again at DNA §71. For discussion of Cajetan’s use of “indisjunction” at §1 and “disjunction” at §71, see Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren, The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), 9n4, and Bruno Pinchard, Metaphysique et semantique: La signification analogiques des termes dans les Principes Metaphysiques (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 161. 56. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts.” 57. Ibid., 404–5. The distinction between objective and formal concepts will be explored in chap. 5, as a part of a more systematic presentation of Cajetan ’s semantic principles. 58. Ibid., 405. Ashworth’s article discusses, in particular, historical disputes about the analogy of “being.” Though this particular case of analogy was undoubtedly one of the most, if not the most, important case for the philosophers she discusses, it remains that the semantic problem is one for analogy generally, and not just for this particular analogical term. Cajetan does discuss the analogy of “being” in DNA, chap. 6, where he contrasts his view with the three rejected views (§71), but still it is clear that he is developing a logical or semantic theory of analogy generally, and not one specific to the case of “being,” which he insists is used only as an example (§72). 59. Cf. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 407. Note that Ashworth’s exclusive alternatives presuppose particular semantic assumptions about the nature of objective and formal concepts, shared by all the authors she considers. If these assumptions are not shared, it would be possible to construe, e.g., “unity of order” and “unequal participation” as not mutually exclusive. This seems to be the position of McInerny in the following passage: “In things named analogically . . . the common notion signified by the name is not shared equally by all the things which receive the name; only one of the analogates is signified perfectly by the name. The others are signified imperfectly and in a certain respect, that is, insofar as they refer in some way to what is perfectly signified. . . . The analogous name signifies precisely an inequality of significations, but according to a certain order.” McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 76. Notes to Pages 77–78  — 205 60. And with unknown authors: a late thirteenth-century commentator on the Sophistici Elenchi describes three kinds of analogy, of which one is the most genuine and involves a ratio that “non est aequaliter participata.” Incertorum Auctorum, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen : Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 1977), 317 (q. 823, l. 85). 61. Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae, vol. 1, ed. Paban and Pégues (1900), 135a, 142a–b (cited in Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 406). 62. Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 102. 63. Soncinas, Super artem veterem (Venice, 1499), f. 19r–v: “unam rationem in actu, sed inaequaliter participatum” (quoted in Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 99). Cf. Soncinas, Quaestiones in XII Metaphysicorum VI, q. 4, ad 1, 9, and Epitomes quaestionum Ioannis Caprieoli, super libros sententiarum I, d. 1, q. 2, 35, both also quoted in Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 101–2. 64. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 406. 65. Dominic of Flanders, Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967 [reprint of Venice, 1499]), IV, q. 2, a. 1. Ashworth finds Dominic attributing the view to others; Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 406–7. Cf. Franco Riva, “L’analogia dell’ente in Dominico di Fiandra,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica 86 (1994): 289–90. 66. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 402. 67. Ibid., 407. 68. John Versorius, Quaestiones super metaphysicam Aristotelis (Coloniae, 1494), f. 25v: “ens dicatur de omnibus entibus . . . de uno primo et principaliter et de aliis dicitur secundum quod unumquodque eorum habet habitudinem ad ipsum primum, ergo non est ibi pura aequivocatio sed est unitas analogiae.” (Quoted in Tavuzzi, “Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy,” 96n11.) 69. Pinchard, Metaphysique et semantique, 161. 70. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 408. 71. Dominic of Flanders, Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicorum, IV, q. 2, a. 6: “Utrum ens significet unum conceptum disiunctum?” 72. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 408. 73. Stephen Brown, “L’unité du concept d’être au début du quatorzième siècle,” in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 334–36. 74. Ibid. Cf. Ashworth, “Analogical Concepts,” 408. 75. DNA §§1, 71. 76. Indeed, a further problem with the “disjunct concept” theory of analogy is that it allows any two things to be analogical, if we stipulate a word that signifies their alternative. This objection is raised by Bochenski, “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948): §16. However, Bochenski does prove that a term so analogous can be the middle term of a valid syllogism, if the ratio of the middle term of the major premise is the disjunction of the ratio of the middle term of the minor premise and some other ratio (“On Analogy,” §15). 206  — Notes to Pages 78–80 Chapter Five 1. Like many Thomists Cajetan also completed Aquinas’s unfinished commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. We could assume from this that Cajetan endorses the semantic principles articulated by Aquinas in that work, though Cajetan’s semantic principles can be reconstructed without relying on Aquinas’s commentary. 2. CPA 3: “. . . res incomplexae non adunantur et distinguuntur cum conditionibus , quas habent in rerum natura, sed ut sic acceptae per intellectum, id est ut stant sub simplici apprehensione intellectus, id est ut obiectae simplici apprehensioni intellectus, et res sic acceptae nihil aliud sunt quam res dictae verbis interioribus, vel (quod idem est) quam res conceptae conceptibus simplicibus, et res huiusmodi nihil aliud sint quam res significatae vocibus incomplexis, quondo voces sunt signa conceptuum et conceptus rerum.” 3. InthisandotherrespectsCajetanstandsfirmlyintheviaantiqua“realist” tradition, on which see Gyula Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” in TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Fall2000ed.),ed.EdwardN.Zalta.URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2000/entries/universals-medieval/. 4. CDEE §84: “. . . est notandum, quod cum nomine naturae intelligatur id quod per diffinitionem significatur, nomen autem suppositi individuum habens illam quiditatem.” 5. CPA18:“. . .scitoquodformaenomineinhacmateriaintelligimusomne id quo aliquid dicitur tale, sive illud sit secundum rem accidens, sive substantia, sive materia, sive forma.” CST I.37.2, n. iv: “Omne denominans, ut sic, habet rationem formalis.” Cf. DNA §§31–32: “. . . in nominibus tria inveniuntur, scilecet vox, conceptus in anima, et res extra, seu conceptus obiectivus. . . . Vocatur autem in proposito res, non solum natura aliqua, sed quicumque gradus, quaecumque realitas, et quodcumque reale in rebus inventum.” Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.37.2.c: “. . . sciendum est quod, cum res communiter denominentur a suis formis, sicut album ab albedine, et homo ab humanitate, omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur, quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae. Ut dicam, iste est indutus vestimento, iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis , quamvis non sit forma.” Cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei 7.10, ad 8: “Dicendum est quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.” 6. CDEE §8: “. . . nota quod sicut quid rei est quidtas rei, ita quid nominis est quiditas nominis. Nomen autem cum essentialiter sit nota earum quae sunt objective in anima passionum ex I Perihermenias, non habet aliam quiditatem nisi hanc quod est signum alicujus rei intellectae seu cogitatae: signum autem, ut sic, relativum est ad signatum. Unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud quam cognoscere ad quod tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalia illius signati, per communia, per essentialia, per nutus et quibusvis aliis modis, sicut a Graeco quaeretibus Notes to Pages 85–88  — 207 nobis quid nominis anthropos si digito ostendatur homo, jam percipimus quid nominis; et similiter de aliis. Interrogantibus ver quid rei, opertet assignare id quod convenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequatae. Et haec est essentialis differnetia inter quid nominis et quid rei, scilicet quod quid nomis est relatio nomis ad signatum; quid rei vero est rei relatae seu significatae essentia . Et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent, puta quod quid nominis sit non entium complexorum, per accidentalia, per communia, per extranea; quid rei vero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia: relatio enim vocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura, et complexa, et declarari per accidentalia, et hujusmodi ; essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis.” 7. To be sure, considered as elements of Cajetan’s particular philosophical psychology, which in turn depends on a certain metaphysical framework, one could take issue with Cajetanian “concepts.” The only point here is that, considered in their general semantic and epistemological function, “concepts” are just what make possible signification and understanding. 8. The metaphysician might treat them as forms analogically, that is as not strictly speaking the same as, but nonetheless analogous to, really existing forms in rerum natura. 9. Cf. Gyula Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 106–7, 114–15. 10. Cf. Gyula Klima, “Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy,” in Logical Semiotics, special issue of S-European Journal for Semiotic Studies 3 (1991): 587–618. 11. The distinction between formal and objective concept is usually traced back to the fourteenth century, though many commentators have found Aquinas expressing, albeit without these technical names, the same distinction. It is not uncommon for it to be invoked in the Thomistic tradition; cf. Jacques Maritain , Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959): 387–417. 12. CDEE §14: “. . . nota quod conceptus est duplex: formalis et objectalis. Conceptus formalis est idolum quoddam quod intellectus possibilis format in seipso repraesentativum objectaliter rei intellectae: quod a philosophis vocatur intentio seu conceptus, a theologis vero verbum. Conceptus autem objectalis est res per conceptum formalem repraesentata in illo terminans actum intelligendi, verbi gratia: conceptus formalis leonis est imago illa quam intellectus possibilis format de quiditate leonina, cum vult ipsam intelligere; conceptus vero objectalis ejusdem est natura ipsa leonina repraesentata et intellecta. Nec putandum est cum dicitur nomen significare conceptum quod significet alterum tantum: significat enim leonis nomen conceptum utrumque, licet diversimode, est namque signum conceptus formalis ut medii, seu quo, et est signum conceptus objectalis, ut ultimi seu quod.” In fact, Cajetan will in some contexts make even further distinctions about how the formal and objective concepts can be considered (cf. CDEE §48). 13. E.g., DNA §31. 208  — Notes to Pages 88–90 14. CDEE §66: “Esse in intellectu contingit dupliciter, subjective et objective . Esse in intellectu subjective est inhaerere ipsi, sicut accidens suo subjecto, ut albedo superficiei. Esse in intellectu objective est terminare actum intellectus.” 15. E.g., I.M. Bochenski, “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948). 16. E.g., E.J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 51, 53. 17. E.g., Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren, The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953). Indeed, Bushinski’s translation also renders “ratio” variously as “character,” “notion,” “nature,” “definition,” and “mode.” This testifies to the difficulty of finding a single adequate word in English, but it also means that the centrality of this important notion is obscured by Bushinski’s translation. 18. CPA 9: “Ly «ratio», licet multipliciter sumi possit, hic sumitur non pro diffinitione, quoniam res generalissimae aequivoca dici non possent, eo quod diffinitione carent, sed sumitur pro conceptu significato per nomen, qui in habentibus diffinitionem est diffinitio ipsa, in non habentibus vero diffinitionem ratio quam significat nomen vocatur, et nihil aliud est quam id quod directe significatur per nomen.” 19. CST I.13.4, n. 3: “[ratio sumi potest pro] conceptionem et definitionem, sed diversimode. Conceptio enim mentalis ratio nominis dicitur, quia est id quo refertur nomen in significatum extra animam: definitio autem, quia est id quo explicatur nominis significatum.” Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.5.2. Cajetan is clarifying the sense of Aquinas’s claim, “Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen.” It is worth noting that in the context of this article Cajetan recommends taking “ratio” as the mental concept, not as the definition, and so his interpretation would apparently differ from that of Ashworth, who would translate “ratio” with “analysis.” Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 51, 53. 20. On the inherence theory of predication see L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum : A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, vol. 1, On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962), 37–38; Peter T. Geach, Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 289–301; and Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being.” 21. Cf., e.g., CDEE §63. 22. Ashworth explains the difference between what is predicated and what verifies the predication as the difference between the significate (significatum) and the thing signified (res significata). Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 50–53. Her explanation is coherent and valuable with respect to the thirteenth-century authors she considers, but I do not notice Cajetan observing a strict technical difference between “significatum ” and “res significata.” 23. In fact, this is the reason why in certain contexts Cajetan is reluctant to describe predication in terms of inherence, and instead describes what looks like the theory sometimes contrasted with the inherence theory of predication, Notes to Pages 90–92  — 209 the identity theory (or “two-names theory”) of predication. CPA 47: “Praedicari de aliquo cum nihil aliud importet quam inesse seu convenire illi de quo praedicatur , consequens est quod praedicari de aliquo secundum nomen nihil aliud sit quam nomen praedicati convenire subiecto, ita quod nomen praedicata sit etiam nomen subiecti; nec refert an tale nomen sit subiecti secundum substantiam aut secundum qualitatem, vel quodcumque aliud extraneum, Sufficit enim quod nomen illud eius aliquo modo nota sit essentialiter vel denominative intrinsece vel extrinsece; et similiter sequitur quod praedicari secundum rationem nihil aliud sit quam rationem praedicata convenire subiecto, ita quod ratio praedicati sit etiam ratio subiecti; nec refert an ratio praedicati sit tota ratio subiecti an sit pars rationis, dummodo sit pars intrinseca, quod dico propter ea quae cadunt in ratione ut addita, sicut subiectum est pars rationis accidentis et corpus animae.” CDEE §9: “. . . veritas propositionis, quae est entis secundo modo significati, nihil aluid est quam compositio facta in secund operatione intellectus objecto conformis, verbi gratia, Sortes est caecus, ly est non significat inhaerentiam caecitatis in Sorte, eo quod caecitas omni inhaerentia caret, cum inhaerere realium accidentium sit, sed significat compositionem factam ab intellectu adequante seipsum per illam objecto, Sorti, scilicet, carente virtute visiva, unde V Metaph. in alia littera, dicitur quod ens significans veritatem propositionis significat quoniam propositio est vera.” But cf. CPI 20–21: “Imaginandum enim est, quod intellectus videns Sortem habere albedinem, prima sua attentione format hanc propositionem mentalem: Sortes est albus in qua propositione tot terminos poscit, quot videt extra animam res; tria siquidem ibi videt, scilicet Sortem, albedinem et inhaesionem albedinis in Sorte.” The point is that on Cajetan’s semantics, in a true sentence the predicate-term and the subject-term both supposit for the same thing(s), because the predicate supposits for that in which the significate of the predicate inheres. Some articulations of the (realist) inherence theory, in emphasizing its contrast with the (nominalist) identity theory, have denied that in the realist theory the predicate supposits. On the supposition of the predicate in realist semantics, see Stephen Theron, “The Supposition of the Predicate,” Modern Schoolman 77 (1999): 73–78. 24. Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” carries out this project with respect to Aquinas, with results substantially the same as those we would expect from a similar analysis of Cajetan. 25. However, what cannot be avoided is that the different senses of “being” that are required to account for these different verification conditions are an instance of “the analogy of being.” Since this outline of Cajetan’s semantic assumptions was supposed to be preparatory for his semantic analysis of analogical signification, it might seem circular for a semantic analysis of analogy to presuppose semantic principles that in turn presuppose the analogy of “being.” However, it is not circular. Cajetan’s theory of analogy is not an attempt to prove that there is analogy, but rather an attempt to show that, given that there is analogy , we can make some sense of its semantic conditions. That these semantic conditions are themselves described in the context of a general semantic theory that in turn is articulated by means of terms that are analogical is no more circular than a presentation of the semantic conditions of univocity that assumes 210 — Notes to Page 92 the existence of (and makes use of) univocal terms. Furthermore, the occurrence of analogical terms even in Cajetan’s basic framework of semantic principles should at least appease those who might otherwise fear that a semantic analysis of analogy is an attempt to analyze analogy away. 26. CPA 16: “non debet denominativum differre a nomine formae denominatis in significatione. . . . Differentia autem in modo significandi inventa inter denominativum et denominans non excluditur.” 27. Otherwise, e.g., “lapis” (stone)—in the accusative “lapidem”—which was hypothesized to have been imposed from “laedens pedem” (foot-hurting), would have foot-hurting as its denominating form, when in fact it denominates stones on account of their nature, which could be called “lapiditas.” Cf. the discussions of imposition in Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” 110–11, and Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 46–50. 28. In general, it is remarkable that there is so little explicit reflection and explanation of the notions of intrinsic or extrinsic denomination, both in modern scholarship and in the medieval authors. While the distinction has obvious precedents in Aquinas and before, it appears in technical terminology only later, and the examples and applications quickly become familiar, but even in a systematic work of logic such as the Ars Logica of John Poinsot’s Cursus Philosophicus the notion of extrinsic denomination is taken for granted and neither fully defined nor explained. 29. E.g., Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum exposito 3.5, §322; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.6.4. 30. For a discussion of the notion of extrinsic denomination in Aquinas, see Thomas J. Loughran, “Efficient Causality and Extrinsic Denomination in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1969), 78–123. 31. The Summa Totius Logicae was also occasionally attributed to Peter of Spain. According to the hypothesis of Angel d’Ors, the author is one Gratiadeus of Asculo, a fourteenth-century Dominican logician, as attested by St. Antonio de Firenze (1389–1459) and Johannes Trithemius. See p. 238 of Angel D’Ors, “Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II): Further Documents and Problems,” Vivarium 39 (2001): 209–54. 32. Summa Totius Logicae tr. 5, c. 6: “Dupliciter autem potest aliquid de alio praedicari denominative, sive illud denominare. Uno modo quod talis praedicatio seu denominatio fiat ab aliquo quod sit intrinsecum ei de quo fit talis praedicatio seu denominatio, quod videlicet ipsum perficiat sive per identitatem sive per inhaerentiam. . . . Secondo modo fit denominatio ab extrinseco, scilicet ab eo quod non est in denominato formali, sed est aliquod absolutum extrinsecum, a quo fit talis denominatio.” 33. John P. Doyle, “Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Works of Francis Suarez, S.J.,” Vivarium 22 (1984): 122–23. Doyle is careful to offer this as a provisional description, not a definition of extrinsic denomination as that was understood by Suarez or other medieval philosophers. 34. Summa Totius Logicae tr. 5, c. 6: “Sciendum est autem, quod denominatio ab extrinseco requirit aliquem per se respectum inter extrinsecum Notes to Pages 93–94  — 211 denominans et denominatum ab eo; quia oportet quod per se et ex conditione rerum talis modus denominandi consequatur res; et ideo oportet quod illud a quo fit talis denominatio, sit fundamentum per se alicujus habitudinis.” 35. CST I.6.4, nn. 3, 8: “. . . denominatio est duplex, quaedam intrinseca, et quaedam extrinseca. Vocatur denominatio intrinseca, quando forma denominativi est in eo quod denominatur, ut album, quantum, etc.: denominatio vero extrinseca, quando forma denominativi non est in denominato, ut locatum, mensuratum, et similia. . . . Dupliciter enim contingit aliquid dici tale ab aliquo extrinseco. Uno modo, ita quod ratio denominationis sit ipsa relatio ad extrinsecum , ut urina dicitur sana, sola relatione signi signi ad sanitatem. Alio modo, ita quod ratio denominationis sit, non relatio similitudinis, aut quaevis alia, sed forma quea est fundamentum relationis similitudinis ad illud extrinsecum; ut aer dicitur lucidus luce solari, ea ratione qua participat eam per formam luminis .” It is not clear whether we can regard one of Cajetan’s two alternatives as reducible to the other, insofar as a relation is only called extrinsic because its foundation is extrinsic. 36. Cf., e.g., Cajetan’s discussion of the objects of understanding being extrinsically denominated as intelligible or as actually understood; CDEE §67. 37. This often seems to be the case in late medieval discussions of whether the “six principles” (the last six of the accidental categories) were real beings or not; it was often suggested that they were not, and that they were denominated extrinsically. Cf. Summa Totius Logicae, tr. 5, c. 6. For discussion of these debates and references, cf. William E. McMahon, “Some Non-Standard Views of the Categories,” in La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XIIe–XVe siècles): XIIIe symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales, ed. Joël Biard and Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain: Peters, 2003), 53–67, and William E. McMahon, “The Categories in Some Post-Medieval Spanish Philosophers,” in Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain, ed. I. Angelelli and P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2000), 355–70. 38. This is at least the case with what were called relatives secundum esse, as opposed to relatives secundum dici; the former signify a relation, the latter only imply a relation insofar as they signify something that is the foundation of a relation. 39. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II.7.2, ad 1: “In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsicus adjacet.” 40. Cf. CPA 4–5. 41. There are some conditions, at least, in which we would be willing to say that the eye sees itself, and not just that the eye sees only its reflection. Alternatively we could have considered the case in which Socrates is thinking about something, and what he is thinking about is his own intellect. 42. CPA 124: “Ly vero «ad aliquid» sive «relativa» potest accipi duplici­ ter scilicet: materialiter pro re illa quae relativa vel ad aliquid denominatur, et formaliter pro ipsa relatione seu re ut habet relatione, verbi gratia: dominus potest accipi pro illo homine qui denominatur dominus, et potest accipi pro illo in quantum dominium habet.” 212  — Notes to Pages 95–97 Chapter Six 1. CPA 10: “Ly «diversa» non coartatur ad diversitatem simpliciter, sed communiter accipitur ut comprehendit sub se diversitatem simpliciter vel secundum quid, totaliter vel partialiter, ita quod aequivoca dicuntur et illa quorum ratio secundum illud nomen est penitus diversa, et illa quorum ratio secundum illud nomen commune est aliquo modo diversa.” 2. CPA 10: “Et propter hoc cave ne dixeris hic esse diffinita tantum pure aequivoca, quae alio vocabulo dicuntur aequivoca a casu, sed dicito aequivoca in communi, ut comprehendunt analoga quae aequivoca a consilio sunt, et pure aequivoca diffiniri, et quod pure aequivocis convenit habere rationem substantiae diversam penitus, analalogis vero diversam aliquo modo.” 3. Cf. CST I.13.5 n. 12: “analoga comprehenduntur sub aequivocis, quae in Praedicamentis definiuntur.” Of course in finding analogy inchoately contained in the Categories discussion of equivocation, Cajetan is just following a long tradition, which includes Boethius and goes back at least to Porphyry. Boethius , In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor, in PL 64, 166B–167A. Porphyry, In Aristotelis Praedicamenta per interrogationem et responsionem brevis explanatio, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IV.1, ed. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimeri, 1887), 65.16–67.34. 4. CPA 11: “Quot autem modis contingat variari analogiam et quomodo, nunc quum summarie loquimur, silentio pertransibimus, specialem de hoc tractatum , si Deo placuerit, cito confecturi.” 5. One of the few studies to compare Cajetan’s teaching on analogy in CDEE with that in DNA is Aloys Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie; Ihr Verhältnis zu Thomas von Aquin (Speyer a. Rh.: Pilger-Druckerei, 1938), 13–18, 20–22. 6. CDEE §21: “Univocata sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est eadem simpliciter. Pura aequivocata sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est diversa simpliciter. Analogata sunt quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est aliquo modo eadem, et aliquo modo diversa seu secundum quid eadem, et secundum quid diversa. . . . Unde analogum est medium inter purum aequivocum et univocum, sicut inter idem simpliciter et diversum simpliciter cadit medium idem secundum quid et diversum secundum quid.” 7. CDEE §18: “. . . aliquid dupliciter contingit de aliquibus praedicari per prius et posterius. Uno modo secundum esse illius praedicati. Alio modo secundum propriam rationem ejusdem. Illud dicitur praedicari analogice secundum esse, quod perfectius habet esse in uno quam in alio et sic omne genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, eo quod perfectius esse necessario habet in una specie, quam in alia.” 8. CDEE §21: “Nota secundo quod duplicia sunt analogata: quaedam secundum determinatam habitudenem unius ad alterum; quaedam secundum proportionalitatem. Exemplum: Substantia et accidens sunt analogata primo modo sub ente; Deus autem et creatura secundo modo: infinita enim est distantia inter Deum et creaturam. Differunt autem haec plurimum: quoniam analogata Notes to Pages 100–103  — 213 primo modo ita se habent, quod posterius secundum nomen analogum diffinitur per suum prius: puta accidens, inquantum ens per substantiam. Analogata vero secundo modo non: creatura enim inquantum ens non diffinitur per Deum.” 9. CDEE §21: “Unde analogata primo modo habent nomen commune, et rationem secundum illud nomen secundum quid eadem et secundum quid diversam: per hoc quod analogum illud simpliciter, id est sine additione aliqua , de primo dicitur, et de aliis vero non nisi diversimode respiciendo primum, quod cadit in eorum rationibus sicut in exemplo de sano manifestum est: analogata vero secundo modo habent nomen commune et rationem secundum illud nomen alliquo modo eadem et aliquo modo diversam: non propter hoc, quod illud simplicitur dicatur de primo et de aliis relative ad primum, sed habent rationem eadem secundum quid propter identitatem proportionis, quae in eis invenitur, et secundum quid diversam, propter diversitatem naturarum suppositarum illius proportionibus. Exemplum: Forma et materia substantialis et forma et materia accidentium sunt analogata quaedam sub nominibus formae et materiae: habent enim nomen commune, puta formam et materiam, et rationem secundum nomen formae sive materiae eamdem et diversam hoc modo, quia forma substantialis ita se habet ad substantiam, sicut forma accidentalis ad accidens; similiter materia substantiae ita se habet ad substantiam, sicut materia accidentis ad accidens: utrobique enim salvatur identitas proportionum cum diversitate naturarum et unitate nominis. Hunc modum analogiae exprimit Commentator (XII Metaph., com. XXVIII), et clarius cum Aristotele (I Ethic., cap. VII).” 10. CDEE §21: “Ens analogice utroque modo analogiae dicitur de substantia et accidente.” 11. The point cannot be, therefore, just that one mode of analogy is rele­ vant to what some refer to as the “transcendental” predication of being (being as said of God and creatures) and another is relevant to “predicamental” predication (being said of the different categories). More will be said about Cajetan’s treatment of such “mixed cases” later in this chapter. 12. We cannot rule out the possibility that Cajetan may have in mind here Aquinas’s distinction between analogy secundum esse and analogy secundum intentionem in I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1, even if he does not cite that text. But even if Cajetan does have that text in mind, we must note that he alters its terminology slightly and does not apply it consistently. Cajetan says: “. . . aliquid dupliciter contingit de aliquibus praedicari per prius et posterius. Uno modo secundum esse illius praedicati. Alio modo secundum propriam rationem ejusdem” (CDEE §18). But being predicated “per prius et posterius . . . secundum esse” is here sufficient to describe (what Cajetan will later call) analogy of inequality, although according to a parallelism with I Sent. 19.5.2 ad 1, two modes of analogy (Cajetan’s analogy of inequality and analogy of proportionality) should be per prius et posterius secundum esse, and a sufficient description of inequality is that it is “secundum esse et non secundum intentionem.” Furthermore, in discussing what will come to be called analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion­ ality, Cajetan does not say that the former is analogy “secundum rationem et non secundum esse,” nor does he say that the latter is analogy “secundum rationem 214  — Notes to Pages 104–105 et secundum esse.” Cajetan’s terminology in these passages thus does not suggest that he is trying to justify his threefold distinction by basing it on implicit reference to the threefold distinction in I Sent. 19.5.2, ad 1. 13. CDEE §21: “. . . cum talis unitas apud Aristotelem (IV Metaph., text. com. II) sufficiat ad objectum scientiae, ens non oportet poni univocum ad hoc quod passiones habeat et contradictionem fundet, et reliqua hujusmodi habeant sibi convenientia.” The reference to Aquinas’s commentary on the Metaphysics is apparently to book 4, lect. 1 (§547 Cathala). 14. Cajetan presents the arguments of Scotus in CDEE §19. 15. Among those who have inaccurately claimed that Cajetan’s distinction between modes of analogy is based on or defined in terms of the properties of extrinsic and intrinsic denomination are E.J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 126, and John D. Beach, “Analogous Naming, Extrinsic Denomination and the Real Order,” Modern Schoolman 42 (1965): 201. 16. DNA §10–11; Cf. DNA §29. 17. DNA§4:“Analogasecunduminaequalitatemvocantur,quorumnomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est omnino eadem, inaequaliter tamen participata”; §8: “Analoga autem secundum attributionem sunt, quorum nomen commune est, ratio autem secundum illud nomen est eadem secundum terminum, et diversa secundum habitudines ad illum”; §23: “[A]naloga secundum proportionalitatem dici, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est proportionaliter eadem.” 18. The one apparent exception to this parallel is that Aristotle was careful to emphasize that he was not defining things as they are, but as they are signified by our terms. Thus, as has often been noted, Aristotle wrote that equivocals and univocals “dicuntur,” rather than “sunt.” Cajetan only follows this inconsistently; he uses “sunt” for analogy of attribution, but since he uses “vocantur” for analogy of inequality and “dici” for analogy of proportionality, I think we can assume that the deviation is not significant. On Cajetan’s appreciation of Aristotle’s use of “dicitur,” see chap. 2, n. 16, above. 19. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 107. Cf. Cajetan’s use of “latere” at DNA §108, quoting Aristotle (Sophisticis Elenchis, 182b22). Ramirez also cites remarks on genus in Aristotle’s Physics in connection with analogy of inequality. Jacobus M. Ramirez, “De analogia secundum doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam,” Ciencia Tomista 24 (1921): 195. 20. CDEE §18: “Unde Commentator (XII Metaph., com. II) dicit quod prioritas et posterioritas specierum non impedit unitatem generis.” DNA §7: “Perhibet quoque huic analogiae testimonium Averroës in XII Metaph., text. 2 dicens, cum unitate generis stare prioritatem et posterioritatem eorum, quae sub genere sunt.” 21. The distinction also turns out to be the same as the distinction between the nature absolutely considered and the nature as it is in things. Cf. CDEE§55. This also helps us to make sense of why Cajetan can say that in analogy of inequality, “the analogates are the same in the ratio signified by that common name, but they are not the same in the being [esse] of that ratio” (DNA §6). Notes to Pages 106–108  — 215 22. DNA §6: “Non solum enim planta est nobilior minera; sed corporeitas in planta est nobilior corporeitate in minera.” While this formulation might seem to depend entirely on a specific version of Aristotelian hylomorphist metaphysics , even someone who rejects that metaphysics can understand the intuitive point that Cajetan is trying to express: that stone and plant are equally bodies, though they are not equal bodies. Cf. Aquinas, preparing us to understand how not all sins are equal, Quaestiones disputate de malo, II.9, ad 16: “Dicendum quod omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalia, sed unam animal est altero maius et perfectus.” In fact, while Cajetan’s and Aquinas’s language presupposes a hierarchy of species within a genus, all that matters for a genus term to signify by analogy of inequality is that there be a diversity of species. For a brief but common-sense discussion of analogy of inequality (“the pseudo-analogy, the stretched univocity called analogy of inequality by Cajetan”) see Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 135–36, 138. 23. DNA §§5, 7. 24. DNA §3. 25. Cajetan also notes that this is why even though in this sense every genus term is analogous, they are not normally so called; DNA §5. Aristotle says that generic unity implies analogical unity in Metaphysics V.6 (1017a2). 26. Herbert Thomas Schwartz, “Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan,” New Scholasticism 28 (1954): 127–44. 27. Frank R. Harrison also fails to understand Cajetan’s comments on analogy of inequality because he fails to understand Cajetan’s semantic principles; in his case, a Wittgensteinian inclination prevents him from understanding the semantic function of the ratio. Frank R. Harrison, “The Cajetan Tradition of Analogy,” Franciscan Studies 23 (1963): esp. 185–86. Armand Maurer criticizes Cajetan’s position on analogy of inequality, but in fact it is precisely the position that Maurer finds and agrees with in Aquinas: accepting it from the point of view of the natural philosopher, rejecting it from the point of view of the logician. Maurer, “St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus,” New Scholasticism 29 (1955): 127–44. Maurer complains that Cajetan’s position is evidence of his “essentialism,” as compared with the “existential” approach of Aquinas. Maurer is apparently reading Cajetan through the somewhat distorting lens of Étienne Gilson, “Cajétan et l’existence,” Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 15 (1953): 267–86. For correctives to Gilson’s interpretation of Cajetan see Laurence Dewan, “Étienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” Maritain Studies/Étudies Maritainiennes 15 (1999): 70–96, and John P. Reilly, Cajetan’s Notion of Existence (The Hague: Mouton, 1971). Riva discusses the allegations of Cajetan’s “essentialism” in Analogia e univocit à in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano” (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1995), 65–82. 28. DNA §8: “. . . sanum commune nomen est medicinae, urinae et animali; et ratio omnium in quantum sana sunt, ad unum terminum (sanitatem scilicet), diversas dicit habitudines. Si quis enim assignet quid est animal in quantum sanum, subiectum dicet sanitatis; urinam vero in quantum sanam, signum sanitatis ; medicinam autem in quantum sanam, causam sanitatis proferet.” Cf. DNA§52. 216  — Notes to Pages 109–110 29. More specifically, it is a relation secundum esse, not secundum dici; cf. chap. 5, n. 38, supra. 30. CST I.13.6, n. 4: “Quaedam enim significant ipsos respectus ad primum analogatum, ut patet de sano.” This is confirmed in Ross’s attempt to formulate definitions of the different modes of analogy, where it is clear that a word analogous by attribution, insofar as it signifies a secondary term, signifies a relation. James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language” in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969), 115. 31. DNA §10: “Attribuuntur autem huic analogiae multae conditiones, ordinate se cosequentes: scilicet quod analogia ista sit secundum denominationem extrinsecam tantum; ita quod primum analogatorum tantum est tale formaliter, caetera autem denominantur talia extrinsece.” 32. Even Ashworth is imprecise on this point, referring to “Cajetan’s notorious claim . . . that the supposed division between analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality is based on the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination.” Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 126. 33. DNA §11: “Sed diligenter advertendum est, quod haec huiusmodi analogiae conditio, scilicet quod non sit secundum genus causae formalis inhaerentis , sed semper secundum aliquid extrinsecum, est formaliter intelligenda et non materialiter: idest non est intelligendum per hoc, quod omne nomen quod est analogum per attributionem, sit commune analogatis sic, quod primo tantum conveniat formaliter, caeteris autem extrinseca denominatione, ut de sano et medicinali accidit; ista enim universalis est falsa, ut patet de ente et bono; nec potest haberi ex dictis, nisi materialiter intellectis. Sed est ex hoc intelligendum, quod omne nomen analogum per attributionem ut sic, vel in quantum sic analogum , commune est analogatis sic, quod primo convenit formaliter, reliquis autem extrinseca denominatione.” 34. DNA §11: “Ens enim quamvis formaliter conveniat omnibus substantiis et accidentibus etc., in quantum tamen entia, omnia dicuntur ab ente subiective ut sic, sola substantia est ens formaliter; caetera autem entia dicuntur, quia entis passiones vel generationes etc. sunt; licet entia formaliter alia ratione dici possint.” 35. E.g., cf. John Beach, “Analogous Naming, Extrinsic Denomination, and the Real Order,” Modern Schoolman 42 (1965): 204, and Henry Chavannes, The Analogy Between God and the World in Saint Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, trans. William Lumley (New York: Vantage Press, 1992), 53–58. Masiello finds Cajetan’s qualification an odd concession. Ralph J. Masiello, “The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman 35 (1958): 95–97. Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 94n33, calls Cajetan’s clarification “l’étrange précaution.” 36. Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 20. Cf. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 7–9. 37. Although this has been McInerny’s interpretation for some time, in this most recent book on analogy it is accompanied by an unfortunate mistranslation Notes to Pages 111–112  — 217 of part of Cajetan’s qualification, which does indeed render that qualification nonsensical: “Although being belongs formally to all substances and accidents, etc., insofar as they are called beings they are all denominated from the being which is a subject, only substance is being formally; the others are called beings because they are properties or becomings of being, etc., although they can be called beings formally for other reasons” (McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 20, emphasis added). However, McInerny had earlier rendered the passage correctly: “For although being agrees formally with all substances, accidents, etc., nevertheless insofar as all are denominated from being taken subjectively as such, substance alone is being formally, and the others are called beings because they are qualities, activities, etc. of being. However, under a different aspect they could be called beings in a formal sense.” Ralph McInerny, “The Logic of Analogy,” New Scholasticism 31 (1957): 157 (emphasis added). 38. Cajetan also uses a reduplicative term when he describes analogy of attribution at CDEE §21: “. . . accidens, inquantum ens [diffinitur] per substantiam . . . . creatura enim inquantum ens non diffinitur per Deum.” We are not surprised to find similar reduplicative phrases in other expositions of Cajetan’s position. Thus Penido writes: “L’attribution en tant qu’attribution ne pose pas autre chose parce qu’ell est un pur rapport de dépendence” (emphasis added). M.T.-L. Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1931), 27. According to Anderson, followers of Cajetan “do not hold that there is nothing intrinsic to the secondary analogates but only that they do not realize formally the analogical notion as such” (second emphasis added). Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), 109–10. Cf. Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 165–66: “If the unity of a concept is analogical, its inferiors make up an ordered set, and . . . neither the unity of the set nor the meaning of each member, considered qua member of the set, is understood except in the system of relations of priority and posteriority . . .” (emphasis Simon’s). 39. Harrison, “The Cajetan Tradition of Analogy,” 191, maintains that Cajetan’s theory couldn’t account for the case of healthy skin. 40. A similar argument could be made for “healthy” as predicated of food. Some foods may have their own intrinsic health, although “healthy” is the traditional example of a term analogous by attribution which denominates food extrinsically. Cf. Aquinas, De Veritate 1.4, and Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktrycheri AB, 1952), 331. We have here also the material for a reply to Beach, who claims that Cajetan is unable to explain how a leech or oyster might be denominated healthy extrinsically , and yet still be intrinsically healthy. Beach, “Analogous Naming, Extrinsic Denomination, and the Real Order,” 204. 41. Log. p. 2, q. 13, a. 4 (487b25–32): “possunt tamen in illis analogatis minus principalibus praerequiri aliqui respectus intrinseci, non quibus denominentur analogice et sub forma analoga constituantur, sed quibus respiciant illud principale analogatum, ut deinde denominentur extrinsece ab illo analogice.” 42. Cajetanians have expressed the point in a variety of ways. GarrigouLagrange puts it this way: “Analogy of attribution never implies intrinsic 218  — Notes to Pages 113–115 denomination in the various analogates, but does not necessarily exclude it.” Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1934, 1936), 207. Anderson, The Bond of Being, 112, describes mixed cases as “a kind of ‘material coincidence’ of attribution and proportionality.” John of St. Thomas speaks of cases of proportionality which contain analogy of attribution “virtually”: “Analogia entis ad decem praedicamenta non sufficienter explicatur dicendo, quod est transcendentiae, sed dicendum est quod est analogia proportionalitatis formaliter, licet virtualiter analogiam attributionis seu proportionis includet.” John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica p. 2, q. 14, a. 3 (512b26–33). Cf. Ibid., q. 13, a. 4 (489b42–490a6): “Quodsi inquiras, quomodo ista duplex analogia possit eidem convenire, v.g. enti, cum habeant conditiones omnino oppositas. . . . Respondetur non dari utramque analogiam formaliter, sed alteram virtualiter.” Joseph Owens arrives at a very similar treatment of the relationship between Aristotle’s two kinds of equivocation (pros hen equivocation and analogy): “There is nothing in the Aristotelian text . . . to preclude the same things from being equivocal in both ways. . . . The two types, though clearly distinct, are not mutually exclusive. Just as things may be denominated univocally or equivocally by the same word, according as their nature demands, so things may be expressed by the same term [either] analogously or through reference, according as their nature allows.” Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics”: A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), 125. 43. Suarez,DisputationesMetaphysicae,vol.2,disp.28,sect.3,¶¶14,17;disp. 32, sect. 2, ¶14 (Paris, 1866; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), 17, 19, 323; P. Pedro Descoqs, Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), 260–69; Descoqs, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, vol. 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932),: 765; Giulio Righi, Studio sulla Analogia in S. Tommaso (Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1981), 97–106. 44. E.J. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background,” Vivarium 33 (1995): 59–65; Ashworth, “Domingo de Soto (1494– 1560) on Analogy and Equivocation,” in Studies on the History of Logic, ed. Ignacio Angelelli and María Cerezo (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 122–23; Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio “Gaetano,” 139–64. 45. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being,” 59. 46. Anderson, The Bond of Being, 232. 47. Ibid., 232–33. Similarly, a review note by R. Bernard in Bulletin Thomist 1 (1924): 124–27, suggests that the different treatments of analogy by the Suarezian Blanche and the Cajetanian Ramirez might be attributed to the fact that the former considers analogy in actu exercito, while the latter considers analogy in actu signato. Cajetan does not invoke this distinction himself in this context, although he introduces the terminology at DNA §78–79; cf. DNA§72. On this distinction in general, a study by Nuchelmans confirms the sense invoked by Anderson and Bernard that it is the distinction between considering a form (or significate of a term) either “as concretely realized in some individual or as abstractly conceived of in an intellectual act of simple apprehension .” Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Distinction Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus Notes to Pages 115–116  — 219 in Medieval Semantics,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 57–90. 48. Ironically, in the context of his criticism of Suarez, Jean-Luc Marion might be said to fall into this same Suarezian trap of failing to distinguish between the signification of an analogical term just as conceived by the intellect, and the signification as concretely realized in the analogates. Thus, after observing that Cajetan grants that accidents have intrinsic (or formal) being, and that even created beings have inherent goodness, Marion writes: “Mais, justement aux yeux de Cajetan, cet être formel et cette bonté inhérente aux analogu és dérivés ne peuvent pas, sauf contradiction, appartenir aussi, per prius et formellement, au seul analogum princeps; il faut donc invoquer un autre être et une autre bonté qui, intrinsèques à l’analogum princeps et à lui uniquement, n’atteindront les autres analogués que par une dénomination extrinsèque. . . . Cajetan n’envisage jamais l’hypothèse que le même être, la même bonté à la fois constituent intrinsèquement, mais sur un mode déficient, les analogués seconds et relèvent intrinsèquement de Dieu qui les constitue” (Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 94). Of these two sentences, the latter is false, and the former is confused by an equivocation. Cajetan needs only to posit an other being and an other goodness “formally”—that is, as distinct semantic entities—to observe the difference between the way a term signifies by analogy of attribution and the way a term signifies by analogy of proportionality. But of course as a metaphysician, Cajetan entertains—indeed, regards as true—the hypothesis that the same being and the same goodness are intrinsic to God and creatures (provided Marion’s qualification that they are in creatures only in a “deficient way,” and provided the further qualification that the “sameness” here is not specific or generic but proportional). 49. E.J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,” in Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol 1, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1991), 28. 50. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in ThirteenthCentury Logic,” 67. Cf. the many other comments by Ashworth on this theme, quoted and cited in chap. 3 above. 51. DNA §8; cf. §4 and §19. 52. And at DNA §12 Cajetan explains that this is true whether we consider the “one” universally or particularly. 53. DNA §14. 54. DNA §15. 55. DNA §19. 56. DNA §20. 57. DNA §7: “In huius modi autem analogis, quomodo inveniantur unitas, abstractio, praedicatio, comparatio, demonstratio et alia huiusmodi, non oportet determinare; quoniam univoca sunt secundum veritatem, et univocorum canones in eis servandi sunt.” 58. DNA §22: “Quomodo autem de huiusmodi analogis sit scientia, et contradictiones et demonstrationes, et consequentiae et alia huiusmodi de eis fiant, 220 — Notes to Pages 116–118 ex dictis, et consuetudine Aristotelis patet. Oportet enim significationes diversas prius distinguere (propter quod ambigua apud Arabes haec dicuntur), et deinde a primo ad alia procedere.” It is commonly said that Cajetan preferred analogy of proportionality to analogy of attribution because the latter involves extrinsic denomination, while the former involves intrinsic denomination. This is only partially correct. It would be more fair to say that Cajetan prefers analogy of proportionality because it is more genuinely a mean between univocation and equivocation; analogy of attribution, as we see here, is logically speaking a form of equivocation, and although unified secundum quid—that is, with respect to the primary analogate, to which the secondary analogates are referred—it is not unified enough to avoid being treated like equivocation in all respects relevant to the logician—that is, insofar as abstraction, predication, and reasoning are concerned. But Cajetan’s reasons for preferring proportionality will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter. Chapter Seven 1. DNA §23: “Ex abusive igitur analogis ad proprie analogiam ascendendo .” Cf. DNA §21. 2. Cajetan also speaks of other “abusive” locutions at DNA §§51, 94, 121. 3. On Latin and Greek use of “analogia” see the introduction. Ashworth notes that fourteenth- and fifteenth-century authors often remarked on the distinction between Greek and Latin senses of “analogia.” E.J. Ashworth, “Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background,” Vivarium 33 (1995): 55–56. 4. DNA §2: “. . . multarum distinctionum adunatio si fieret, confusionem paret.” 5. The exaggerated phrase is from John Deely, “The Absence of Analogy ,” Review of Metaphysics 55 (March 2002): 539. Cf. Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 21, 24, interpreting Cajetan as accusing Aquinas of a “misuse” of language. A similar overinterpretation of “abusive” is found in Jean-François Courtine, Inventio analogiae: Métaphysique et ontotheologie (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 231–32. 6. Still, the sense of improper or abusive language should not be diminished too much; DNA §121 implies that a term’s use can be extended so that its use is “quite broad and liberal” without being improper, but that if it is extended too much, it would become “abusive and false.” 7. For examples of some playful metaphorical language in De Nominum Analogia, see Cajetan’s use of ‘expoliata’ in §111 and ‘pater’ in §122. 8. DNA §23: “analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic: Analoga secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum nomen est similis secundum proportionem.” 9. Cf., e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6 (esp. 1016b31–1017a2); Aquinas, De principiis naturae c. 6. Notes to Pages 122–125  — 221 10. Of course, Aristotle clearly seemed to distinguish these two kinds of unity in the famous passage in Nichomachean Ethics I.6 (1096b27–29). Cajetan invokes this passage at DNA §28. On the difference between analogy and pros hen equivocation in Aristotle, cf. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics”: A Study in the Greek Background of Medical Thought, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), 116–25. 11. DNA §23: “. . . quia sicut intelligere, rem animae offert, ita videre corpori animato.” 12. DNA §§25–26: “Fit autem duobus modis analogia haec: scilicet metaphorice et proprie. Metaphorice quidem, quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet rationem formalem, quae in uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur. . . . Proprie vero fit, quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur: ut principium in corde respectu animalis, et in fundamento respectu domus salvatur. Quod, ut Averroës in comm. septimo I Ethic. ait, proportionaliter de eis dicitur.” 13. This is why in metaphor, as opposed to analogy of proper proportion­ ality, what is secondarily (metaphorically) signified by the term is not understood without understanding also what is primarily (nonmetaphorically) signified by the term. Cf. DNA §75–76. More will be said on this in chap. 8, below. 14. A principled theoretical distinction between metaphor and analogy does not rule out hard cases in practice. Given the development of language, an extension of a term that is originally only metaphorical may come to be regarded as no longer (merely) metaphorical but rather more (analogically) literal. (E.g., it is not clear that English speakers regard speaking of the “leg” of a table as merely metaphorical, although it may once have been.) Indeed, at certain points in a language’s history it may be difficult to determine whether given terms are being used metaphorically or properly analogically. (E.g., is it only metaphorically that we speak of “folders” on the “desktop” of a computer operating system?) Likewise, a term that is predicated of something analogically in one language may have a correspondingly close translation in another language whose predication of the same thing would be regarded as at best metaphorical. (E.g., while a support for a table is called a “leg” in English, the standard French translation of “leg” [jambe] would be predicated of a table support only metaphorically ; in French, it would more properly be called a pied [English “foot”].) Indeed, analogical or metaphorical predications in one language may be completely nonsensical in another language, as is often the case with poetic expressions and figures of speech (idioms, colloquialisms, slang, etc.). That is why so much of learning a language involves coming to appreciate what metaphors and analogies are considered native to a language, and where certain terms are in the move from metaphor to proper analogy. 15. The formula is used especially in the debate between Penido and Descoqs, and from there is taken up by, e.g., Garrigou-Lagrange and Mascall. P. Pedro Descoqs, Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis, vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), 269–83; Descoqs, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, vol. 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932, 1935), 794–96; M. T.-L. Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique (Paris: Vrin, 1931), 22–25, 65; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: 222  — Notes to Pages 125–130 His Existence and His Nature, vol. 1, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1934, 1936), 218–20; E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London: Longmans, Green, 1949), 104–11, 120. 16. Austin Farrer frames the “two unknowns” objection, saying, “The scheme of proportionality looks as uninformative as it is unexceptionable . . . we cannot do the sum which the formula appears to propose to us.” Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1943), 53. Likewise, Mascall frames the objection: “Our equation has . . . two unknowns and cannot be solved.” Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 110. 17. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, vol. 1, 227. Cf. Ibid., vol. 2, 217–20. 18. James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), 286–90. Anderson adds to this a further response to the two-unknowns objection: he says that the apparent equation actually contains only three terms, not four, since two of the four are analogically the same. This leads to an objection of circularity, as it seems the fourth term in an analogy is known only by analogy; the objection of circularity will be considered below. 19. To the objection that in analogy, “it is impossible [except in mathematical analogies] to ascertain the nature of one term from the other three,” James F. Anderson agrees, saying, “But metaphysical analogy is not a means of ‘calculating ’ or in any way ascertaining the nature of something from the known natures of other things. It is in our minds a way of seeing how things are, not of discovering what they are.” Anderson, “Response to Comments,” Review of Metaphysics 5 (1952): 470. 20. Hilary Putnam, “Thoughts Addressed to an Analytical Thomist,” The Monist 80 (1997): 496–97. 21. Thus McInerny notes that Cajetan’s definition of analogy of proportionality “could be trivialized by rephrasing it thus: ‘those things are said to be analogous according to analogy which have a common name, and the notion signified by the name is the same according to analogy.’” McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 22. 22. Anderson, The Bond of Being, 289. 23. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 104–5. 24. Ibid., 105–6. For a compressed version of the infinite regress objection, see Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktrycheri AB, 1952), 474. 25. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 109–26. 26. David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 13. 27. Ibid., 9. 28. Ibid., 10. 29. Ibid., 14. 30. Ibid. 31. Paul C. Hayner, “Analogical Predication,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1958): 857, 860, 862. Notes to Pages 130–135  — 223 32. Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 139. 33. One may object here that what Cajetan offers is rather an explanation of what it is for two things to be analogically related. Cajetan’s definition speaks of analogues, after all, not analogous terms. In response, observe that Cajetan offers an explanation of what it is for things to be said to be analogous by analogy of proportionality: “analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici, quorum nomen est commune [&c.].” Given Cajetan’s understanding of the nature of logic, this statement proves to be equivalent to the claim made here, that Cajetan offers an explanation of what it is for a term to be analogous by analogy of proportionality. Cf. CPA 4–5: “Idem enim est tractare de rebus ut conceptis simplici apprehensione, et de vocibus ut significant illas sic conceptas. . . . Quamvis autem sic intellecta intentio ista sustinenda sit, memores tame esse oportet eius quod optime ab Avicenna in principio suae Logicae dicitur, scilicet quod considerare de vocibus non est logici negocii ex intentione, sed necessitas ad hoc compulit, quoniam res sic conceptas nonnisi verbis exprimimus, docemus , adunamus et ordinamus. . . . Et propterea si quaeratur, de vocibus an de rebus principaliter hic tractetur, respondendum est quod de rebus non absolute sed incomplexe conceptis et consequenti necessitate significatis.” 34. James F. Ross, “Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,” in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969), 131. 35. To Ross’s hope for a “practicable criterion of similarity relations” it is tempting to respond with the words of Aristotle: “But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars” (Poetics, 22 [1459a5–8]). It was no doubt a failure to secure the kind of “practicable criterion” Ross was looking for that led to the different turn his work took with Portraying Analogy, although in giving up the search for such a “practicable criterion” Ross did not have to repudiate Cajetan and classical semantics. 36. More typical of Aristotelian commentators is to treat the ability to found a contradiction as a feature of univocal terms, e.g., Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Categories, 34.7–11” (On Aristotle’s “Categories 1–4,” trans. Michael Chase [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003], 48). But for Simplicius and others this is still compatible with treating analogous terms as a mean between univocation and equivocation, exhibiting some features of both. Scotus may have been the very first to define univocity explicitly in terms of the ability to found a contradiction, an approach that became common among Scotists. 37. DNA §§3, 23, 27. 38. The priority of attribution in Aquinas is defended by Klubertanz, Montagnes, Lyttkens, and others. But the findings of Klubertanz also make clear how difficult it is to discern in Aquinas’s works a coherent teaching on analogy in general, or on analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution in particular. In this light it is somewhat surprising that those who most 224  — Notes to Pages 135–140 faithfully remind us that Aquinas had no ex professo teaching should be the most adamant that Cajetan’s teaching contradicts Aquinas’s own teaching on analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. 39. George B. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analy­ sis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 92. Chapter Eight 1. DNA §30: “Sed quoniam, ut dictum est, obscura et necessaria valde res haec est, accurate distincteque dilucidanda est per plura capitula.” 2. A similar structural observation was made by Robillard, although he did not classify chap. 11 as pertaining to reasoning. Hyacinthe-Marie Robillard, De l’analogie et du concept d’être de Thomas de Vio, Cajetan: Traduction, commentaires et index (Montreal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1963), 253. 3. CPA 8: “Aequivoca ergo diversis respectibus et nomina et res significare dicuntur. Dicitur enim nomen aliquod aequivocum, quia significat plura secundum diversas rationes, ut ly ‘canis’ significat caelestem, marinum atque terrestrem canem. Ipsae vero res significae dicuntur aequivocae, non quia significant , sed quia significantur unico vocabulo diversis rationibus, ut sydus illud et piscis et animal latrabile aequivoca appelantur. Unde ipsum nomen appelari consuevit aequivocum aequivocans, res vero aequivoca aequivocata.” 4. CPA 11: “Est siquidem duplex univocum, scilicet univocans univocum etc.” 5. DNA §31: “Et quia in nominibus tria inveniuntur, scilicet vox, conceptus in anima, et res extra, seu conceptus obiectivus: ideo singula perlustrando, dicendum est, quomodo analogum ab analogatis distinguatur.” 6. DNA §33: “Unde inter univocationem et analogiam haec est differentia : quod res fundantes univocationem sunt sic ad invicem similes, quod fundamentum similitudinis in una est eiusdem rationis omnino cum fundamento similitudinis in alia: ita quod nihil claudit in se unius ratio, quod non claudat alterius ratio. Ac per hoc fundamentum univocae similitudinis, in utroque extremorum aeque abstrahit ab ipsis extremis. Res autem fundantes analogiam, sic sunt similes, quod fundamentum similitudinis in una, diversae est rationis simpliciter a fundamento illius in alia: ita quod unius ratio non claudit id quod claudit ratio alterius. Ac per hoc fundamentum analogae similitudinis, in neutro extremorum oportet esse abstractum ab ipsis extremis; sed remanent fundamenta distincta, similia tamen secundum proportionem; propter quod eadem proportionaliter vel analogice dicuntur.” 7. DNA §34: “Et ut possint omnibus praedicta patere, declarantur exemplariter in univocatione huius nominis animal, et analogia huius nominis ens. Homo, bos, leo et caetera animalia, quia habent in se singulas naturas sensitivas, seu proprias animalitates, quas constat diversas secundum rem esse, et mutuo similes: sic quod in quocumque extremo, puta homine aut leone, consideretur secundum se animalitas, quae est similitudinis fundamentum, invenitur aequaliter abstrahens ab eo in quo est, et nihil includens in uno quod non in Notes to Pages 141–146  — 225 alio. Ideo et in rerum natura fundant secundum suas animalitates similitudinem univocam, quae identitas generica vocatur; et in esse cognito adunantur non ad duas vel tres animalitates, sed unam tantum, quae animalis nomine in concreto per se primo significatur, et univoce vocatur communi nomine animal.” 8. DNA §34: “Substantia autem quantitas, qualitas etc., quia non habent in suis quidditatibus aliquid praedicto modo abstrahibile, puta entitatem, (quoniam supra substantialitatem nihil amplius restat), ideo nullam substantialem univocationem inter se compatiuntur.” 9. DNA §35: “Et quia cum hoc, quod non solum eorum quidditates sunt diversae, sed etiam primo diversae; retinent similitudinem in hoc, quod unumquodque eorum secundum suam proportionem habet esse; ideo et in rerum natura non secundum aliquam eiusdem rationis in extremis sed secundum proprias quidditates, ut commensuratas his propriis esse fundant analogam idest proportionalem similitudinem. Et in intellectu adunantur ad tot res, quot sunt fundamenta, proportionis similitudine unitas, significatas (propter illam similitudinem ) entis nomine, et analogice communi nomine vocantur ens. Differenter ergo res adunantur sub nomine Analogo et Univoco.” 10. Representatio and significatio are not always the same, but here Cajetan’s “repraesentare” is just a word for the natural signification of the objective concept (the object of the intellect) by the formal concept (the intellectual intention that mediates understanding). It does not imply the kind of problematic “representationalism ” that has been rightly distinguished from genuine Thomistic philosophies of mind and language. See John O’Callaghan, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). 11. DNA §38: “conceptus unus repraesentans perfecte alterum analogatum ut sic, imperfecte repraesentat reliquum.” 12. DNA §36: “analogo et suis analogatis respondet unus conceptus mentalis imperfectus” (emphasis added). Cf. DNA §38: “Analogi vero et analogatorum ut sic, plures necessario sunt conceptus perfecte ea repraesentantes, et unus est conceptus imperfecte repraesentans.” 13. In fact, this seems to be Cajetan’s position at DCE §7: “Et sicut in mente duplex conceptus imperfectus reperitur, ita res significata, extra potest obici dupliciter: imperfecte scilicet vel in uno explicite in quo caetera obiciuntur indeterminate; vel in nullo explicite, sed omnia implicite, in solo formalissimo significato explicite.” 14. DNA §37: “Unde et analogum unum habere mentalem conceptum, et plures habere conceptus mentales: verum est diversimode; quamvis simpliciter loquendo, magis debeat dici, analogi esse plures conceptus; nisi loquendi occasio aliud exigat. Dico autem hoc: quoniam cum secundum dicentes, analoga omnino carere uno conceptu mentali, sermo est; unum eorum conceptum absolute dicere non est reprehendendum. Propter quod oportet solerti discretione lectorem uti quando invenitur scriptum, quod analogata conveniunt in una ratione , et quando invenitur dictum alibi, quod analogata non conveniunt in una ratione.” 226  — Notes to Pages 146–148 15. On the sense in which there is and is not a common concept in analogy, cf. John of St. Thomas addressing the question “utrum in analogis detur unus conceptus ab inferioribus praecisus” in Ars Logica p. 2, q. 13, a. 5, especially (492b49–493a7): “Analogia proportionalitatis propriae possunt habere conceptum unum respectu omnium analogatorum inadaequatum et imperfectum, nec praescindentem ab inferioribus per aliquid, quod in potentia illa includat et actu excludat, sed per aliquid quod actu non explicet, actu autem includat seu implicet.” 16. DNA §§33, 34. 17. DNA §43: “[abstrahere] semper sonat intelligi unum, non intellecto altero.” 18. DNA §44: “nihil aliud est agere de abstractione analogi ab analogatis quam inquirere et determinare, quomodo res significata analogo nomine intelligi possit, non cointellectis analogatis; et quomodo conceptus illius habeatur, absque conceptibus istorum.” 19. DNA §46. 20. DNA §58. 21. DNA §47: “Unde concedi potest, rem analogam abstrahere, et non abstrahere ab analogatis diversimode. Abstrahit quidem, pro quanto abstrahit ab eis, quemadmodum res ut sic, idest ut res similis alteri proportionaliter abstrahit a se absolute sumpta. Non abstrahit vero, pro quanto res ut sic accepta seipsam necessario includit, et absque seipsa intelligi non potest. Quod de univocis dici non potest: quia res univoca, absque aliis quibus est univoce communis, intelligitur sic, quod res in suo intellectu nullo modo actualiter includit ea quibus est communis, ut patet de animali.” Cf. DNA §56: “Sicque fit, ut in analogo secundum identitatem in se clausam, ad diversitatem rationum in se quoque clausam comparato, abstractio quaedam, quae non tam abstractio quam quidam abstractionis modus est inveniatur.” 22. DNA §53. 23. David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 14. 24. DNA §49: “De ratione siquidem unius proportionaliter est habere quatuor terminos (ut in V Ethicorum dicitur). Quoniam proportionalitas qua similitudo proportionum fit, inter quatuor ad minus, (quae duarum proportionum extrema sunt), necessario est; et consequenter unum proportione non unificatur simpliciter, sed distinctionem retinens, unum pro tanto est et dicitur, pro quanto proportionibus dissimilibus divisum non est. Unde sicut non est alia ratio quare unum proportionaliter non est unum absolute, nisi quia ista est eius ratio formalis; ita non est quaerenda alia ratio, cur a similibus proportionaliter non potest abstrahi res una; hoc enim ideo est, quia similitudo proportionalis talem in sua ratione diversitatem includit. Et accidit ulterius procedentibus, ut quaerant id, quod sub quaestione non cadit: ut quare homo est animal rationale, etc.” 25. I.M. Bochenski, “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948): 425–77, §17. (I cite this work by section number as it has been reprinted, with corrections, in Logico-Philosophical Studies, ed. Albert Menne (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1962), and in Notes to Pages 148–150 — 227 Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, ed. James F. Ross (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971), 99–122. 26. Cf. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, trans. Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 397, commenting on a discussion of “systematic ambiguity” from Principia Mathematica: “All the statements in question evidently share the same formal structure. We have in fact a case of isomorphy. It is remarkable that the name used for this kind of isomorphy , ‘systematic ambiguity,’ is an exact translation of the common Scholastic expression aequivocatio a consilio, synonymous with ‘analogy’; for isomorphy is precisely analogy.” 27. DNA §§33–34. 28. This is not just an ad hoc distinction, but one anticipated before the writing of DNA, as is evident from Cajetan’s discussion of univocation in CPA. Commenting on Aristotle’s definition of univocals, according to which there is “eadem ratio substantiae,” Cajetan says of the word “eadem” that it “non dicit identitatem simpliciter vel secundum quid, sed identitatem simpliciter, ita quod licet ad aequivocationem sufficiat qualiscunque diversitas rationis secundum illud nomen, ad univocationem tamen non sufficit qualiscunque identitas rationis secundum illud nomen, sed exigitur quod ratio univocatorum, quae attenditur penes illud nomen in quo univocantur, sit totaliter eadem et nihil plus aut minus includat unum quam reliquum in ratione illius nominis” (CPA 11). 29. DNA §§67–68: “Fundatur enim superioritas super identitate rationis rei significatae, idest super hoc quod res significata invenitur non in hoc tantum, sed illamet non numero sed ratione invenitur in alio. Univocatio autem supra modo identitatis omnimodae scilicet identitate rationis rei significatae, idest super hoc quod ratio rei significatae in illo et in isto est eadem omnino. Quamvis enim in analogis hic identitatis modus non inveniatur, quem in univocis inveniri pluries dictum est, identitas tamen ipsa rationum invenitur. Est namque identitas proportionalis, identitas quaedam. Et ideo non minus analogum (puta ens) est praedicatum superius, quam univocum (puta animal), sed alio modo: analogum enim est superius proportionaliter, quia fundatur supra identitate proportionali rationis rei significatae; univocum autem praecise et simpliciter, quia supra omnimoda identitate rationis rei significatae eius superioritas fundatur.” 30. Cajetan describes the same sophisma consequentis at CST I.13.5 nn. 9–10, this time explictly in response to Scotus’s famous argument that a concept is univocal between God and creatures if it is not specific to one but applies commonly to both. Cajetan replies: “illud argumentum nihil aliud concludit nisi alietatem conceptus sapientiae, verbi gratia, in communi, a sapientia Dei et sapientia creaturae. Sed ex hoc inferre, ergo univocus conceptus, est sophisma Consequentis: quoniam conceptus analogus est etiam alius ab inferioribus. Non tamen eo alietatis modo, quo est alius conceptus univocus ab univocatis: quia hic est alius ut praecisus ab eis, ille vero ut continens eos, ut diffuse scripsimus in tractatu De Nominum Analogia.” 31. DNA §69: “. . . obiectiones ad oppositum adductae in hoc peccant, quod inter identitatem et modum identitatis non distinguunt. Fatendum enim 228  — Notes to Pages 150–153 est, quod ad hoc, quod aliquis terminus denominetur superior aut communior , oportet ut rem unam et eamdem in utroque ponat; sed sophisma consequentis committitur inferendo ex hoc: ergo oportet quod dicat rem unam et eamdem omnino. Et est semper sermo de identitate secundum rationem, seu definitionem. Identitas enim et unitas continent sub se non solum unitatem et identitatem omnimodam, sed proportionalem, quae in analogi nominis ratione salvatur.” 32. DNA §1. 33. DNA §71: “Ex praedictis autem manifeste patet, quod analogum non conceptum disiunctum, nec unum praecisum inaequaliter participatum, nec unum ordine; sed conceptum unum proportione dicit et praedicat.” 34. DNA §83: “Constat autem quod analogum nomen, puta ens aut bonum, non relationem identitatis aut similitudinis significat, sed fundamentum.” 35. CST I.13.6, n. 4: “Quaedam enim significant ipsos respectus ad primum analogatum, ut patet de sano. Quaedam vero significant fundamenta tantum illorum respectuum; ut communiter invenitur in omnibus vere analogis, proprie et formaliter salvatis in ominbus analogatis.” 36. DNA §79: “sicut animal dictum de homine et de equo importans univocationem in actu exercito, non praedicat de homine totum hoc, scilicet naturam sensitivam eamdem omnino secundum rationem naturae sensitivae equi et bovis, sed naturam sensitivam simpliciter; quam tamen ad hoc, quod univoca sit praedicatio, oportet omnino esse eamdem secundum rationem naturae sensitivae equi et bovis,—ita ens importans proportionalitatem in actu exercito, non praedicat de quantitate totum hoc, scilicet habens se ad esse sic proportionaliter sicut substantia, aut qualitas ad suum esse; sed habens se ad esse sic absque alia additione; quod tamen oportet, ad hoc quod analoga sit praedicatio, idem proportionaliter esse cum altero, sic se habere ad esse quod de substantia aut qualitate ens praedicat.” 37. DNA §76: “analogum metaphorice sumptum, nihil aliud praedicat, quam hoc se habere ad similitudinem illius, quod absque altero extremo intelligi nequit.” 38. DNA §75: “sed proprie sumptum, in ratione sui metaphorice sumpti claudi necesse est; quoniam impossibile est intelligere quid sit aliquid secundum metaphoricum nomen, nisi cognito illo, ad cuius metaphoram dicitur. Neque enim fieri potest, ut intelligam quid sit pratum in eo quod ridens, nisi sciam quid significet risus nomen proprie sumptum, ad cuius similitudinem dicitur pratum ridere.” 39. To be sure, as Yves Simon pointed out, one can understand a metaphorical predication, and even know that it is a metaphorical predication, without knowing the primary (nonmetaphorical) analogate, and so without understanding why the subject of the metaphorical predication is a subject of that predicate —but then, in a crucial sense, one does not understand the metaphor. “Many people who know that ‘crocodile tears’ stand for demonstrations of feigned sadness do not know why such demonstrations are called crocodile tears. . . . I cannot say why feigned demonstrations of sadness are called crocodile tears unless Notes to Pages 153–156  — 229 I know that in ancient legends crocodiles were reputed to imitate human sobbing in order to attract passersby and devour them.” Yves Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” in Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 167. 40. DNA §78. 41. DNA §82. Cf. CST I.13.6 n.7: “Huiusmodi nomina, quoad rem significatam , prius de Deo: quoad impositionem nominis, prius de creaturis dicuntur.” 42. The question of an order of priority in proportionality was raised by Blanche. For citations and discussion see the long footnote in Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 165–67n27. 43. DNA §67. 44. DNA §86: “Succumbitur autem difficultati huic, quia proprium comparationis fundamentum non consideratur. Fundatur enim super identitate seu unitate rei, in qua fit comparatio, et non super modo identitatis aut unitatis; sicut de intentione superioritatis praedictum est. Unde cum analogum ex dictis constet rem unam, licet proportionaliter, dicere; nihil prohibet in ipso comparari analogata, licet non eo modo, quo univoca fit comparatio.” 45. Cajetan returns to the issue of comparison in analogy in CST I.13.5 nn. 9–10. To the Scotistic objection that “omnis comparatio est in aliqualiter univoco,” Cajetan responds: “compariatio fit etiam in analogo, quod medium est inter univocum et aequivocum. . . . Cum enim dicitur, Deus est perfectius ens creatura, comparatio fit in ratione entis una secundum analogiam, et sic communi utrique, ut alibi docuimus.” 46. DNA §46. 47. DNA §56. 48. DNA §57: “Sicque non sola significationum in voce confusio, analogo convenit, sed confusio quaedam conceptuum, seu rationum fit in identitate eorum proportionali, sic tamen ut non tam conceptus, quam eorum diversitas confundatur.” 49. DNA §§98–100. 50. DNA §§102–3. 51. DNA §99. Chapter Nine 1. DNA §105: “Verbi gratia: si ponamus sapientiam esse analogice communem Deo et homini, ex hoc quod sapientia, in homine inventa, secundum formalem rationem praecise sumpta, dicit perfectionem simpliciter: non potest concludi: ergo Deus est formaliter sapiens, sic arguendo: Omnis perfectio simpliciter est in Deo; sapientia est perfectio simpliciter; ergo etc. Minor enim distinguenda est: et si ly sapientia pro ratione sapientiae, quae est in homine stat, argumentum est ex quatuor terminis: quia in conclusione, sapientia stat pro ratione sapientiae quam ponit in Deo, cum concluditur: ergo sapientia est in Deo. Si autem pro ratione sapientiae in Deo, stat in minore; non concluditur, ex 230 — Notes to Pages 157–162 perfectione sapientiae creatae, Deum esse sapientem; cuius oppositum et philosophi et theologi omnes clamant.” 2. DNA §106: “Decipiuntur autem isti, Scotum (cuius est ratio haec I Sent. dist. 3, q. 1) sequentes: quia in analogo diversitatem rationum inspicientes, id quod in eo unitatis et identitatis latet, non considerant.” 3. DNA §106: “eo quod quidquid convenit uni, convenit et alteri proportionaliter ; et quidquid negatur de una, et de altera negatur proportionaliter : quia quidquid convenit simili, in eo quod simile, convenit etiam illi, cui est simile, proportionalitate semper servata.” 4. Cf. DNA §36: “Quidquid assimilatur simili ut sic, assimilatur etiam illi, cui illud tale est simile.” Cf. DCE §3: “quidquid est imago alicuius similis alteri, est etiam imago illius alterius quatenus primo assimilatur.” It goes without saying that similarity, in addition to being transitive, is also symmetrical. 5. Even here a clarification is needed: if one did not call the picture cute qua picture of that puppy, but rather called it cute because of its artistic style, then it does not follow that one regards the depicted puppy as cute. But then this case also confirms Cajetan’s principle. 6. DNA §107: “unitas analogiae non esset in coordinatione unitatum numeranda , nisi unum proportionaliter, unum esset affirmabile et negabile, et consequenter distribuibile et scibile, ut subiectum, et medium, et passio.” 7. DNA §112: “Identitas siquidem tam rerum quam rationum, ut pluries replicatum est, ad identitatem proportionalem se extendit.” 8. DNA §111: “Unde, cum fit huiusmodi processus: Omnis perfectio simpliciter est in Deo; sapientia est perfectio simpliciter; ergo etc.; in minore ly sapientia non stat pro hac vel illa ratione sapientiae, sed pro sapientia una proportionaliter, idest, pro utraque ratione sapientiae non coniunctim vel disiunctim ; sed in quantum sunt indivisae proportionaliter, et una est altera proportionaliter , et ambae unam proportionaliter constituunt rationem.” 9. Bochenski offers a formal proof of the validity of syllogisms using ana­ logical middle terms, in “On Analogy,” The Thomist (1948): §19. He defines analogy in terms of “isomorphy” (which is proportional similarity) (§17), and attributes this interpretation of analogy (“the isomorphic theory”) not only to Cajetan (§16) but also to Aquinas (§12 and §17). 10. DNA §113: “Ex hoc autem apparet, Scotum in I Sent. dist. 3, q. 1, vel male exposuisse conceptum univocum vel sibi ipsi contradicere: dum, volens univocationem entis fingere, ait: «Conceptum univocum voco, qui ita est unus, quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem». Et sic univocum vult esse ens. Si enim identitas sufficiens ad contradictionem , univocatio dicitur; constat quod, ponendo ens esse analogum, et secundum proportionalitatem tantum unum, satisfiet univocationi: quod scoticae doctrinae adversatur, tenenti ens habere conceptum unum simpliciter, et omnino indivisum, (ut de univocis diximus). Si autem non omnis talis identitas sufficit ad univocationem, non recte igitur univocatio conceptus declarata est esse eam, quae ad contradictionem sufficit, quasi proportionalis identitas ad hoc non sufficiat.” Notes to Pages 162–164  — 231 11. DNA §109. 12. DNA §108. “. . . ideo oportet, huiusmodi analogis nominibus utendo ex parte unitatis, semper modum proportionalitatis subintelligi; aliter in univocationem lapsus fieret. Nisi enim prae oculis haberetur proportionalitas, cum dicitur immateriale omne esse intellectuale, tamquam univoce dictum acciperetur , et latens aequivocatio non visa obreperet.” Apparently the problem Cajetan has in mind in his example (“everything immaterial is intellectual”) is that in concluding to God’s intellectuality from his immateriality, we might wrongly attribute to his intellectuality what is proper only to creaturely intellectuality (e.g., that it is discursive). 13. DNA §115. 14. DNA §117. Cf. DCE §5. 15. DNA §118: “Cavendum tertio est, ne vocalis unitas rationis analogi nominis mentem involvat. Ex eo namque verbi gratia, quod principium dicitur esse id ex quo res fit, aut est, aut cognoscitur; et haec ratio in omnibus quae principia dicuntur, salvatur: principii nomen univocum creditur. Erratur autem, quia ratio ipsa non est una simpliciter, sed proportione et voce. Vocabula enim, ex quibus integratur, analoga sunt, ut patet; neque enim fieri, neque esse, neque cognosci, neque ly ex unius omnino est rationis, sed proportionalis salvatur. Et propterea ratio illa in omnibus utpote proportionalis salvatur: sicut et principii nomen proportionaliter commune dicitur.” 16. DNA §119. 17. DNA §§120–22. 18. DNA §§123–24. 19. DNA §125: “Unde si quis falli non vult, solerter sermonis causam coniectet.” 20. CDEE §14: “. . . idem est loqui de conceptu entis et de significatione ejus.” 21. DCE §3; cf. DNA §§36, 106. 22. DCE §4. 23. DCE §5. 24. DCE §6. 25. DCE §7. 26. DCE §8. 27. DCE §9: “Ita quod (ut unico verbo rem absolvam): ens esse primo notum in quod fit omnis resolutio, in quod omnia addunt, per modum analogi interpretandum est: cum quo stare potest, quod ens secundum perfectum adaequatumque conceptum, non abstrahit a naturis praedicamentalibus, sicut nec aliquod analogum a fundantibus analogiam.” 28. And it is compressed, despite Cajetan’s polite claim to the contrary (“Plura nunc non mihi occurunt ad propositum dicenda, immo prolixior fui acutissimo ingenio tuo, quo ex unico verbo concepisses cuncta” [DCE §10]). 232  — Notes to Pages 164–168 ...