Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Responsibility: The New Language of Global Bioethics and Biolaw

7. A Synthetic Summary

7 A Synthetic Summary Summary of the Key Philosophical Arguments In this book I have surveyed the historical development of “human dignity” as a normative value. Following this survey and insights from philosophy, anthropology, and psychology I explicated a philosophical theory of human dignity. Then a theory of human rights was established on two parallel modes of reasoning. The first is the notion of moral rights as the strongest enforceable protection of the most basic values of those who deserve the strongest moral status. No argument has been marshaled for acceptance of the notion of the strongest moral status and its given definition; neither have I argued against the possibility that alternative doctrines and instruments might serve better humanity ’s most basic values. The second mode of reasoning is derived from the historical development of human rights and their self-reliance on the authority of human dignity. This ethos of human dignity also supplies a definition of human identity, according to which every live offspring of human parents is human. Human sexual reproduction connects all humans and precludes all animals. Sexuality is a unique template of embodied rationality, free will, and relationality—all are part of the ethos of human dignity. In the second part of this chapter I will elaborate more on the relationship between sexual reproduction, socialization through intimate care, and the inclusion criteria to the highest moral status. While the logical structure of moral rights precludes nonhumans from the category of the strongest moral status, it does not exclude any born human. Because the ethos of human dignity confers the highest moral status on humans, the two lines converge. Moreover, the norms prescribed by human rights laws are quite consistent with the normative implications of the theory of rights. The unborn are the only borderline 296 Chapter 7 category—being endowed with human dignity but not yet capable of benefiting from human rights. Human dignity is an ethos rooted in religious and secular traditions alike. Its dominant normative aspect is recipient centered. This is respect for human dignity, according to which every human being deserves special moral regard; humans manifest this regard through complex and positive mental attitudes and social roles, which are irreducible to either emotional states or cognitive judgments and are not limited to mere checklists of available material goods and formal entitlements. Permission to exploit animals is not part of this definition. Moral or natural rights constitute a comprehensive recipient-centered enforceable instrument that is based on equality and respect. As the strongest moral instruments, they trump all other interests and values. Human dignity does not address all moral problems. The instrument of rights does not cover all dignity-related issues. Even some rightsrelated issues are not protected by human rights, for example, when enforcement is not likely to be effective and when it is likely to be self-defeating. The ethos of human dignity animates and directs the instrument of rights. Although rights are properties of individuals only, rights derive their meaning and authority from the group to which the individual belongs. Consequently, species-typical properties, needs, and capabilities form a grid of reference for the conceptualization, interpretation, and implementation of rights. The notion of the strongest moral status as a beneficiary of the strongest moral protection imaginable entails the existence of an individuated locus of well-being, who is the beneficiary of the protection. Since life is a fundamental value, life must be one of those basic values of human individuals. Life is always the default value; it is not necessarily the ultimate value. From the ethos of human dignity, and from empirical research, we know that some other incommensurable basic values are no less fundamental than life in the sense that substantial loss of each renders reasonable the judgment by the affected person that death is better for one’s self than resignation. In other words, in the normative domain, life is conceptualized in terms broader than mere biological existence; and, as long as the person is capable of rational free choice, his or her free choice is relevant to the choices that transcend one’s wellbeing at the biological level. The anchoring of all rights in living human individuals, the ethos of human dignity, and the internal logic of the notion of “the strongest A Synthetic Summary 297 moral status” enable us to conceptualize the substance of human rights in three complementary formulations. 1. The basic needs and...