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2 Poisons and Parasites: The Entanglement Thesis and the Evolution of Disgust 2.1 A Puzzle about Disgust A few comparative questions will help frame the discussion in this chapter. First: is the emotion of disgust found only in human beings? This question is interesting not only for the insight an answer might shed on human nature but also because different theorists working on the emotions have given it different answers. On the one hand, a group of prominent researchers who have focused on disgust in particular answer the question in the affirmative . In the view they recommend, disgust is “a very old (though uniquely human) rejection system” (Haidt et al. 1997), which “is absent in nonhuman primates, yet extremely frequent and probably universal in contemporary humans” (Rozin et al. 2008). Proponents of this view are impressed by a number of distinctive features of disgust that they have uncovered in their work, including its decidedly cognitive, symbolic, and conceptual character; the role it plays in regulating human social interactions; its wide cultural variation; and its link to a plurality of domains, including morality. Additionally, they note that despite the confidence of some theorists, many who actually work closely with animals fail to observe anything that fits the description of disgust in those other species (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973; see also Morris et al. 2007).1 Additionally, some supporters of this view also endorse an argument that suggests why disgust might be unique to humans. The motivation for the argument comes from the work of the cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973), author of The Denial of Death. Becker, like Nietzsche and Freud before him, assigned great import to the fact that humans, alone among the animals, must psychologically confront the knowledge of their own inevitable deaths. He argued that recognition of our own mortality and eventual death induces existential anxieties and even, in extreme cases, terror. Feelings and attitudes such as these constitute an adaptive threat, 44 Chapter 2 the line of thought goes; they can be at worst paralyzing but even in milder cases can stifle or disrupt normal, fitness-enhancing behavior. Building on this idea, Rozin and his colleagues maintain that due to cultural evolution, conceptual and symbolic disgust now mainly serves to protect against such paralyzing and fitness-reducing thoughts, repressing anything that reminds us that we are animals and are thus mortal. This, in turn, is thought to help explain why only humans have disgust: “Only human animals know they are to die, and only humans need to repress this threat” (Rozin et al. 2008). Following the literature, I call this view the Terror Management theory. Another set of factors pulls in a different direction, however. Consider a second comparative question: are there homologies of disgust in primates and other animals?2 Some researchers of the emotions have thought so, and in their view it would be quite surprising if there were not homologies of disgust in all sorts of other animals (Ekman 2003; Griffiths 1997; Darwin 1872; cf. Fessler and Navarrete 2003a). While those sympathetic to this view tend to focus on emotions in general rather than disgust in particular, their confidence in the assertion is bolstered by a number of specific considerations. These include the presence of clear homologies of other basic emotions such as anger and fear in primates and other mammals . Those holding this view also tend to see disgust as serving to monitor food intake and protect against ingested toxins. They thus point to the presence of something approximating the gape face (the characteristic facial expression associated with disgust) in primates and the existence of acquired taste aversions in many other animals. Perhaps more than anything else, though, they emphasize the broad evolutionary continuity that exists between humans and primates to support their contention. Accordingly , I call this view the Simple Continuity view. At first, these two views appear to be opposed to each other. If they are indeed incompatible, it would be nice to know which one is correct. However , one may not be forced to take sides; there are other stances to take with respect to the issue. For instance, there may be an irenic conclusion that could be endorsed, holding that each view is partially correct when understood properly. On the other hand, it could also be the case that neither is correct, and both should be rejected. In what follows, I argue for this last option. To say why, however, I must first motivate and defend the alternative view...

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