Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway

Appendix A. Nagumo’s Official Report (Excerpts)

a p p e n d i x a nagumo’s official report (excerpts) Excerpts from the Of¤ce of Naval Intelligence translation of Vice Admiral Nagumo ’s of¤cial report on the Battle of Midway—“Mobile Force’s Detailed Battle Report #6.” The translation was published in June 1947 under the title “The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway.” (OPNAV P32–1002.) The ¤rst 21 pages of the translation are reproduced here in their entirety, and verbatim (though some translator’s notes are omitted.) Even the translator’s typographical errors and inconsistencies in punctuation are preserved. There is, however, a change in format—made in the interests of readability due to the smaller pages of this book: the original double-columned text has been converted to conventional single-columned text so that a larger typeface can be used. This changes the pagination of the document, and also requires that footnotes be put in brackets where the original footnote numbers were, rather than at the bottom of the page. But, so that citations made in this book to the original document can be precisely located, the original pagination is inserted in brackets— and in bold face—where the original pages began. 296 appendix a The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway MILITARY SECRET First Air Fleet Secret #38 of 6. 15 June 1942 (sent on 1 Feb) (Seal of CinC First Air Fleet) Copy #7 of 20 Mobile Force’s Detailed Battle Report #6. First Air Fleet’s Detailed Battle Report #6. Midway operation From 27 May to 9 June 1942. Headquarters, First Air Fleet. CINC FIRST AIR FLEET DETAILED BATTLE REPORT NO. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I. EXISTING CONDITIONS AND TRENDS: 1. General Situation of the Enemy. 2. Situation in the Midway area. 3. Mobile Force Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. PART II. PLANS: 1. Fleet Organization and Composition immediately prior to Motivation of this Operation: (a) Organization. (b) Organization of Attack Units: (1) Attack on Midway. (2) First Attack on Enemy Carriers. (3) Second Attack on Enemy Carriers. (c) Organization of Reconnaissance Units. 2. High Command’s Operation Orders. 3. Preparation for Operation. 4. Outline of Movement of Commander and Men during the Period of Preparation for the Operation. PART III. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION: 1. Direction of Operation by the Commander and his Movements. 2. Outline of Developments (Excerpts). 3. Actual Condition of the Enemy: (a) Actual Conditions in the Midway area. (b) Enemy Carriers. (c) Attacking planes of the Enemy. 4. Conditions and Circumstances which Affected the Operation. 5. Outstanding Events during the Operations: (a) Attack on Midway. (b) First Attack on Enemy Carriers. (c) Second Attack on Enemy Carriers. (d) Action of Cover Units. nagumo’s official report (excerpts) 297 (e) Action of AA Units. (f) Enemy Action and Damages suffered by us. 6. General Situation at Conclusion of Operations and the Commander’s Estimate concerning it. 7. Movement and Action Charts: Supplementary Table #1: Track Chart. Supplementary Table #2: Action Chart. PART IV: ORDERS, REPORTS, ETC.: War Diary (Abbreviated). [This part is missing from the document.—Ed.] [P. 2] PART V: RESULTS: 1. Attack on Midway: (a) Military Installations. (b) Aircraft. 2. Attacks on Carriers. 3. Action of Air Cover Units (Supplementary Tables 3 and 4). 4. Action of AA Units (Supplementary Tables 3 and 4). 5. Recapitulation of Results Obtained during Midway Operation. 6. Damage Sustained: (a) Surface Vessels (Outline). (b) Aircraft (destroyed). (c) Personnel (killed). PART VI: RECOGNITION OF MERITORIOUS ACTIONS. PART VII: REFERENCE MATERIAL: 1. Battle Lessons (Separate Volume). 2. Weather Charts. 3. Mobile Force’s Operation Order #34. SUPPLEMENT TO FIRST AIR FLEET SECRET FILE #37 OF 6. MOBILE FORCE DETAILED BATTLE REPORT #6. FIRST AIR FLEET DETAILED BATTLE REPORT #6. OCCUPATION OF MIDWAY OPERATIONS, 27 MAY 1942–6 JUNE 1942. PART I. EXISTING CONDITIONS AND TRENDS 1. General Situation of the Enemy Because of developments during the First Phase Operations, the enemy’s outposts which he had relied on to be his ¤rst line of defense, collapsed one after another until he began to feel direct threats even to such areas as India, Australia, and Hawaii. The enemy was exerting every pressure to stem this tide by stepping up his submarine strength in the waters controlled by us and by increasing his air strength in the Australian area. He employed these to carry on guerilla type tactics. Task force thrusts were also made...