In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

162 chapter seven Breaking the Ice Kissinger and Haig in Beijing, July 1971–January 1972 When publicly announced on 15 July 1971, Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing stunned the world. Kissinger’s second and open visit to Beijing in October of the same year, and the visit of the advance team led by Kissinger’s deputy Alexander Haig in January 1972, ¤nalized the diplomatic, political, and even logistical preparations for President Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. It seems that the two top American of¤cials’ visits veri¤ed the old Chinese proverb shui dao qu cheng (when water ¶ows, a channel is formed). How Beijing and Washington could ultimately break the ice by instituting a summit meeting after twenty-plus years of hostility and confrontation proved far more intricate. For a better understanding, one needs to address several particular issues. Other than discussions on detailed arrangements for Nixon’s stay in China, issues embodying signi¤cant policy implications were vigorously tackled by both the American visitors and their Chinese hosts. They included: What did Beijing and Washington expect to achieve through the upcoming face-to-face talks at the highest level? How did Kissinger and Zhou Enlai manage to overcome mutual suspicions and misperceptions in setting the agenda for the talks? What concessions did each make in order to get the new relationship on the right track from the outset? What, in the end, did they accomplish? breaking the ice 163 I Early in 1971, Kissinger had asked John Holdridge, Winston Lord, his special assistant, and Richard (Dick) Smyser, his NSC Vietnam specialist, to begin preparing brie¤ng books for his visit to Beijing, which he anticipated would be later in the year. Kissinger wanted Holdridge to create a detailed set of brie¤ng papers in loose-leaf binders.1 They included a scope paper describing what the Chinese objectives were, what the U.S. hoped Kissinger’s visit would accomplish , and what his opening statement would be, and a series of position papers touching on every conceivable issue that might come up in his talks in Beijing. These issues comprised a summit, a communiqué, Taiwan, Indochina, great power relations, South Asia, Korea, and future contacts. This sort of brie¤ng book was to prepare for any of Kissinger’s signi¤cant meetings in Beijing.2 As Kissinger explained in his memoirs, “I have always believed that the secret of negotiations is meticulous preparation. The negotiator should know not only the technical side of the subject but its nuances.” He also found it essential to study the psychology and purpose of his opponents in order to reconcile them with his own.3 Holdridge and his team did just that. The brie¤ng book anticipated that China was expecting to “make major political gains” from Kissinger’s secret visit and Nixon’s China trip. PRC’s status would increase greatly, and it would secure its position as truly one of the “big ¤ve.” Thus, the PRC would have a better chance to get into the UN. In agreeing to Kissinger’s visit, the brie¤ng book anticipated that the PRC had several objectives. They would include an agreement with the U.S. on reducing and eventually eliminating U.S. forces in Taiwan, U.S. acknowledgment of the PRC’s importance in world affairs, a nonaggression treaty or agreement of “peaceful coexistence,” and an af¤rmation of Nixon’s visit to Beijing.4 The brie¤ng book argued that in order to realize these objectives, the Chinese leaders would probably be ready to “pay a price.” Kissinger expected that China would use its in¶uence in Vietnam to force it toward a peaceful and acceptable settlement and to develop relations with the United States. Meanwhile , the United States could still maintain its diplomatic ties and mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The U.S. and China would keep in direct contact so that mutual interests—arms control, expanded trade and travel, reduction of tensions in East Asia and Southeast Asia—could be discussed.5 The brie¤ng book also laid out Kissinger’s strategy in talking with the Chinese leaders. Kissinger noted that over the years of U.S.-China negotiations, the Chinese were tired of Americans saying “no, unless,” while the Americans grew weary of China’s hard-line approach. He would emphasize the common areas and play down the differences, leaving them unstated so long as the Chinese did not press him too hard.6 His...

Share