Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka

2 Violent Conflict and the First Half Decade of Open Economy Policies in Sri Lanka: A Revisionist View

2 Violent Con®ict and the First Half Decade of Open Economy Policies in Sri Lanka: A Revisionist View John M. Richardson Jr. Preliminaries Setting the Stage This chapter examines the human consequences of J.R.Jayawardene’s open economy reforms during his ¤rst half decade in of¤ce. Three points of departure set the stage. First is a topology of con®ict events data1 that shows the period in question as one of intensifying violent political con®ict. Second is an amalgam of political-economic theories, linking violent political con®ict with economic processes , which suggests that worsening economic conditions, particularly those with signi¤cant adverse human impact,create a climate in which violent con®ict is likely to intensify. Third is a body of conventional wisdom that characterizes 1977–82 as an economic success story and attributes the causes of intensifying violent con®ict more to the policies of Prime Minister Bandaranaike’s United Front government than to those of President Jayawardene. The 1977–82 period surfaces as a focus of inquiry because of a disconnect between these three points. If United Front policies were principal causal agents, one might have expected violent con®ict to reach a protracted stage earlier than it did. If 1977–82 was an economic success story, one might have anticipated a decline in con®ict intensity, rather than escalation. This chapter does not seriously address the relative weight that should be given to United Front policies, but it does conclude that open economy reforms did not produce sustainable economic growth, that adverse human impacts of those policies were signi¤cant, and that those adverse human impacts contributed signi¤cantly to the escalation of violent political con®ict in Sri Lanka. Measuring the Intensity of Violent Political Con®ict Figure 2.1 maps the level of violent con®ict intensity in Sri Lanka, along with major changes in governments, between1948 and 1988.Versions have appeared in several previous publications.2 Graphs like this are motivated by a methodological- 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 UNP MEP (SLFP) Nat Govt (UNP) UF (SLFP) UNP Figure 2.1. Violent con®ict intensity. 42 John M. Richardson Jr. epistemological stance which postulates that operationally de¤ning a phenomenon as observable problematic behavior, unfolding over a relatively long period of time, is a useful starting point for analysis (Meadows and Robinson 1985: 17–90).3 The analyst then seeks to identify other phenomena that cause variations in the problematic behavior. In the case of Sri Lanka’s violent con®icts (“ethnic” and “nonethnic”),4 the graph of problematic behavior was generated by collecting verbal descriptions of more than 5,000 con®ict events, coding and aggregating them into monthly con®ict intensity indices.5 Elsewhere, I have likened the intensi¤cation of violent con®ict in Sri Lanka to the spread of an infection in a biological organism.6 Were this a chart of infection, the period prior to 1984 might be labeled “relatively good health.” The organism seemed resilient. Relatively severe outbreaks did occur, between 1956 and 1965 and again in 1971, 1977, and 1983, but they subsided. Either the disease was not virulent, there was an effective immune response, or appropriate treatment was provided. Beginning in 1984, there was a qualitative change. High levels of infection appeared to be normal. Reduced levels were transient remissions. By 1986, an ominous metastasizing pattern is apparent. Were we to extend the plot for a decade or so, the added years would resemble the period after 1984, not before. Edward Azar coined the term protracted social con®ict to describe con®ict patterns similar to those that have been present in Sri Lanka since 1984 (1990: 64–72).7 Protracted social con®ict means endemic con®ict, largely dictated by militant group agendas. It has no clear termination point and produces negative sum outcomes in which virtually all participants lose. The economic spillover effects are widespread. A con®ict mentality pervades the society’s political culture and political economy, frustrating attempts to make peace. Con®ict resolution without external intervention is rare. Protracted con®ict, in Azar’s words, reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions. . . . Societies undergoing protracted social con®ict ¤nd it dif¤cult to initiate...