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Martin Heidegger, “Parmenides: ÁlhqeÖhV e‹kuklèoV åtremïV ©tor” “The well-rounded, unshaking heart of truth”—with these words from the “didactic poem” of Parmenides (Fragment I, 29), the Goddess names for the thinking man what he should experience in the course of his sojourn along the path that is ¤rst, both temporally and in terms of priority. Before this, however, the Goddess characterizes the basic character of the whole journey in her greeting (Fragment I, 27):© gär åpÏ ånqr»pwn ìktóV pâtou ìst¤n; “truly, it runs far away and outside the common residence of humans;” This word of the Goddess still holds today, and probably more urgently so for every attempt to ¤ttingly follow the originary thinking of Parmenides . Thus the common translation of the title words cited above probably also lacks the care of this demanding and unusual saying. It listens neither to the Greek language, nor does it bother with a precise and thoughtful determination of what is said by the Goddess. The truncated text at hand attempts to come nearer to such a determination. The words of the Goddess read as a whole: . . . creã dè se pânta puqèsqai ömïn ålhqeÖhV e‹kuklèoV åtremïV ©tor “. . . but it is necessary for you to experience everything [namely along all three of the paths to be pointed out by me] once [along the¤rst, the main path], the well-rounded, never trembling heart of truth.” ÁlhqeÖh means, literally translated, unconcealment. Indeed, by means of such literalism even less is gained for an insight into the state of affairs thought by Parmenides. ÁlhqeÖh does not mean “truth,” if what is meant by this is the validity of propositions in the form of statements. It is possible that what there is to think in ål±qeia, taken strictly for itself, has nothing yet to do with “truth,” but everything to do with the unconcealment presupposed in every determination of “truth.” In order to make the disclosure that reigns in unconcealment more closely recognizable, let us keep to the epithet e¡kukloV. It most commonly means “well rounded” as a property of things. Revealing, unconcealment, is nevertheless not a thing. We encounter its reign sooner, if we translate e¡kukloV by “¤tting encircling.” But Parmenides is supposed to experience along his ¤rst path not only this “¤tting encircling unconcealment,” but above all its åtremïV©tor, its “never trembling heart,” that which everywhere pulses Parmenides: ÁlhqeÖhV e‹kuklèoV åtremïV ©tor [404–405] 95 through all revealing, thoroughly attuning it, but which itself rests, lasts, and essences. What is this? Does the Goddess tell us anything about it? Indeed; and poignantly enough, if we attend to what Parmenides ¤nds before him, by her direction, upon his ¤rst path. In Fragment VIII, 1 f., the Goddess says: . . . mínoV dÏ Åti mmqoV Ñdo¢o leÖpetai øV Åstin . . . “there still remains just one saying of the path that leads forth to there . . . (which shows): øV Åstin ‘that it is’;” We are embarrassed and ask: What is, then? The answer lies near: it is obvious: beings and not nothing. But in order to establish such a thing, no unusual path beyond the ordinary representation and opinion of humans is required. It is much more a matter of bringing into view what is most dif¤cult to think. By his wording, Parmenides provides an unequivocal report concerning what the øV Åstin, “that it is,” refers to. In Fragment VI, 1 he says: Åsti gär e†nai, “[it] is: namely being.” But in saying this, is not “being” mistaken for some being? Only of beings are we able to say “[it] is.” Before rushing to entrench ourselves in this objection, one which all too easily announces itself, we must ¤rst ask ourselves whether we also think in a Greek manner the Greek saying of the words: Åsti and e†nai; even more, whether we think something, on the whole, suf¤ciently determinate in our use of the words “is” and “being.” Thought in a Greek manner, e†nai says: “to presence.” This verb speaks more precisely. It brings us demonstrably closer to the matter to be thought. Accordingly, we must translate Åsti gär e†nai as: “presencing namely presences” [anwest nämlich anwesen]. And—at the same time we come across a new dif¤culty. We stand before an obvious tautology. Certainly, and before a genuine one, too. It...

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