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181 eight The Proof of Paradoxical Reason If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. (John 8:31–32) I am the way, the truth, and the life. (John 14:6) The truth in the sense in which Christ is the truth is not a sum of statements . . . but a life. (PC, 205) This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. (John 17:3) That is, only then do I know the truth, when it becomes a life in me. (PC, 206, commenting on John 17:3; emphasis added) Kierkegaard appears to reject the requirement of reason that he critically evaluate the beliefs grounding both his own and his rival’s ways of life. But in fact he affirms this requirement. We have already examined some of Kierkegaard’s reasons for appearing to reject rational evaluation of ways of life. He thinks that he needs the incognito of irrationalism to help his readers become more rational, but if he unambiguously set about critically assessing lives with arguments pro et contra he would blow his cover. He also thinks that the 182 · The Paradoxical Rationality of Søren Kierkegaard task of reason is not so much to think the truth as it is to live it. Of course living the truth includes thinking it, but it also embraces feeling, willing, and enacting it. Since he wishes to encourage his readers to live what they know and believe, and since he is aware that they are very prone to substitute thinking for living, he avoids writing in such a way as to promote or excuse an obsession with thinking. Obviously, guarding in this way against an obsession with thinking does not permit publishing forthright and extensive rational evaluation of ways of life. We must suspect that the quality of critical assessment will decrease when its role in rationality is drastically demoted. If one gives the activities of proving, assessing, and arguing little time and attention, surely one will become less adept and successful at them than one would by devoting oneself to them. Thus Kierkegaard seems to have sacrificed rational evaluation on the altar of subjectivity. Kierkegaard is willing to make this sacrifice, if necessary. But it is not clear that it is necessary. For we succeed better at some things by not devoting ourselves wholly to them, or by situating them mid-range within a hierarchy of values. For example, single-minded devotion to physical health is not always the best means to this goal. Striving for other things might yield a more robust constitution than a fanatical pursuit of muscle tone, skin care, and low cholesterol. Likewise a budding romantic relationship might get on better if one does not prematurely put too much stock into it. Again, it could be that one will be a more astute philosopher if one cultivates familiarity with other disciplines, arts, and sciences than one would be by reading, writing, and talking only straight philosophy. Finally, to quote Richard Lovelace, “I could not love thee, dear, so much, loved I not honor more.” Applying all this to our current question, it is possible that we will know the truth better if we love it so much that we attempt to feel, will, act, and even be it, than we would if we loved it only enough to think about it a lot. In this chapter, we will examine yet another reason that Kierkegaard appears to flout the rational duty of critical assessment: namely, the unusual character of his conception and practice of proof. When the truth is a sum of statements, one proves it primarily by arguing for it; but when the truth is a life, one proves it primarily by living it. Given that the goal of objectivity is theoretical contemplation of ideas, while that of subjectivity is holistically living them, we should not be surprised The Proof of Paradoxical Reason · 183 that objectivity and subjectivity differ considerably in their manner of evaluating ideas. My examination of Kierkegaard’s subjective mode of evaluation will consist in arguing for and against it, publicly. And this is to say that I am going to assess subjectivity objectively. “But,” someone should protest, “doesn’t such a manner of proceeding distort subjectivity, and even betray it?” The event will decide. I for my part think that reason is one...

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