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142 chapter seven Supreme Command Although the defeat at Ball’s Bluff reinforced McClellan’s belief in the virtues of restraint, it did not have the same effect on the Radical Republicans. On October 25, Senator Benjamin F. Wade informed his wife that he planned to work his fellow Radicals to “frighten” the administration “into a ¤ght.” That day he, Chandler, and Lyman Trumbull decided to visit Montgomery Blair, who had previously been their most dependable ally in pushing the administration to action. Blair responded to their visit by arranging a conference between the three men and McClellan that evening.1 During their meeting, Wade urged McClellan to attack immediately, even at the risk of a defeat, which he said was preferable to delay because it “could be easily repaired by the swarming recruits.” McClellan replied that “he would rather have a few recruits before a victory, than a good many after a defeat,” but did not challenge their call for action. Instead, he enlisted them in his campaign against the commanding general by suggesting Scott would have to go before any signi¤cant ¤ghting could take place. As historian Mark Grimsley has observed, “This was duplicity of the most transparent sort. McClellan no more advocated prompt action against the Rebels than he advocated the devil, and the Radicals undoubtedly suspected it.” Nonetheless, after they departed, McClellan reported to his wife that the senators had pledged to “make a desperate effort tomorrow to have Genl Scott retired at once.”2 The following evening the senators took their case to Lincoln. Chandler told the president thathe was “in favor of sending for Jeff Davis atonce” if something was not done soon. To the senators’ exasperation, Lincoln defended McClellan ’s “deliberateness.” The senators then pressed the matter of Scott’s removal. Afterward, Lincoln went to McClellan’s headquarters to discuss “this new mani- supreme command 143 festation of popular impatience.” Lincoln assured McClellan that he would have the time to prepare fully before ¤ghting but also advised the general that public opinion “was a reality, and should be taken into the account.”3 Although Lincoln gave no indication during this meeting of his decision to accept Scott’s resignation, by October 30 McClellan was con¤dent that it was not far off. “The vox populi,” he advised his wife, “is coming out strongly on my side. . . . I presume the Scott war will culminate this week—and as it is very clear that the people will not permit me to be passed over it seems easy to predict the result.” He told her that he appreciated all the dif¤culties that would accompany his forthcoming promotion—“the impatience of the people, the venality and bad faith of the politicians, the gross neglect that has occurred.” But he was con¤dent that he could overcome them. “Much as we in the North have erred,” he opined, “the rebels have been far worse . . . desert[ing] from the cardinal virtues.”4 McClellan then went to work on a paper describing the condition of the Army of the Potomac for Secretary of War Cameron, which he prepared with the assistance of Edwin M. Stanton. When McClellan arrived in Washington, Stanton had immediately sought him out and quickly established himself as a con¤dential advisor to the young general. As attorney general during the waning months of James Buchanan’s presidency, Stanton had worked vigorously to inject ¤rmness into the administration’s response to the secession crisis. When Buchanan left of¤ce in March, Stanton remained in Washington seeking a new station from which he could contribute his considerable energy and talents to the Union cause. And by October, rumors were a¶oat that such a position would soon be available—secretary of war.5 Cameron had been a source of embarrassment for Lincoln from the moment he was selected to head the War Department. Cameron’s notorious reputation for corruption might have been tolerable if the war had ended in the summer of 1861. But by the fall it was clear he was unequal to the task of mobilizing and administering the North’s vast military resources for a prolonged war. Corruption , inef¤ciency, and chaos quickly gained ascendancy at the War Department , and by August a serious movement was under way to get Cameron ousted from of¤ce.6 Lincoln also wanted Cameron gone. On October 2, he complained to a secretary that Cameron was “utterly ignorant and regardless of the course of things . . . sel¤sh...

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