Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II

3. Readiness and Training: 1939–1941

34 3 Readiness and Training 1939–1941 Mobilizing the National Guard along with the Regular Army was a basic assumption of national defense planning, and as far as the war plans were concerned ,makinguseofNationalGuardforceswasnotasoptionalasthedebates of 1940 and 1941 made it appear. The United States was not ready for war when the security crisis in Europe worsened in 1938 and 1939, nor after mobilization began in 1940. America had some war plans and a few hundred thousand soldiers at that time, but these served as only a starting point. National Readiness Unjustified optimism characterized the nation’s war plans in 1939. The 28th Divisionformedasignificantportionofthe“InitialProtectiveForce”underthe War Department’s Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) that was supposed to field 420,000 soldiers, the majority of whom were to be National Guardsmen, to meet a national emergency. The nation’s defense plan that year could not, however, field combat-ready forces in a timely manner. For instance, the core of Regular and Guard forces totaled only 260,000 troops. Assuming at least thirty days between mobilization and the outbreak of hostilities, the PMP envisioned 300,000–400,000 volunteers rushing to National Guard armories, followed by 200,000 a month until the federal government enacted conscription about sixty days later.1 War Department plans required Pennsylvania to recruit 48,000 volunteers within two months.2 This force was to be ready to fight within a month and at the same time enter training—two contradictory goals.3 Moreover,ithadtobeabletowagecombined-armswarfareagainstacapable enemy, a capability that required many months of sophisticated training Readiness and Training | 35 to acquire.4 These plans reflected an unrealistic attitude toward preparedness. The month that war broke out in Europe, divisions in both the Army and the NationalGuardweremorethanathirdbelowtheminimumstrengthnecessary for effective operations.5 Neither the 28th Division nor the National Guard at large was ready for war in 1939, even though the chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), Major General Albert J. Blanding, claimed that the eighteen divisions could go to war immediately if necessary; in the same breath, however, he admitted that they were inadequately prepared for such a situation. Blanding failed to explain how his forces could be ready for action and at the same time needed to receive equipment so they could carry out their mission.6 Speaking before Congress in February, the assistant chief of staff of the Army, Brigadier General George C. Marshall, testified that both the Army and the National Guard badly needed refitting because of their “antiquated” weapons.7 Even two years later Marshall had complained that he almost never found a National Guard artillery 2nd lieutenant who had fired more than one artillery shell.8 For its part, few of the PNG soldiers managed to become qualified with their basic weapons.9 An unnamed officer who evaluated the 1939 Manassas Maneuvers was livid over the lack of modern equipment. Losing his temper with a repetitive veracity, he fumed, “There was not a single 37mm anti-tank gun, there was not a single 37mm anti-aircraft gun, there was not a single light divisional howitzer, there was not a single long range heavy field gun, there was not a single light machine gun.”10 The First Corps area commander, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, claimed that the Army was deficient in every kind of war materiel except armored fighting vehicles.11 Seven months later Congress refused to appropriate enough money for trucks for the National Guard, even though General Marshall testified that the Guard had only a third of its necessary vehicles.12 The lack of proper weapons approached the absurd. Company D of the 110th Infantry Regiment, for instance, was supposed to possess a whole platoon of mortars, but it did not even have a single tube. Instead, the platoon had to rely on the largess of the steel mill where one of the officers worked. He fashioned ersatz mortars from steel pipes, with rubber bands with which one could launch little sacks of flour to simulate shell bursts.13 During the 1939 field exercises, the Guard used cigar boxes and blocks of wood as stand-in mines. The1903Springfieldrifleremainedthesoldier’sprimaryweapon.Mortarswere inaccurate and obsolete, and field artillery battalions relied on the Frenchdesigned 75mm cannon from World War I.14 36 | Guard Wars The country had underfunded weapons production for many years. In 1933, for example, the Ordnance Department produced only fourteen 105mm howitzers, and no artillery of any larger size...