The Brusilov Offensive

Five A Tale of North and South

c h a p t e r f i v e A Tale of North and South On 9 July 1916, the army commanders of the Central Powers believed that the Brusilov Offensive had to be regarded as a failure. Though they had faced “seemingly [ . . . ] the greatest crisis of the world war” less than a month earlier, they were now convinced that the Russians’ moment had passed.1 North of the Pripet Marshes, Evert and Kuropatkin were no longer seen as a threat to the German positions. Indeed, while they possessed more than a two-to-one numerical superiority, the Russian commanders —including Alekseev—were thoroughly convinced that the German troops were simply superior. All future Russian operations in the north would be intended as either pinning or diversionary. The advance on Kovel had been halted and the front secured; neither Lemberg (Lvov) nor BrestLitovsk seemed in the slightest danger of being overrun. Kaledin and Lesch had pushed the Central Powers out of their positions on the Styr River, it was true, but new and seemingly stronger positions had been established on the Stochod River. Brusilov still possessed vast resources, including the elite Guards Army, but the Germans in particular were confident in their defenses. “In Galicia,” Falkenhayn wrote later, “the most dangerous moment of the Russian Offensive had been passed before the first shot on the Somme was fired.”2 The only remaining threat seemed to be in the Bukovina. The Hungarian leadership and population were war-weary, and reportedly lacked 114 The Brusilov Offensive the will to continue—at least under Habsburg command. Pflanzer-Baltin’s Seventh Army, charged with holding the Carpathian passes, had lost nearly 60 percent of its original strength. The 24th Infantry Division alone, which had begun with 16,000 men, had suffered more than 13,000 casualties.3 It still appeared likely, moreover, that Romania would enter the war on the side of Russia and thus possibly tip the balance decisively in favor of the Allies.4 If that were to happen, and the Habsburg Empire either collapsed or made a separate peace with the Russians, Germany’s military outlook would be bleak indeed. Though Falkenhayn found it utterly distasteful, German troops would have to support the Habsburgs. Because of the continuing crisis in the north around Kovel, however, neither the Germans nor the Austro-Hungarians had been able to take measures sufficient to check the southern Russian advance that had begun in early June. The Austro-German armies had blown two key crossing points on the Czeremosz River, five bridges over the Dniester, and six roads spanning the Pruth without slowing the Russian advance significantly.5 Even Brusilov’s inattention to the southern sectors and the timely arrival of the German 119th Infantry Division on 30 June had simply prolonged the emergency. The Russian Ninth eventually had broken even the German units, which, ironically, had to be driven back into the lines at saber-point by Austrian officers. Letschitski’s supply difficulties, however, prevented him from driving to the Carpathians.6 Pflanzer-Baltin’s Seventh Army nevertheless remained in a state of perpetual crisis. His forces were divided, with one-third of his army, the Austrian XI Corps, pinned behind the Moldova River nearly 20 kilometers to the south. XI Corps was hardly a significant fighting force; it consisted of (north to south) the 24th Infantry Division, the 40th Honved Light Infantry Division, the 5th Infantry Division, three battalions of guards infantry known as Group Kaltenborn, and Brigade Papp, which was an irregular formation of Landsturm units, local gendarmes, and the Bukovina Volunteer Regiment. The remaining two-thirds of his force (north to south: Group Hadfy, VIII Corps [formerly Group Benigni], and Cavalry Corps Brudermann) stood on a line that ran from the Dniester River in the north down to the Czeremosz River. Their defenses were, in general, hastily constructed, badly cared for, and in tactically poor positions. The morale of the troops and their trust in their commanders was almost unbelievably low. The outlook was so dismal that the commander sent to relieve Benigni on 1 July, Feldzugmeister Scheuchenstuel, resigned almost immediately after arriving and reviewing the situation.7 By the time Archduke Karl took A Tale of North and South 115 command of Army Group Dniester (which included both the South Army under Bothmer and the Austrian Seventh under Pflanzer-Baltin), the Russians occupied most of the Bukovina...