Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy

Notes

469 1. Introduction 1. The German version of Chinese place names of the time are used throughout this book. 2. He was made a member of the hereditary nobility by the Emperor in 1900. From then on he was von Tirpitz. 3. J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson , The Evolution of Prussia, 370ff. See also Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent chap. 1 (cited as Steinberg). 4. Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs , 2 vols. (cited as Tirpitz, Memoirs); Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht (cited as Tirpitz, Aufbau); and Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg (cited as Tirpitz, Ohnmachtspolitik). 5. See, e.g., Hans Hallmann, Der Weg zum deutschen Schlachtflottenbau (cited as Hallmann); Walther Hubatsch, Die Ära Tirpitz (cited as Hubatsch, Ära); and Der Admiralstab und die obersten Marinebehörden 1848–1945 (cited as Hubatsch, Admiralstab). 6. Hubatsch, Ära, 83, 18. 7. Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 2:201 (cited as Ritter). 8. See, e.g., Carl Galster, England, Deutsche Flotte, und Weltkrieg (cited as Galster, 1925), and Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (cited as Wegener). Their critiques, and others from Tirpitz’s in-service critics, Notes are dealt with below, as is the trenchant analysis of Rolf Hobson, Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875–1914 (cited as Hobson). 9. Holger Herwig, “Clio Deceived , Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War,” 87–127 (cited as “Clio Deceived”); and Michael Epkenhans, “Clio, Tirpitz, und die Marine,” 466–485 (cited as Epkenhans , “Clio”). 10. Nachlass Capelle, N 170/3, 11– 14, Hollweg to Capelle, January 1926. 11. See Eckart Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894–1901 (cited as Kehr) (English translation: Battleship Building and Party Politics, 1894–1901, ed. and trans. Pauline R. Anderson and Eugene N. Anderson); and Kehr, Economic Interests, Militarism , and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History. 12. Volker Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie (cited as Berghahn). Also see his Germany and the Approach of War in 1914(cited as Berghahn, War 1914); and Imperial Germany 1871–1914: Economy, Society and Politics (cited as Berghahn, Imperial Germany). 470 Notes to pages 8–14 13. Wilhelm Deist, Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda: Das Nachrichtenb üro des Reichsmarineamts, 1897–1914 (cited as Deist); Michael Epkenhans, Die Wilhelmische Flottenr üstung, 1908–1914: Weltmachtstreben, industrieller Fortschritt, soziale Integration (cited as Epkenhans). Just before this work was completed, Epkenhans published Tirpitz: Architect of the German High Seas Fleet. This is the first English-language Tirpitz biography. Although only eighty-seven pages of text, it is easily better than the existing short German language biographies. Epkenhans ’s interpretation sticks closely to the existing Berghahn/Deist view of Tirpitz, and thereby differs substantially from this work. Its brief scope does not permit an in-depth look at many of the issues that surrounded Tirpitz. 14. From a review article of Berghahn’s book by Jonathan Steinberg , Historical Journal, 196–204. 15. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840–1945, 308. 16. Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization , Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning, 1888–1940 (cited as Gemzell). 17. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (cited as Allison). The title is somewhat misleading because the book goes far beyond a single crisis. The author reviewed a number of other political science models, but most are jargon-filled and too purely theoretical to suit empirically based historical study. The Allison model, though not perfect, is both flexible and fact-oriented, and therefore seemed the best instrument available to explore many of Tirpitz’s deviations from rational behavior. The default model for most historians is the rational actor one, and sometimes historians can fall into the trap of assuming their subjects are as rational as they are. Such is the case, in my opinion, of some of the work of otherwise excellent historians such as Berghahn and Paul Kennedy, when they write about Tirpitz. 18. Allison, 15. 19. Ibid., 18. 20. Ibid., 255–56. 21. Tirpitz, Memoirs, 1:128–29. 22. Nachlass Capelle, N 170/3, 6, Capelle to Hollweg, 9 November 1925. Capelle was Tirpitz’s chief subordinate in the RMA until 1915, when he resigned for reasons of health. Tirpitz later resented him for succeeding him at the RMA in 1916 when he was forced out. This estrangement saddened Capelle , who held no personal grudge against Tirpitz. 23. Ibid., 9–10, Hollweg to Capelle, 12 December 1925. 24. Ibid., 14...