We Are the Union: Democratic Unionism and Dissent at Boeing

4. The Problem with “Jointness”

4 The Problem with “Jointness” In keeping with the traditional union philosophy, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers’ (IAMAW’s) vision has been one of maintaining credibility through negotiation with Boeing rather than antagonism . There is perpetual hope that this method will result in job security and other gains. However, time and again, conciliation has been just that: agreement to concessions and the maintenance of friendly team relationships with management at the expense of workers’ power against the company through antagonism. As Steve Early and Paul Buhle have each pointed out, the adoption of a posture cooperative with the interests of employers is common among established union leaders.1 As this chapter will demonstrate, union activists at Boeing have regarded the union as cooperating with management in both the bargaining process and the creation of and participation in joint management safety programs, quality efforts, and productivity programs. Unionists for Democratic Change (UDC) activists label certain union leaders and workers seeking promotion into quality or safety team management positions as “company union” spokespeople and/or “Boeing managers.” Technically, workers with jobs in the company management programs remain in the bargaining unit and are not managers, but the labels serve to emphasize the cooperative roles that some officials and workers seek to fill. The union’s behavior during the 1995contract negotiations is a case in point. Sean Mullin, for example, discussed how union leaders tried to sell the flawed second contract in 1995. Like other UDC members, he recalls seeing the local’s president, David Eagle, on television repeating, “This is a good contract. He’s holding it in his hand. This is a good contract. I know we’re going to buy it. This is a great contract offer. We’re gonna buy this. We went out and voted.” As soon The Problem with “Jointness” · 81 as the workers rejected the contract, “It wasn’t thirty minutes later, David Eagle was on the TV, telling the news media just exactly how bad that contract was.” Mullin concluded that the union leadership had made a deal with the company to recommend a contract benefiting Boeing. Union organizer Mike Burleigh gave credence to this idea even as he, too, exulted in the rank-and-file victory: The strike of ’95 was a blow to Boeing because Boeing felt that we were very small people and that we should not be able to stand up to them like we did. They really was still rocking over that because they never thought that would ever happen. Right after the strike, I kind of took it upon myself to call one of the vice presidents of the company, who used to be our manager, and he came down and talked to us. And he said that he never thought that we would vote the second contract down. And you know, they never learn. And the people really will stand against them again. Keith Thomas explained that he thought that Eagle behaved during the strike as if he were a “Boeing manager”: David Eagle is a Boeing manager. In the second proposal [rejected by the rank and file in the 1995 strike], David Eagle went on television and read a letter on television down here that nothing was changed in medical benefits and that this was a good proposal, everything was fine, and this is a good contract and we should buy it. Well, it was an outrageous lie. He’s been reelected twice since then, by the way. The contract was over, it doesn’t make any difference that people rejected that contract, David Eagle did what he was supposed to do, he read that letter, he got rewarded for reading that letter by getting a paid union position which they had to create in the Quality through Training Program. So the president of our local is a Boeing manager.2 Thomas’s hyperbolic description of Eagle’s role brings into relief the ways that union officials increasingly play quasi-managerial roles, communicating management aims and participating in joint programs that blur the distinctions between union and management. Thomas himself took the training to work in the Quality through Training Program, but he turned down a position in its operation when it was offered to him. Again, the Administrative Caucus does not agree with the UDC that taking such a position makes one aligned with management at Boeing. In my interviews both in Seattle and Wichita with Administrative Caucus representatives of Local 834 and...