China and the People's Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developing State? (review)

This book is a reaction to the spate of writings portraying a "China threat" that Solomon Karmel feels "fundamentally misrepresent the goals, the force structure, the economic foundations, and the budget of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the state leadership that it is designed to defend" (p. 20). He chooses to examine China's military-industrial complex and military budgets to provide data to address the central theme of the book as reflected in the title. The central question of the book is:

So is China a great power, on a path that may soon challenge East, Southeast, South Asian, Japanese, and perhaps even U.S. national security interests? Or does China more resemble a struggling developing state, consumed by security problems on the home front and enervated even by half-hearted power-projection efforts beyond its poorly defined borders?"

(p. 3)

The book is logically organized and flows well. Conceptually, Karmel traces the issue of China's supposed pursuit of great-power status from strategy and planning through implementation in force structure and budgeting to evaluation of the success of the whole venture. The book is divided into six chapters: the introduction, "Developing World Security Priorities and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)"; chapter 1, "The Goal: Overhauling China's Military Strategy"; chapter 2, "The Reality: Implementation and Force Structure"; chapter 3, "The Military-Industrial Complex and the Ephemeral Hunt for Profits"; chapter 4 , "Trends in Chinese Defense Spending and the Illusive Goal of Modernization; and the conclusion, "China and the Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific Region."

The introduction functions as an executive summary, defining key terms and providing a short synopsis of each chapter. In the first part of the introduction a "great power" is defined as a state whose

capital, strategic centers, and outlying regions are all comparatively secure and well-defined; one that is able to link the interests of other states to its own, and significantly influence the actions and security policies of other states through alliances (or, in a previous era, through colonial proxy relationships); one with a military that is professional in the sense outlined here (technically competent, possessing a clear mission that emphasizes defense of the state, logically managed, and legally and financially proscribed); and one whose military is advanced strategically and tactically by contemporary standards.

(p. 14 )

While allowing that China could possibly be both a great power and a developing state, Karmel concludes: "Despite sources of strength, China most resembles a developing state—not a great power or even a very stable and fully established, modern nation-state" (p. 17). The rest of the book attempts, rather successfully, to support this conclusion.

Chapter 1 traces the evolution of Chinese military strategy from People's War to what the author labels an emerging strategy of "technocratic command." Considerable space is given to explaining how and why the PLA is intent on ridding itself of the last vestiges of Mao's venerable "People's War" and it's Dengist revision, "People's War under Modern Conditions." Faced with the combination of, on the one hand, very high levels of technological warfare capability in truly advanced nations, particularly the United States, and, on the other, the growing realities of unconventional war, Karmel argues, the PLA understands that it must now readdress issues of leadership and command and control and technological modernization that have plagued China since the Qing dynasty but which also have deep roots in Chinese military theory dating back to Sun Tsu. The chapter concludes: "Giant obstacles may block the Chinese high command from achieving success in its strategic modernization effort." What seems to be missing in Chinese post-Mao strategic thinking is the strategy piece. People's War explained how to fight a war; People's War under Modern Conditions and its various follow-ups, including "technocratic control," are more about how...