TRAINING IN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

5 8 Y T R A I N I N G I N P O L I T I C A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A R T H U R T . H A D L E Y Vol. 17, no. 4, July 1928 To the man who has studied the history of the ancient world, and particularly that of Greece, the vitality of democracy in the United States comes as a perpetual surprise. It was the general opinion a hundred years ago that democratic government was at best a dangerous experiment. It had sometimes succeeded in small communities, where all the citizens had pretty nearly the same habits, the same ideals, and the same amount of property. Each man could then see that his interests and those of his fellow citizens were closely allied. But in more highly developed commonwealths, where there was a noticeable gulf between rich and poor, separate class interests had almost always made themselves felt. The majority of voters would follow the leader who promised to do what they wanted, rather than the one who was intelligent and fearless enough to tell them what the public need required. Under such circumstances, the rule of the majority meant the rule of the demagogue. If the demagogue was a weak man, his government became too weak to provide safety at home or abroad. If he was a strong man, he used his power to become a tyrant – an irresponsible monarch in fact if not in name. These things had happened so often that Aristotle – the wisest 5 9 R and best-informed student of politics in the ancient world – regarded them as almost inevitable. To prevent democracy from committing political suicide, it appeared to him necessary to temper a democratic constitution with some aristocratic elements. This sort of combination was tried with success in the two leading republics of the ancient world – Carthage and Rome – and more recently in the older Swiss Confederation. But neither Carthage nor Rome was a democracy in the modern sense of the term; nor did Switzerland become so until the nineteenth century. Each was an aristocracy with some democratic features. And the things which happened at Rome in the brief periods when the democratic element gained the ascendancy confirmed the impression left by Greek experience – that a really democratic constitution in a large and prosperous state must in the nature of things be shortlived . With these facts in mind four generations of critics on both sides of the Atlantic have been waiting, with impatience or with apprehension, for the downfall of the American Republic. To the first generation it seemed likely to fall to pieces by its own size. No democracy had ever succeeded in governing so large a territory successfully. When at the end of thirty years our country was both larger and stronger than it had been at the beginning, the critics found a new source of danger, in the increase of immigration from di√erent parts of Europe. No democracy made up of di√erent races with equal rights had ever endured. When another thirty years had passed, and we were assimilating our immigrants in 1850 as well as we did in 1820, they found new ground for pessimism in the fact that the land was getting filled up. They explained our previous success by the fact that there were plenty of rich farms within easy access. As population grew denser they felt sure that the discontent of the masses would increase. But 1880 came and the masses were about as well contented as they had been in 1850 – contented enough to remain loyal American citizens . Since 1880 pessimists have based their prophecies of disaster on our rapidly increased production and concentration of wealth. Latifundia perdidere Italiam – large estates were the ruin of Italy. With the experience of the Roman republic before their eyes, our critics warn us that the American commonwealth may expect a similar fate. 6 0 H A D L E Y Y Are they likely to prove any nearer right than their predecessors ? Not if we face the danger seriously and take proper steps to...