The Jiangnan Shipyard and the Modernization Efforts of the Nationalist Government, 1927–1937

The Jiangnan Shipyard and the Modernization Efforts of the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 by Christine Cornet I. Introduction The Nationalist desire for modernization during the Nanking decade (1927-1937) found expression in the economic and political state institutions . This institutionalization of developmental policy contributed to the strengthening of the industrial sector. Two characteristics of the Jiangnan dockyard--a public and strategic enterprise--offer an opportunity to examine the efficiency of state intervention in the national economy. As a symbol of Chinese regional modernization, since its foundation in Shanghai in 1865, the Jiangnan Shipyard gave clear indi~ation of its modernity by adapti.pg its production to both the dolJI~stic and international markets. Since 1905, the management of Jiangnan had been organized on a commercial basis: military vessels were repaired at cost, but a profit was taken on work done on commercial ships. From 1905 to 1927, this scheme changed the status of the greatest Chinese shipyard. During these twenty years, Jiangnan was operated in cooperation with a · Scottish ·engineer, Robert Buchanan Mauchan. 2 This double administration enhanced the modern image and autonomy of the Jiangnan Shipyard. This balanced cooperation, which was not con)rolled by the central authority, ended with the Nationalist takeover. Between 1927 and 1937, the government created a favorable institutional environment for national economic development. Three organizations were set up to be specially concerned with economic development: the National Reconstruction Commission, the National Resources Commission, and the National Economic Council. But government intervention ,rlso restrained the enterpreneurial spirit and individual efforts. The Jiangnan Shipyard, where the line between public and private interest was not clearly drawn, was reformed to become the model yard for the Chinese Navy. In order to appraise the efforts of the government, through the example of the Jiangnan Shipyard, it is necessary to recall the new institutional naval context. We then will analyse the staff technical training program and the "Great Works Policy." II. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE CHINESE NAVY AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE JIANGNAN SHIPYARD. 1. The Naval Reorganization. Within the Chinese state's administrative structure, the Ministry of the Navy was often a department of the War Office. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ministry of the Navy (hereafter, M.N.) become autonomous, but its efficiency was impeded by the lack of an appropriate budget. While in theory the public dockyards were under M.N. control, the Jiangnan Shipyard was largely autonomous from 1905 to 1927. From 1927 on, the Nationalists undertook reorganization of governmental institutions, and began to modernize the Navy. Although the M.N. was at first dissolved, it was reestablished three years later as an independent ministry. ~he law of 25 January 1930 divided the ministry into eight sections. The staff consisted of one viceminister , two to four advisers, four secretaries, and eight section chiefs. The Chinese Navy was organized into four regional fleets: the first fleet, led by Vice-Admiral Chen Jiliang, dealt with the Changjiang Valley and was based in Nanjing; the second fleet, based in 59 Shanghai, was supervised by Rear-Admiral Ceng Yijing and patrolled the Fujian coast; the third fleet, formerly the fleet of the North (Beiyang Haijun), was headed by Rear-Admiral Xie Gengzhi. and had its headquarters in Qingdao; and the fourth fleet was the traditional Cantonese one with Jiang Xiyuan at its head. A report written by the French Settlement Police and sent by the Consul, J. Meyrier, to the French Foreign Ministry, gives us a typical description of the Chinese Navy: China does not possess a Navy in the strict sense of the word. In this country, we see different naval organizations based in different regions, which sail under the same flag and theoretically recognize the power of Nanjing; but, in fact, they are almost independent from one another and often even are enemies. 6 The absence of unity was a traditiona1 aspect of the Chinese fleet since China began to build a modern Navy. For the first time in the history of the Chinese navy, a statesman, Chiang Kai-shek, really yearned to form a modern state. The pioneers of modernization always defended their regional powers, while the central government was unable to coordinate...