The Cold War and the Origins of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China by Niu Jun (review)

When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, Chinese Communist leaders needed to make some critical decisions on the country's foreign relations immediately. The outside world also had to decide what to do with the emergence of a new power. Actions taken by the two sides at the time would significantly affect international affairs in the following decades. Today, with China rising as the world's second-largest economy, how should China and the world react to the changing circumstances? History offers us some important lessons.

In this well-researched and illuminating study, Niu Jun examines the making of China's foreign policies in the years from 1949 to 1955. With his careful investigation of major events during the period, especially decision-making in China, Niu directs our attention to some historical imperatives that shaped Chinese leaders' outlook on the world and policies on some key issues in China's foreign relations. Chief among those larger historical forces were the Chinese Communists' transition from revolution to nation-building, their responses to the unfolding Cold War, and the continued agency of a revolutionary ideology in a new international environment. These forces, Niu argues, collectively formed some "visions, vocabularies, and diplomatic behaviors, as well as some important features that had lasting impact" (p. xix).

The presentation comes in four parts. In part one, the author relates the breakdown of U.S.-China relations and the establishment of a Sino-Soviet alliance soon after the founding of the PRC. In spite of some explorative gestures on the Chinese and American side, neither the recently founded PRC nor the United States had sufficient will to forge a working relationship with the other party since such an action would compromise their ideological principles and cause domestic and international complications. The decision to ally the PRC with the Soviet Union initially arose from Communist ideals, but the Chinese concern with national interests did inform the negotiations with the Russians. Niu observes: "Mao set out seeking alliance with the Soviet Union in order to achieve revolutionary goals, but in the process he bargained with Stalin for 'nation-building' and had complaints about Stalin" (p. 50).

In part two Niu investigates how Chinese leaders decided to support Ho Chi-minh's struggle against French colonialists in Indochina and Kim Il-sung's attempt to unify Korea by force and his subsequent resistance to American intervention on the Korean Peninsula. As the author demonstrates, multiple factors contributed to Chinese policies and actions, including the desire for revolutionary solidarity, traditional consideration of national security, and the dynamics of the ongoing Cold War.

Part three focuses on Chinese involvement in three major events—the ceasefire in Korea, the Geneva Accords that (temporarily) stopped military actions in Vietnam, and the contention over the Taiwan Strait that did not prevent the signing of a U.S.-Taiwan security pact but led to the PRC-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. With his close look at the Chinese operations, Niu further highlights the ways in which factors such as ideology, national interests, and the Cold War converged to lead the Chinese government to positions that were firm at certain times and flexible on other occasions.

In part four of the volume, Niu probes two major initiatives that the Chinese launched in 1954 as the country pursued a new kind of foreign policy. Beijing decided to develop atomic bombs and made diplomatic efforts to engage nonaligned nations of Asia and Africa. By the middle of the 1950s, the author notes, the PRC had grown to be more sophisticated in its conduct of foreign relations, poised to break out of the strict confinement of the Cold War and explore a new, broader kind of diplomacy with attention to the "middle zone."

By integrating empirical research with...