Counterfactuals of Freedom and Saint Anselm’s Explanations of Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom, and Evil

I present an interpretation of Saint Anselm’s views on divine foreknowledge, human freedom, and evil that offers a way to understand divine counterfactuals of freedom (CFs). I first critique Katherin A. Rogers’ argument that Molinism is incompatible with Anselm’s explanation of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by showing that, from Anselm’s account of the “uprightness” of creation, CFs are plausible. Second, I use this interpretation to reply to three criticisms against CFs. First, in contrast to Timothy O’Connor’s rejection of CFs for lacking a proper grounding, I show that Anselm’s metaphysical principle of uprightness provides a viable grounding for making CFs. Second, in contrast to William Hasker’s rejection of CFs as contrary to human freedom and promoting determinism, I show that Anselm’s use of prevenient and subsequent grace as ways to understand the uprightness of creation enables Anselm to envision God’s true knowledge of future events as the free choices for uprightness. Finally, in contrast to J. L. Mackie’s claim that theism is irrational because of the presence of evil in the world, I show that from Anselm’s perspective of the uprightness of creation considered according to the divine knowledge of CFs, God is not responsible for evil or for designing a world in which evil could not occur.