Capturing Power Shift in East Asia: Toward an Analytical Framework for Understanding “Soft Power”

Mainstream International Relations (IR) theory has problems fully accounting for the regional dynamics of East Asia. This article explores whether the pursuit of soft power—a concept that has been given a prominent position in research on East Asian IR—can provide one piece of the puzzle for understanding East Asia’s regional dynamics. This article proposes an analytical framework for analyzing soft power that problematizes the rigid soft power/hard power binary. The framework proposes a way to understand soft power and the hard-soft spectrum of behavior that allows for the inclusion of economic power while still drawing a line between hard and soft power, where not all economic power is soft, but nor is it all hard. It is argued that to keep the concept of soft power relevant in the East Asian context economic power needs to be included. The line is drawn between economic coercion and economic inducement, arguing that when induced there is still a certain level of freedom as one can choose whether the payments or bribes offered are good enough for it to be worthwhile to change one’s preference and behavior. Coercion, in contrast, utilizes a different dynamic where the point is to force someone to do something they are unwilling to do.

Since the end of the Cold War, mainstream International Relations (IR) theory has often had problems accounting for the regional dynamics in the East Asian security setting, a region which is at the center of a power shift from West to East, and from the United States to China. These regional dynamics follow rules and norms that fall outside what mainstream IR would prescribe. Countries in the region have chosen a path that avoids the construction of legalistic institutions and frameworks in preference for consensus building, noninterference and conflict avoidance. This article explores whether the pursuit of “soft power” can provide a piece of the puzzle to assist in the understanding of these regional dynamics. The framework will be applied on China’s diplomatic approach, as China is the only current challenger to the existing US-led regional order.

The idea or concept of soft power has been given a prominent position in research on East Asian international relations (Rivlin 2004; Kurlantzick 2007; Lampton 2008; Li 2008; Watanabe and McConnell 2008; Callahan and Barabantseva 2011; Vyas 2011; Lai and Lu 2012; Sun 2013; Kivimaki 2014; Hagström 2015a). However, much of the existing research on soft power in East Asia has not addressed soft power as a theoretical concept in a comprehensive way. Often, it even lacks a well-developed definition (see below). This article contributes by proposing an analytical framework for analyzing (soft) power that problematizes the rigid soft power/hard power binary. Such a framework is important to account for and understand the ongoing power shift in East Asia, which has been taking place since the end of the Cold War. The binary understanding of power has not worked. The approach to power preferred by realists, which gives primacy to “hard” military force, has failed to account for post-Cold War developments and provides an—at best—shallow account of power dynamics in East Asia.

Soft power, an alternative concept introduced by Joseph Nye, has gained a considerable degree of acceptance among analysts and policymakers but has significant flaws in its implementation. There is also a problem with the current use and definition of the term. A particular problem is derived from the fact that analysts tend to include economic power in their analyses of China’s soft power without making a clear (re-)definition of the concept. This is highly problematic, as in Nye’s definition of the term, economic power is a form of hard power. The ability to understand and successfully analyze China’s diplomatic approach and ambitions have policy implications. It is central not only to ensuring regional peace, stability, and prosperity but also to how we are to perceive and influence the direction of international relations and world politics. It is also particularly important as it will help us to understand and find ways to benefit from the ongoing power shift. This would include how to develop and maintain the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, today and into the future. The article also provides a framework for analyzing the soft power dimension while still taking economic power into account. This is essential because if the economic dimension is excluded, China arguably has little or no soft power.

The article first reviews the existing literature on soft power in East Asia and argues that most of the existing research on soft power in an East Asian context does not address soft power as a theoretical concept in a comprehensive way. The concept itself is then discussed providing a short background on the range of other ways to label, understand and divide power on the spectrum from military to soft power, before looking at Nye’s definition(s) of the concept. After that, the relation between hard and soft power is discussed with a focus on Nye’s framework, and the proposed analytical framework is presented. This framework is applied to China’s diplomatic approach since the end of the Cold War, and some conclusions are drawn.

The Limitations of Soft Power in Research on East Asia

The idea of soft power has been at the forefront of China’s foreign policy since 2007 when President Hu Jintao undertook a publicity blitz to take a path that has been followed ever since. It has intensified since 2011 under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Outside China, soft power is used to try to understand China. What China wants to be is a crucial question in East Asian international relations that has implications throughout and beyond East Asia, even more so since the introduction of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) in 2013. BRI here offers a new vision of the future of the world, as a concrete manifestation of previous visions such as “harmonious world” and “peaceful development,” as well as Xi’s own “Chinese Dream” of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Callahan 2013; Nordin 2016; Nordin and Weissmann 2018). Thus, while first and foremost an economic undertaking, at the same time, the success of the BRI is at least in part dependent on the attractiveness of China and the Chinese offer. Once again, there is a problem separating economic power and soft power.

However, most of the existing research on soft power in East Asia does not address soft power as a theoretical concept in a comprehensive way. It often lacks even a well-developed definition. This can best be exemplified in the extensive number of studies aimed at understanding China, and comprehending its rise and diplomatic strategy (Gill and Huang 2006; Cho and Jeong 2008; Breslin 2009; Lee 2009; Holyk 2011; Lai and Lu 2012; Liu and Tsai 2014; Kim 2015; Li 2015), as well as analyzing its normative power (Callahan and Barabantseva 2011), the attractiveness of its national model (Ramo 2004; Cho and Jeong 2008) or the economic system as a successful alternative to the US/Western democratic neoliberal system (Huang and Ding 2006; Ding 2008). These studies focus on the perceived role of an often undefined concept, often simply based on Nye’s work without more comprehensive elaboration or focus. The aim is to account for China’s rise/status, but they offer limited clear guidance on the link between hard and soft power, or what soft power is and how it works. In fact, the field of research on power in East Asia, while extensive, is theoretically underdeveloped. A systematic look at the soft power literature, as is demonstrated below, reveals a number of weaknesses.

First and foremost, soft power is problematic as an analytical category as there is a lack of linkage to any concrete impact on hard questions such as national security or other “hard security” issues. Much of the research has been vague on actual outcomes or looked for an outcome that is in fact not an outcome—emphasizing, for example, the number of Confucius Institutes, the number of Chinese festival celebrations, the findings of opinion polls or how cultural artefacts such as manga and anime have spread, but without convincing tracing effects (Gill and Huang 2006; Kurlantzick 2007; Paradise 2009; Holyk 2011; Wortzel 2013; also see Bukh 2014 for a historical review; Chu, Kang, and Huang 2015; Yennie Lindgren 2020).

This said, there have been attempts to conceptualize soft power in various ways. For example, Mattern (2005) has modelled attraction as a relationship constructed through representational force and Bukh (2014) argues against the idea that skillfully crafted policy utilizing cultural artefacts enhance Japan’s soft power, instead arguing that cultural diplomacy reflects discursively constructed national identities to a large degree shaped by international ideational structures. Hagström (2015b) has used the idea of “abnormality” and “normality” and the desire for status as drivers in international politics to analyze Japan’s ongoing remilitarization. Gustafsson, Hagström and Hanssen have developed the idea of normality and abnormality further, analyzing Japan’s pacifism (Gustafsson, Hagström, and Hanssen 2018, 2019). Hagström has also together with Pan criticized the conceptualization of soft power and hard power as empirically and normatively dichotomous, arguing that power is discursively constructed and that hard and soft power are best understood as respectively ‘representational force’ and ‘physical force’ being intertwined in the productive and disciplinary forms of power (cf. Hagström and Nordin 2019; Hagström and Pan 2020).

Part of the problem is the entwining of a theoretical definition of soft power, which has made it futile to attempt to trace any real impact of the concept; soft power has simply been too soft to be able to trace genuine outcomes. This problem is well illustrated in Gill and Huang’s influential article on the sources and limits of Chinese soft power, which fails to create a working analytical category and finds only that soft power has not been as successful as it could have been (Gill and Huang 2006). The article is also an excellent example of the problem with the all too common practice of using opinion polls conducted for other purposes to attempt to trace and measure impact. The trustworthiness of the link between soft power (not clearly defined) and the poll results, and even more so the impact, are at best left vague.

In fact, from a realist perspective, based on the way soft power has been used, it would be possible to make a strong argument that even to use the term itself risks distraction from issues of “real” importance. Good examples here are Heng (2010), which explores how soft power has evolved and been used differently in Japan and China with a focus on who is the softest of the two; Giulianotti (2015), which focuses on mega-events in the context of national branding; and a more recent study on education as a source of soft power, which stops at attractiveness and leaves impact alone (Wojciuk, Michalek, and Stormowska 2015)—from a realist perspective, very much the opposite of presenting a useful analytical category.

There are significant problems with most of the existing research that draws on realism to operationalize the concept of soft power, because the focus tends to be on the possession of capabilities (Shambaugh 2013, 2015). This has led to a general problem that much of the literature is focused squarely on capabilities for the production and dissemination of cultural artefacts and the related problem of “vehicle fallacy,” which puts power on a par with resources, and is also cascading through the research on soft power in East Asia. Existing research provides numbers on, for example, language students or Confucius Institutes, or the spread of Chinese movies or Japanese manga and anime (Gill and Huang 2006; Lum, Morrison, and Vaughn 2008; Hunter 2009; Blanchard and Lu 2012; Katsumata 2012; Heng 2014; Leung and Du Cros 2014; Hartig 2015) and it has asked how cultural products from Japan are received (Allison 2008; Nakano 2008; Otmazgin 2008). Soft power here tends to be assessed in terms of numbers of films, Confucius Institutes, or similar resource-focused measures that in themselves are made the assumed effect of soft power.

Soft power has very often been ascribed to Japan-based solely on the global commercial success of cultural artefacts that originate in the country (Shiraishi 1997) so the term has thus been conflated with “cultural weight” (Agawa 2008; Kondo 2008). The latter usage overlaps with, and has been nourished by, the notion of Japan’s “gross national cool” (McGray 2002). Many have thus noted the potential power implications of Japan’s “cultural weight” (Otmazgin 2008; Heng 2010). There is also a tendency for soft power analysis to use illustrative or anecdotal evidence (Nye 2004a, 2004b; cf. Leheny 2006, 212; Lam 2007; Allison 2008; Nakano 2008; Heng 2010). It has also been standard practice to use public opinion polls as a way to measure the effects of soft power resources (Gill and Huang 2006; Paradise 2009). This is clearly a blunt instrument, to either attempt to trace effects from public opinion polls, or attempt to separate the effects of different cultural promotional activities, and between these “forms of soft power” and other factors. Arguably, this is more a case of easy access to data than an actual tracing of effects.

Even when trying to stay true to Nye’s relational concept, a realist conception of power has persisted, and there has been a failure to transcend the rationalized, behaviorist and causal understanding of power. In works on Chinese soft power, there is a near-universal acceptance of Nye’s definition of soft power as the ability to achieve outcomes through attraction or image rather than coercion or payment. However, such work fails to transcend the rationalistic, behaviorist and causal understanding of power (Gill and Huang 2006; Castro 2007; Cho and Jeong 2008; Wuthnow 2008; Castro 2009; Hunter 2009; Heng 2010; Zhang 2012; Chu, Kang, and Huang 2015; Wilson 2015). Some of the literature has moved further, agreeing that consent can be produced or reproduced through the very production of interest and identity, but still tends to stay within Nye’s behavioral and rationalistic epistemology and causal ontology (Hartig 2015; Wojciuk, Michalek, and Stormowska 2015).

The problem with the tendency in existing research to reproduce a soft/hard binary, or between normative, ideational or symbolic power, on the one hand, and military and economic power, on the other, also applies to the literature on East Asia. This binary view can be found in many types of studies, such as those which use surveys to measure the effect of soft power (Zhang 2012), those which use a narrative framework (Hartig 2015), and analysis by Wojciuk, Michalek, and Stormowska on education systems that, while agreeing that attraction is intersubjectively constructed and what defines soft power also depends on the structure of the international political order. In addition, studies that accept that there is spectrum between hard and soft power still tend to accept the basic binary premise (e.g. Castro 2007, 2009). A good exception here is Callahan (2015), who in exploring what he calls “China’s ‘negative soft power’ strategy” takes a social constructivist approach to the China Dream discourse that:

Rather than simply describing how its positive achievements and aspirations are being exported to the world, . . . explores how China dream discourse’s anti-Japanese, anti-American and anti-Western themes seek to build the positive Chinese self through the negative exclusion of Otherness.

(Callahan 2015, 217)

The concept of soft power has also played an essential role in research that has used it as a tool and/or framework for comprehending China—both externally to understand China and internally for China to understand itself and its future in the region and the world (Kang 2007; Chu, Kang, and Huang 2015). Externally, soft power has been used as a tool to try to understand what China wants to become. This is a critical question in East Asian international relations that has implications throughout East Asia and beyond. China is also trying to come to terms with itself and debates on soft power have become a prominent feature of the process. Soft power has been at the forefront of China’s foreign policy since President Hu Jintao undertook a publicity blitz in 2007 and has been the path to follow ever since. This situation has intensified since 2011 under Xi Jinping. There has been extensive debate within China on what soft power is supposed to be, and its meaning and role in Chinese foreign policy (Glaser and Murphy 2009; see Li 2011). The fact that this has been the focus of so much research, including in China, shows that soft power has in itself become an attractive concept. It is a concept widely used by officials, experts, and pundits alike, including in China. Its attractiveness can be exemplified by a quote from a senior Chinese official stating that “China is using soft power with the objective of creating an international environment that is favourable to China’s development” (Glaser and Murphy 2009, 25). This comment is also a good summary of the broad, pragmatic Chinese policy approach that is using the term “soft power” to account for any diplomatic actions where it thinks will be beneficial. Basically, anything short of an outright military intervention might very well be labelled soft power by Beijing. It should also be noted that soft power is not a static concept, but one that is continuously redefined in the perspective of China’s needs. Hence, as an analytical tool for conceptual development, the Chinese debate has little to offer. While, admittedly, a lot when it comes to understanding China (but that is a different story).

One other area that has been addressed within a soft power framework is the attractiveness, or pull, of economic success. The focus of studies that explore this dimension is the attractiveness of China’s economic success (Ramo 2004; Frost 2007; Kurlantzick 2007). Economic power also features prominently in works that warn the United States and the West against regarding China as a soft power (Windybank 2005; Yang 2009). There are also works that look more specifically at the attraction of China’s economic success (Percival 2007) or the link between China’s use of a no strings attached approach in its search for natural resources and its political ties with developing countries (Braütigam and Tang 2012).

Tracing the Idea of Soft Power

Soft power is not a new concept but an old one to which a new term has been attached. The idea of soft power can be traced back more than two millennia in the behavior of Chinese rulers and the ideas of thinkers such as Sun Zi (544–496 BC) and Mo Zi (470–390 BC) (Ding 2008; Ding 2010). Nor is soft power new in Western thinking, where for example Clausewitz distinguished between “moral qualities and effects” and “the whole mass of the military force” (Clausewitz 1977, 149).

More recently, a range of other ways has been devised to label, understand and divide power, types of power, and the spectrum from hard military power to soft power. There is a tendency to distinguish between three types of categories or “faces” of power. For example, Lukes (2005) refers to “three faces of power” while Kenneth E. Boulding (1989) and David M. Lampton (2008) have titled two of their key works Three Faces of Power and The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds, respectively. Moreover, the three categories have remained more or less the same: military power, economic power, and a third category that represents versions of normative or symbolic power. What is included varies somewhat over time, but in its basic principles remains constant—what changes is the ‘sexiness’ of the label. The constant feature of the third category seems to be best described in Lukes’ understanding of the third face of power, which he calls ideological power. This is the power to manipulate what people think they want, or the power to shape desires and preferences (Lukes 2005).¹

Etzioni (1975) was already using a categorization similar to Nye’s in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit with less ‘sexy’ labels. Etzioni (1975) separated between coercive/physical, remunerative/material, and normative/symbolic power. Coercive/physical power relies on inflicting physical or psychological pain or deprivation, that is, the equivalent of Nye’s “military power.” Remunerative/material power relies on material inducements and is therefore the equivalent of “economic power.” Normative/symbolic power is the equivalent of “soft power,” as it relies on the capacity to motivate through the force of ideas and win compliance by creating group norms with which individuals wish to identify. The similarity becomes even more apparent when Etzioni notes that when economic sanctions or group norms are used to ostracize, both remunerative/material power and normative/symbolic power bleed into coercion. Coercion, in turn, is a central defining feature of Nye’s spectrum of behavior.

In his book on the three faces of Chinese power, Lampton uses the same categorizations with the exception of “ideational power,” which he broadens. His labels are might/coercive, money/remunerative, and minds/ideational. It is interesting to note that Lampton also points out that money/remunerative power can be hard power. Etzioni’s concept of normative/symbolic power is broadened to “ideational power,” which is “power deriving from human intellect, power expressed in the creation and dissemination of knowledge and compelling ideas. . . . [It] includes leadership, human intellectual resources, innovation, and culture” (Lampton 2008, 10). Lampton argues that his minds/ideational power is close to Nye’s soft or attractive power, “inasmuch as it explicitly embraces innovation; it is narrower inasmuch as it excludes the attractive aspects of material inducements” (Lampton 2008, 10).

Joseph Nye and Soft Power

Nye’s definition of soft power has been developed somewhat over time, since its introduction in 1990. (For a summary of Nye’s approach to power, see table 1.) The key difference is that in his later work, he downplays the relative importance of agenda setting and upgrades attraction. He has also changed his assessment of China’s soft power. Until the mid-2000s, Chinese soft power and the threat of such power were being presented as having potential, but as still limited with a “long way to go” before it threatened the United States (Nye 1990, 130–140, 2002, 18–22, 2004a, 83–89). In 2005, however, he changed his view, warning that “although China is far from America’s equal in soft power, it would be foolish to ignore the gains it is making. . . . It is time for the US to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in Asia” (Nye 2005, 11; also see Nye 2010, 2012).

In his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, Nye used a more narrow definition of soft power than the one often used today (particularly in the context of China, as is discussed below). Nye distinguishes between “indirect” or “co-optive power,” or “soft power,”² and what he refers to as “directive” or “command power” (Nye 1990, 31). It should be noted that the term soft power itself was not at the center of the analysis. It is not included in the index and is added as a possible way of thinking about the indirect or cooptive dimension of power. Soft power concerns the ability to “get others to want what you want,” in contrast with active command power behavior, which is “getting others to do what you want” (Nye 1990, 31). Soft power “can rest on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express” (Nye 1990, 31). Command power, on the other hand, concerns the ability to get “other states to change” using inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks) (Nye 1990, 31). This is to be contrasted with indirect or cooptive power, which concerns the ability of a country to achieve its preferred outcomes “. . . because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects” (Nye 1990, 31). In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure situations in world politics as it is to get others to change situations. The ability of soft power to set others’ preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions, while “hard command power” is usually associated with tangible resources such as economic and military strength (Nye 1990, 32).

In his 2002 book, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, Nye continues to define soft power as “getting others to want what you want,” referring to it as an indirect way to exercise power, or coopt rather than coerce (Nye 2002, 8–9): “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its examples, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” (Nye 2002, 8–9). It is important to note that he explicitly does not include economic power as a form of soft power. He explicitly separates two kinds of “hard command power”—military power and economic power—from soft power (Nye 2002, 8–9).

This book places emphasis not only on intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions, but also on the ability to set the political agenda and the ability to determine the framework for debate in a way that shapes the preferences of others. Shaping preferences is essential, as: “If I can get you to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye 2002, 9). Nye emphasizes that soft power is one source of influence but not the same as influence. It is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. As Nye states,

It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation. . . . [If a country’s] culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. It can establish international rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks.

(Nye 2002, 9–10)

In other words, it is clear that Nye at this point has started to move toward his later emphasis on attraction as the key source and characteristic of soft power. In the context of attraction, it should be noted that Nye has argued that soft power is not something that only belongs to a country’s government (Nye 2002, 11).

In 2004, Nye published Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Nye 2004a). As mentioned above, a key difference is that, compared with his earlier books, this volume downplays the role of agenda setting in preference to a country’s attraction (also see Womack 2005). Soft power is not merely the same as influence, which can also rest on “the hard power of threats or payments” (Nye 2004a, 6). At the same time, it is more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument: “It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are assets that produce such attraction” (Nye 2004a, 6).

Nye has also used the term “smart power,” which refers to “a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion” (Nye 2004a, 32; Armitage and Nye 2007; Nye 2008b, 1353; Nye 2009; Nye 2011b, chap. 7; Nye 2011a). To cite Nye, “[s]mart power means learning better how to combine our hard and soft power.” It is a concept that he has developed “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye 2009, 160). Smart power is thus not about soft power, but a term that covers the full range of foreign policy tools. It is founded in a broad understanding of power as “. . . one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants” by using “coercion, payment, and attraction. . . . If a state can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot on carrots and sticks. But rarely can it totally replace either. Thus the need for smart strategies that combine the tools of both hard and soft power” (Nye 2009, 160). While smart power might be a useful way for policy-makers to think, it is an all-inclusive concept of little value when trying to develop an analytical framework of soft power.

Toward an Analytical Framework

Power is a vague and problematic concept. As Jae Ho Chung correctly points out, “[p]ower is indisputably an elusive concept at the least and, therefore, assessing it properly poses a daunting challenge both conceptually and methodologically” (Chung 2015, 2). Nevertheless, instead of going into repeating or elaborating on what has been said elsewhere, here a definition outlined by Joseph Nye will be adopted. Power is here simply defined as “. . . the ability to affect others’ to obtain the outcomes you want” (Nye 2008a, 94). This definition is suitable for the purpose of this article, and as the purpose here is to elaborate on soft power using Nye’s definition seems like a suitable choice.

Hard power and soft power are related. The distinction between the two is one of degree, in the behavior and in the level of tangibility of resources. Soft power resources tend to be associated with cooptive behavior and hard power resources with command behavior. However, this relationship is not absolute:

[Sometimes] countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. A strong economy not only provides resources for sanctions and payments, but can also be a source of attractiveness. On the whole, however, the general association between the types of behavior and certain resources is strong enough to allow us to employ the useful shorthand reference to hard- and soft-power resources.

(Nye 2004a, 7–8)

The central idea of attraction is in itself a highly vague and problematic concept. Here attraction is understood as something that makes actors want to do something. It is one possible underlying reasons for why someone else behaves a certain way. In line with Nye, the most likely resources creating attraction among other states are political values, culture, and foreign policies.

As outlined above, Nye distinguishes between three types of power: military, economic, and soft power. His typology is summarized in Table 1. These three types of power are located on a behavioral spectrum from (hard, direct) command power to (soft, indirect) cooptive power, ranging from military power in the form of coercive behavior/deterrence/protection, through economic inducement and coercion to the soft powers of agenda setting and attraction. The most likely sources of these power behaviors are, in turn, military threats and force, economic sanctions and payments/bribes, and, for soft power institutions and values, culture and policies. The resources and behaviors are pursued in different government policies. Military power is pursued through coercive diplomacy, war, and alliances. Economic power is implemented as sanctions, payments/bribes, and aid. Soft power is pursued through public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

Nye developed his thinking on the difference between hard and soft power, arguing that one way to think about the differences is by considering the different ways in which the preferred outcomes can be achieved (Nye 2004a, 6–7): (a) commanding someone to change their preference using the threat of force or economic sanctions; (b) inducing someone by using economic power to pay them; (c) restricting preferences by setting the agenda in such a way that “more extravagant wishes” appear too unrealistic to pursue; and (d) appealing to others’ sense of attraction, love or duty in the relationship and appealing to “shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes.”

According to Nye, soft power is at work “If I am persuaded to go along with your purpose without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short of my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye 2004a, 7).

Thus, in Nye’s view, paying someone is an example of hard power. This practice, which is common in Chinese soft power diplomacy and included in most analyses of Chinese soft power, would clearly not be seen as soft power in Joseph Nye’s conception of soft power.

In contrast, the author argues that there is a need to draw a line between hard and soft power while at the same time accounting for the inclusion of at least those aspects of economic power that are needed to keep the concept of soft power relevant in the East Asian context (see Table 2 below). It is here argued that the line should be drawn down the middle of economic power. Economic power in the form of coercion is to be seen as having tipped over into hard power, while inducements are seen as still within the soft power part of the spectrum. There is, of course, a fine line between payments/bribes/aid and sanctions, but there is in principle a big difference. When induced, there is still a certain level of freedom as one can choose to be “induced;” to decide that the payments or bribes offered are good enough and gives one enough utility for it to be worthwhile move in the direction of behaving in line with what the other’s preferred outcome is. Coercion, in contrast, utilizes a different dynamic where the point is to force someone to do something they are unwilling to do.

Table 1.

Summary of Nye’s Approach to Power

Table 2.

An Analytical Framework for (Soft) Power

So, how does the above understanding of power and the hard-soft spectrum fit into the proposed analytical framework? When looking at the spectrum of behavior as manifested in Nye’s four ways to achieve preferred outcomes, it is clear that to use the threat of force to command someone to change their preference is a case of hard power. The same is the case when appealing to the others’ sense of attraction, love or duty in a relationship or appeal to “shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes” which is clearly a case of soft power. The same is the case with agenda setting, i.e. to restrict preferences by setting the agenda in such a way that “more extravagant wishes” seem too unrealistic to pursue.

When moving on to economic power, as outlined above the case is not as straightforward as proposed by Nye. The proposed framework agrees with Nye that the act of coercing someone using the threat of economic sanctions to get them to change their preferences is a case of hard power. However, trying to use positive economic incentives in the form of different forms of payments, bribes, or aid to convince someone to change their preferences is here considered a form of soft power. Whether a transaction is labelled or perceived as a bribe, payment, or aid is secondary. The critical point here is “positive incentives,” i.e. economic incentives that add value rather than making your economic situation worse as in the case of sanctions.

It should here be recognized that an indication or promise of a payment/bribe/aid can be linked to an implied or explicit threat of economic punishments if you do not agree. If so, it would not be considered soft power in the proposed framework, as this would be a form of coercion. However, the implied or explicit threat of you not receiving a possible economic incentive if you do not do something would still qualify as soft power. Here your economic situation, ceteris paribus, would be the same as it is now if you decide not to change your preference. Thus, it is a form of inducement when, as discussed above, it gives you a certain level of freedom to decide whether the conditions are good enough to change your preferences and behavior.

Capturing Power Shift: the Case of China

Can the proposed framework contribute to a better understanding of China’s diplomatic approach in the region since the end of the Cold War? Does the framework proposed understanding of soft power moving beyond a rigid soft/hard power binary provide a piece to the puzzle of understanding the ongoing power shift and China as a regional and global leader?

When analyzing China’s diplomatic approach using the proposed framework as a lens, it is clear that it provides an analytical frame that fits better with reality than talking about either soft or hard power. Using the proposed framework enables the inclusion not only of attraction and agenda setting, but also of the inducement aspect of economic power in the context of soft power. Together this provides a better account and understanding of China’s post-Cold War diplomacy in the East Asian region. If to understand China’s foreign policy and diplomacy, there is a need to move beyond pure attraction and agenda setting to include economic aspects of power, without which there would be limited Chinese power. At the same time, it is not just about economic power, as this would not fully account for China’s new-found regional and global influence. Nor is it only about military power or economic coercion, both of which on their own would create a rule by fear. The latter would not be an accurate description of reality.

Starting on the hard power part of the spectrum of behavior, it is clear that China’s current and projected future military power is a factor to be reckoned with (Heginbotham 2015; Xi 2017; Kristensen and Korda 2019; see e.g. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019). With increased military power, the China threat has become more real, both in the form of what kind of China that is to be expected in the future and also its military capabilities today. While China is not a competitor to the United States, the trend is clear, and there are today areas where China have a competitive edge in specific regional scenarios. To cite RANDs report “The US-China Military Scorecard”:

. . . the PLA can pose problems—and potentially win wars—without catching up to the United States in terms of overall quality, sophistication, or system numbers. By many standards, the Chinese military continues to lag far behind that of the United States. However, the scorecard analysis shows that it is necessary to consider the operational circumstances of specific regional scenarios in evaluating the balance of power in any tangible or meaningful way.

(Heginbotham 2015, 22)

China’s military rise is not only recognized by the United States but also by China’s neighbors. For example, Japan’s defense ministry did in 2019 identify China as its greatest national security threat (Kelly 2019).

In relation to power, it is not only the military might that matters but also what you do with your military power resources. Here it is important to note that China over time has become less willing to downplay its relative military might. This can be seen most clearly in the case of the South China Sea where China has increased both its presence and posture to never-before-seen levels with major land reclamation and major military infrastructure constructions and deployment of advanced weapon systems (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, 73–76). Also in the case of Taiwan there have been a substantial increase of capabilities as well as pressure (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, 70–71). It should also be recognized that new areas of warfare have developed, with an increased role for, and capability in, cyberwarfare capabilities and other hybrid warfare capabilities (Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron 2015; Cheng 2017; Raska and Bitzinger 2020). China has also become more prone to use military diplomacy as part of its broader foreign policy strategy (Allen, Saunders, and Chen 2017). While not per se qualifying as hard power, it shows a willingness to utilize its military power resources. In fact, depending on how it is executed, military diplomacy may even be a way to build attraction.

To sum up, in the case of military power, China both increased its resources and its willingness to use these resources to get others to change their preferences and behavior. It is clear that at least in cases of core national interest, military power is something that can and is being used.

Moving on to the economic power part of the spectrum, the area where the line between hard and soft power is drawn. While not being its preferred strategy in most cases, China uses economic coercion to get others to change their behavior. Economic sanctions are mainly used in priority areas of importance for national security and in relations to sovereignty issues, such as arms sales to Taiwan, rather than “optional” issues (Nephew 2019, 3–4). Other examples include the South Korea Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016 and 2017 that China saw as a threat and responded by curbing tourism, cutting imports, and target the auto companies (Harrell, Rosenberg, and Saravalle 2018). China has also targeted Japanese and Philippine exports, as well as other areas such as tourism and popular boycott of goods, in relation to the Philippines maritime dispute over the Scarborough Shoal and the Sino-Japanese maritime dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu (Harrell, Rosenberg, and Saravalle 2018).

Nevertheless, while willing to use the hard power part of the behavior spectrum when reasons are deemed to require it, China has shown a strong preference for utilizing the soft power part of the spectrum instead inducing its counterparts to change their preference. In simple words, China prefers to offer carrots, or signaling the loss of a carrot, if its counterparts do not change their preferences and behaviors in the direction China wants rather than using the stick. An example here can be seen in the use of economic incentives toward the Philippines influencing the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manilla on April 28–29, 2017 when it was expected that most ASEAN members would raise concerns about China’s behavior in the South China Sea (Foon 2017). A similar pattern was seen in 2012, when the then rotating chair of ASEAN, Cambodia, prevented the ASEAN foreign ministers to issue a joint communiqué containing wordings on the South China Sea, to give but two examples (BBC 2012).

Economic incentives are a crucial component in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the focus of Xi Jinping’s exertions for regional and international leadership. In short, BRI is clearly a major policy tool in China’s geoeconomic strategy and Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations in the infrastructure and industrial sectors (Li 2020). A similar pattern can be seen in China’s diplomacy toward Southeast Asia, as the BRI and its “Maritime Silk Road” are central for China’s policy toward and engagement with Southeast Asia (Lu 2016; Soong 2018; Yuen 2019). Here the Council of Foreign Relations are worth citing, as it gives a good picture of the magnitude of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative:

China’s overall ambition for the BRI is staggering. To date, more than sixty countries—accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population—have signed on to projects or indicated an interest in doing so. Analysts estimate the largest so far to be the $68 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a collection of projects connecting China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. In total, China has already spent an estimated $200 billion on such efforts. Morgan Stanley has predicted China’s overall expenses over the life of the BRI could reach $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027, though estimates on total investments vary.

(Chatzky and McBride 2020)

In the case of agenda setting, over time China has played an increasing role in the international system, in particular through its engagement in various multilateral organizations and other forums of importance for the international agenda setting. While traditionally having to a large extent adapted its policies to fit existing international institutions rather than attempt to change existing ones, there has now been a shift where China has increasingly taken a reformist position being increasingly willing to offer its own supplementary alternatives (Breslin 2018). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is one such alternative. In the last years, China has moved even further in its attempts to influence the international agenda. The most striking example here is Xi Jinping’s offering at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017 where he stood among other world leaders and offered Chinese leadership, promising that China would be a defender, promoter, and leader of global capitalism and free trade (for details see Nordin and Weissmann 2018).

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has by now reinvented itself as a global leader, even so far as being an alternative leader of the global capitalist system offering an alternative to the existing liberal order and US leadership. China is clearly using bilateral and multilateral diplomacy trying to influence the international agenda promoting its preferred alternatives and attempting to revise existing institutions. If these attempts are successful, the outcome will be a revised international agenda where the definition of what the “more extravagant wishes [that] seem too unrealistic to pursue” (Nye 2004a, 7) will be different than today as a consequence of being to a larger extent decided by China than is the case today.

Arguably, the idea of China as a realistic alternative for international leadership is no longer as unrealistic or unthinkable as was the case one decade ago. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership it is not only Chinese foreign policy itself that has changed, but also its ability to have influence in the region and the world (Weissmann 2015; Chang-Liao 2016; Ferdinand 2016; Boon, Li, and Char 2017; Poh and Li 2017; Hu 2019). BRI is an excellent example of this shift, having progressed from being a case of “One Belt” and “One Road” when launched in 2013, to have become an overarching framework for the progress toward Xi’s “Chinese dream” of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Lastly, trying to appeal to others’ sense of attraction, love or duty, have been a prominent feature of Chinese public diplomacy. However, success has been limited (e.g. Gustafsson 2014), and can mainly be found in China’s attraction among its Asian neighbors, including in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Here it is important to note that it is de facto highly problematic to separate the attraction for China’s political values, culture, and foreign policies from its current and expected future power in the economic and military spheres and its ability to set the agenda as these are intertwined.

In fact, the dimension of expected future power is fundamental if to understand Chinese leadership. Shaun Breslin made this argument concerning China’s regional leadership back in 2008, finding that the East Asian state elites

are indeed altering their domestic and international strategies [not only] in response to what China already is and, more importantly, in preparation for what they expect China to become in the future. China’s regional leadership is thus in some ways already a reality because regional elites have imbued China with power and responded accordingly to their own constructed image of a Sino-centric regional future.

(Breslin 2008, 131)

Thus,

. . . whether China actually has power or not is irrelevant—if others think that China is powerful now or will gain greater power soon and adjust policies accordingly, then China is effectively ‘empowered’. In the process, the preferences and objective of China’s elites gain greater significance in policy-making processes at national and regional levels. Just as financial markets discount future economic shocks—for example, oil price rises— by dealing with them before they occur, so East Asia’s leaders have discounted China’s future economic rise.

(Breslin 2008, 140–141)

The question today is to what extent a similar pattern has been or will be replicated also in other parts of the world.

It should be said that more recently, there has been a relative shift from the attraction to agenda setting. Attraction is still essential, but its success has been decreasing somewhat as the focus has explicitly moved toward harder the harder types of soft power. That is, from attraction and to some extent agenda setting, to China becoming a core agenda setter with high importance put on active economic inducements. Here, again BRI is a good example—BRI is not about attraction; it is first and foremost about agenda setting and economic inducement.

The exact balance of relative importance between the three categories of soft power will evolve over time. As has been outlined above, China is today offering a new form of global leadership. This leadership is manifested in its foreign policies, political values, and culture; whether its offer to the world will be attractive enough to make other countries want what China wants, and behave as China wants them to behave, also without the lure of economic inducements and agenda setting is highly questionable. Regardless, the combined force of China’s attraction, its ability to influence agenda setting, and its positive economic inducements will for many be a very attractive “soft power package.” For some, it will even be an alternative to what the existing liberal order and US leadership offer and worth some serious consideration. As Nye once said, “what attracts in Caracas may repel in Paris” (Nye 2010, 145). The million-dollar question is how large is that part of the world more like Caracas than Paris.

Conclusion

As is demonstrated above, using the proposed analytical framework and its understanding of soft power to analyze China’s diplomatic approach in East Asia can enhance our understanding of developments in East Asia. It is also apparent that using a strict definition of soft power is of limited use, as then China would be assessed as having far less power than China actually has today. Nor is hard power in a strict sense a good explanation for post-Cold War developments. Few would argue against the importance of economic power as necessary component and catalyst in China’s rise since. However, to say that economic power alone can fully account for the post-Cold War developments would be an over-simplification. Thus, the framework presented above proposes a way to understand soft power and the hard-soft spectrum of behavior that allows for the inclusion of economic power while still drawing a line between hard and soft power, where not all economic power is soft, but nor is it all hard.

Including the full spectrum of behavior from the coercive use of military and economic power to the attraction of values, culture, and policies, while at the same time including economic power dimensions within the idea of soft power, creates a framework that improves our ability to understand and predict China’s diplomatic approach today and in the future. Increased understanding and predictability will enhance the ability of the international community not only to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, but also to understand how China may influence the direction of international relations and world politics. Furthermore, it will help the United States and others to understand, and find ways to influence the direction of, and/or benefit from, the ongoing power shift in East Asia as well as the global shift from the West to the East. This includes how to safeguard and develop a role for the United States in East Asia beyond today and into the future.

Using the proposed analytical framework to understand China’s diplomatic approach and foreign policy practices also allow us to map and understand how power is used more precisely, rather than vaguely, or wrongly, using concepts such as soft power to try to understand China or East Asian security dynamics. The importance of mapping and understanding how power is used cannot be stressed too much, as China is a complex actor and it is clear that its diplomacy cannot be understood using a strict definition of soft power. Nor will using a definition of soft power that includes everything but military power suffice.

To sum up, the proposed analytical framework provides a better account of power in international relations, without falling into the trap of making things black and white, or resorting to all-encompassing concepts such as smart power. It should be acknowledged that reality is grey. Providing an inclusive, yet still clear, analytical framework for understanding how the complex multidimensional world works does not only enhance our understanding but also provides a more realistic and nuanced base for foreign policy decision making. In short, policymakers, politicians, the business community, the military and civil society actors alike will be better able to make better and more informed decisions. This is important at all levels, ranging from the international to the national, as well as the local level. With a better comprehension of the concept of power and China, you are more likely to end up where you want to be; or, to put it in Nye’s words, to find ways in which your preferred outcomes can be achieved—be it for China, the United States, Europe, or some other country.