Unselfishly for Peace and Justice—And against Evil: The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–1956 by Kari Alenius (review)

The United Nations (UN) Security Council was the international forum for the first skirmishes in the Cold War. Whereas negotiations involving the great powers were held behind closed doors, the Security Council was the first venue in which debates transpired in public. The Soviet Union and the United States took the Security Council very seriously. The United Kingdom normally played a supporting role to the United States, and France and China (represented by Taiwan until 1972) were often bystanders.

Kari Alenius, in this groundbreaking study, attempts to unravel the techniques deployed by the various actors in the drama. He examines in considerable detail the various facets of rhetoric that were deployed. Rhetoric can be seen as consisting of three parts: the personality of the speaker; pathos or attempts to involve the listener emotionally in the argument; and the logic of the argument. Alenius uses the metaphor of the fairy tale to dissect many of the speeches. Rhetoric employs various dichotomies: good versus evil; logical versus illogical; beneficial versus inimical. One’s own arguments are always positive, and those of the opponent always negative. This leads to the creation of an enemy image. The goals of the enemy are depicted as dangerous, damaging, and having long-term consequences. The enemy image did not appear fully formed in 1946 but took shape as the Cold War intensified. A recurring discourse is one that presents the delegate’s policies as “just, honest, and unselfish” (p. 233). Another rhetorical tactic is to represent one’s country as neutral. The objective is to solve the problem under review.

Aleniu examines the Iran crisis of 1946, the Palestinian crisis of 1948, the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), the crisis in Guatemala in 1954, and the Hungarian and Suez crises of 1956. He concentrates on the first month of each crisis. I would have liked the Greek Civil War to have been included. Aleniu quotes no speeches in the original Russian and appears to rely solely on English and French translations.

The term “propaganda” appears often. The problem with using that word is that the English meaning is normally negative. However, in Russian, German, and other European languages it does not have inherently negative connotations and normally means “information.” In Russian, “propaganda” was linked to agitation and agitprop and was of great importance. Propaganda inculcated the value system of Marxism-Leninism. It was always hostile toward Western “bourgeois” ideology.

Civility was observed by all during the Iran crisis, but this mask was dropped as the Cold War heated up. The fairy tale approach is evident: one’s own side is all good, and the other side is all evil. Other countries that are on the evil side are seen as being duped or used or coerced by the evil one. Alenius states that Soviet rhetoric was “demanding and commanding and unfailingly contained elements constructive of the enemy image” (p. 234). One can add to this that Soviet officials negotiated rather than bargained. Initially, they would put forth a demand, and then a threat. If that was not successful, they would come up with a bigger threat. Soviet officials shared information only with those they trusted, not with strangers. Trust is based on personal contacts. This explains why the Soviet Union devoted little time to compromise, concession, or understanding the viewpoint of the opponent. Alenius also emphasizes that leaders in Moscow believed the USSR’s enormous loss of life during World War II conferred on it a special status. It did not regard other states as its equal. The United States, by contrast, sought a win-win situation. Bargaining, concessions, and the like were important. The British set out to avoid giving offense to anyone and sought to win by logical argument. They assumed that everyone was a rational actor. The French...