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  • The Rise of the Egyptian Middle Class: Socio-Economic Mobility and Public Discontent from Nasser to Sadat by Relli Shechter
  • Bruce K. Rutherford (bio)
The Rise of the Egyptian Middle Class: Socio-Economic Mobility and Public Discontent from Nasser to Sadat, by Relli Shechter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 269 pages. $105.

Relli Shechter takes a fresh look at one of the most important recent periods in Egyptian history: the 1970s, when the combination of an oil boom and Sadat's opendoor policy (infitah) created a much larger middle class and, with it, new tensions in Egyptian society.

Shechter documents the rapid growth of the middle class during this period and analyzes the public discourse that sought to understand its impact on Egyptian society and culture. He argues that a long-standing ("establishment" or effendi) middle class had been an important part of Egyptian society since the 19th century, when Mehmed 'Ali and his successors expanded the Egyptian state. The social mobility of this class was grounded in easier access to higher education and subsequent employment in Egypt's growing bureaucracy. Shechter argues that the Nasserist revolution was grounded in responding to the demands of this middle class. President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser dramatically facilitated its growth by further increasing access to higher education and broadening opportunities for employment in the bureaucracy and the public sector. Nasser made a de facto bargain with this state-centered middle class: it would accept Nasser's leadership in political matters in exchange for his assurance of reliable employment and a comfortable standard of living. In practice, this entailed expanding the state's provision of education and social services, as well as adopting an extensive web of subsidies on everything from food [End Page 138] to housing. When the oil boom hit in 1973, this existing governing bargain remained in place. Sadat further expanded access to higher education, increased the allocation of state resources to subsidies, and broadened opportunities for state employment.

However, the oil boom brought with it several challenges to the security and comfort of this established middle class. It contributed to sustained high levels of inflation that eroded the purchasing power of civil servants' salaries. It also created new avenues for access to the middle class. Poor Egyptians could work in the Gulf and quickly earn salaries that enabled them to enter the middle class without educational attainment or professional credentials. In addition, manual laborers could earn salaries in construction and the trades that enabled them to rival or even exceed the income of the established middle class.

This tension produced one of the central conundrums that drives Shechter's analysis: Egypt in the 1970s experienced substantial economic growth, increased job opportunities, and dramatic social mobility for many millions of citizens. However, these rosy statistics did not lead to happiness and optimism—quite the contrary. As Shechter documents with great care and precision, the prevailing Egyptian discourse emphasized deepening anxiety that "progress" was coming at too high a cost. At the heart of this anxiety was the regime's inability to meet the public's expectations for state ser-vices and state employment. The root of this failure lies in demography: there were simply too many Egyptians, and too many of them moving into the middle class, for the state to sustain the old social contract that had arisen under Nasser. At the same time, parts of the social contract were working at cross-purposes. As Nasser and then Anwar al-Sadat dramatically expanded the civil service to provide jobs for this expanding middle class, this increasingly bloated state became less efficient. Just as the middle class's expectations for state services were expanding, the state's capacity and efficiency were declining. The quality of education fell, state services of all kinds deteriorated, and state subsidies of core staples proved inadequate. The result was a decline in the quality of life for the state-centered middle class. Adding salt to the wound, the new entrants to the middle class—with wealth derived from the informal economy or from work in the Gulf—exhibited a crass and excessive consumerism that offended effendi sensibilities. These newcomers lacked social etiquette and engaged...

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