Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission, 2007–2017 by Paul D. Williams (review)

Although the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the most robust military engagement of the AU and one of the most significant peace operations in history, given the complexity of the mission there have been only limited efforts to achieve a comprehensive examination. Paul D. Williams, who is associate professor of International Affairs George Washington University’s Elliott School, is the first to research extensively the first decade (2007–2017) of AMISOM, after almost ten years of constant research in the offices and the field (17). During this period, the author of Fighting for Peace in Somalia examined and analyzed hundreds of UN Security Council Resolutions, AU Commission Reports, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), joint assessments, strategic directives, policy guidelines, and other documents to understand the evolution and development of AMISOM and find the answer to the question: can “AMISOM model”—a peace operation led by a regional organization but financially and logistically highly supported by a wide net of donors—be implemented in other circumstances? And although his answer is negative, the exploration of the mission and its daily workings contributes to understanding the complexity of politics and warfare on the Horn of Africa.

Although his book is not the first one published about the African Union Mission in Somalia,¹ it is beyond doubt that this is the most complex, comprehensive, and well-structured work about the operation. The author examines in fourteen chapters and almost 400 pages almost all important aspects of the mission. The first part of the monograph investigates the first ten years of AMISOM (2007 to mid-2017); the second part examines six challenges for AU peacekeepers: logistics, security sector reform, protecting civilians, strategic communication, stabilization, and exit. Therefore, it can be stated without exaggeration that Williams has made the handbook of AMISOM, and is a compulsory reading for anyone interested in contemporary Somalia.

Fighting for Peace in Somalia is not easy reading. In order to avoid never-ending storytelling and becoming lost in details—which sometimes happens in other papers about the mission—Williams provides an extremely tight narration. It is supported by the clear structure of the book overall as well as the chapters and subchapters, which also work as independent studies (mainly the later six chapters about the challenges of the mission). The author explains the line of argument for each section, as well as his guidelines for analysis. These features make the book accessible for a variety of readers including academics and policy experts. Nevertheless, the structure of the book also results in repetitions and didactic features. Of course, it does not lessen the academic value of the book, but, as mentioned above, does not make it an easy reading.

We must emphasize that Williams is not interested in examining the geopolitical background of the mission. As he states, “the focus of my analysis is not the international and regional political debates that took place about AMISOM. . . . Instead, my focus on the operational level is in keeping with the primary purpose of peace operations” (4). It means that, regrettably but wisely, the author avoids trying to clarify the various theories (perhaps true but hardly validated) about the “real” intentions of troop contributing countries (TCCs) of AMISOM and the wider donor community in Somalia. Although he shows that the narratives and perception of the local Somali population and politicians about the mission and foreign powers are sometimes very negative, Williams does not attempt to depict the complex and ever changing geopolitics of the Horn. For instance, Williams notes that in the eyes of many Somalis, “AMISOM is just the tool of foreign occupation and interests to destabilize and rule Somalia” (281–95). He illustrates this argument through an examination of the tangible motives of the TCCs, which were other than “helping Somali people,” namely, to gain economic, institutional, political, and...