Righteous War in Early Daoist Classics

Abstract¹

This paper examines the concept of "righteous warfare" as employed in three early Chinese texts associated with Daoist philosophy: the excavated manuscript Huangdi sijing 黃帝四經 (The Yellow Emperor's Four Classics), the Wenzi 文子 (Book of Master Wen), and the Huainanzi 淮南子 (Book of the Master of Huainan). At first glance, their promulgation of offensive righteous warfare seems at odds both with the Laozi's 老子 (Book of the Old Master) condemnations of war and its rejection of "righteousness." However, a closer analysis suggests that, despite differences in terminology and emphasis, there is a common thread in how political treatises belonging to the different branches of Daoist thought, as well as different stages in its development, treated warfare and its ethical dimensions.

The early Chinese politico-philosophical works I discuss in this paper, the Huangdi sijing, the Wenzi, and the Huainanzi,² support warfare but make a distinction between approvable and reprehensible types of war. Among the acceptable types, "righteous warfare" (yibing 義兵), a concept that appears first in the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Annals of Lü Buwei), is most important. My goal is to show how the texts in question developed arguments defending their positions on righteous warfare and whether or not their support of this type of war render them irreconcilably at odds with the Laozi.³

When discussing these texts, I refer to the categorization of early Chinese positions on warfare and their relation to the civil organization of a state as proposed by Christopher Rand. According to him, we can distinguish between the three main approaches in regard to this question: "militarism" (or wu 武), placing "high value on martiality, as opposed to civility, to secure social stability and to build a lasting political order" (2017, 22); "compartmentalism," positing a clear separation between martial and civil (or wen 文) realms and claiming that "martial activity is necessarily subordinate to civility and must be applied only in extremis" (2017, 25); "syncretism," stressing "the need for balance and reciprocality between martiality and civility and to integrate these elements more closely in their application" (2017, 27).

Warfare in the Laozi

The Laozi's condemning depictions of war and weapons are among the best-known features of the work. Chapter 30 says, for instance,

Where troops have encampedThere will brambles grow;In the wake of a mighty armyBad harvests follow without fail.

(Lau 2001, 45)

The association of armies with bad luck and famine is developed further in the subsequent chapter:

It is because arms are instruments of ill omen andThere are things that detest them,That the one who has the way does not abide by their use.The gentleman gives precedence to the left when at home,But to the right when he goes to war.Arms are instruments of ill omen, not the instruments of the gentleman.When you have no choice but to use them, it is best to do so without relish.There is no glory in victory,To glorify it despite this is to exult in the killing of men.One who exults in the killing of men will never have his way in the empire.

(ch. 31; see Lau 2001, 47; Hendricks 1989, 83)

Even though these passages offer a critical stance on the use of weapons, this need not lead us to assume, as some have done, that there is a "uniform abhorrence of war" in the Laozi (Rand 1979, 191) or that the text promotes pacifism (Wang 2018, 122). To begin, the phrases from chapter 31 that seem most critical of war, such as "arms are instruments of ill omen" (bingzhe buxiang zhiqi 兵者不祥之器) and one should use them only if "there is no alternative" (budeyi 不得已), appear (often together) in a number of military classics,⁴ texts that certainly do not advocate the abolition of weapons. Moreover, the text sees fit to use a number of images associated with military affairs to exemplify the nature of its central concept, the Way (Fech 2018, 5-6). Most importantly, the Laozi's persistent preoccupation with the topic of achieving victory (sheng 勝) (see chapters 31, 33, 36, 45, 61, 67, 68, 69) is a clear indicator that its authors were developing a view on how to succeed in situations where conflict arose, including military affairs.

Some scholars hold that, given the Laozi's general worldview, it is "only in self-defense, in response to the aggressive moves of others, that the use of arms becomes acceptable and indeed unavoidable" (Graff 2010, 197). While some passages seem indeed to suggest this,⁵ one should not overlook the fact that, elsewhere, the Laozi speaks approvingly of the offensive use of arms, such as in the following line from chapter 67:

Through compassion, one will triumph in attack (zhan 戰)And be impregnable in defense (shou 守).

(Lau 2001, 99-100)

Here the text claims that regardless of "attacking" or "defending,"⁶ battles are won through adopting a correct moral stance, described as "compassion" (ci 慈). The "sympathetic" attitude also provided a clue for determining the authors' view on what makes the use of offensive weapons legitimate. For example, it stands to reason that the Laozi would most likely not object to raising weapons for the sake of a humanitarian intervention. Indeed, Ellen Zhang claims that "not dealing with violence in dire situations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing" would be an example of an "unnatural" action criticized in the text (2015b, 222). Given this, the motto of "using weapons only when there is no alternative" as used in the Laozi does not always limit options to defensive warfare. Rather, it seems to indicate that whether or not the Way has been transgressed, rather than whether warfare is defensive or offensive, is the appropriate criterion for making decisions about military action.

The importance of the correct ethical approach to warfare is reiterated in many other passages of the Laozi. In chapter 69, the decisive factor for emerging victorious in a battle is identified as "sorrow" (ai 哀), while chapter 68 claims that a good warrior displays a "non-martial" (buwu 不武) and "calm" (bunu 不怒) attitude. Chapter 69 further warns not to make the mistake of taking the enemy "lightly" (qingdi 輕敵).

Ellen Zhang summarized the Laozi's view on the permissible attitude to warfare in three points: "1) maintain a humble attitude; 2) fight with compassion; and 3) know when to stop to avoid committing unnecessary violence" (2015a, 194). These points can be ultimately seen as expressing a "non-contentious" approach to life (buzheng 不爭) promulgated throughout the text (chs. 8, 22, 66 and 68), which manifests the Laozi's core principle of "naturalness" (ziran 自然) (Liu 2015, 81-82). The repeated conviction that nobody will ever be able to match a "non-contentious" person (and a warrior) proves the efficacy of "naturalness."

If we take "naturalness" to entail a return to "primitive" forms of society, as Rand (2017, 98) and most contemporary scholars do,⁷ then it becomes impossible to subsume the Laozi under the categories of "martiality," "civility," or "compartmentalism." This is so because the text, while rejecting "martiality," also appears to be opposed to "civility," i. e. any form of sophisticated social organization (Rand 2017, 98-99). There are, however, other views of "naturalness" allowing for its humanistic and "civilized" interpretation—critical of the Confucian model of civility (Liu 1998). If we accept them, then the Laozi appears to lean toward a "compartmentalist" stance. Yet a clear distinction between the civil and military modes of governing, typical for this kind of thinking, appears only rarely in the text.⁸ Most chapters claim that, regardless of the situation, one should always follow the principle of "naturalness."

Summing up the Laozi's position on warfare, it becomes clear that, in addition to honoring the basic right of self-defense, the text also supports offensive warfare, provided there are appropriate goals and military actions are carried out with a correct mindset—a humble, non contentious, and non-celebratory attitude. The text seems to preclude bloody wars of attrition, as it shows a firm conviction that the people of the whole world will naturally subject themselves to someone who holds "the great image" (daxiang 大象) (ch. 35).

Warfare in the Huangdi sijing

The Huangdi sijing consists of a group of four silk manuscripts, discovered in Mawangdui in 1973, that date to the first decades of the Han dynasty.⁹ The four are the Jingfa 經法 (Sciptural Laws; 9 chs.), Shida jing 十大經 (Ten Great Scriptures; 15 chs.), Cheng 称 (Precepts; 1 ch.), and Daoyuan 道原 (Origin of the Way; 1 ch.). Their placement on the same piece of silk as a copy of the Laozi suggests that they were thought to deliver similar philosophical messages. Although the four texts treat some central notions with different emphasis, this lack of unity should not be exaggerated in view of their overall similarities (Vankeerberghen 2015, 313).

The philosophical doctrine of the corpus can be summarized to the effect that while they all treat the Way as the origin of the world, greater attention is given to the patterns discernible in the natural world. Accordingly, they see all phenomena as being shaped by an interplay between positive and negative forces, sometimes called "civility" (wen 文) and "martiality" (wu 武) (Ryden 1997, 70-100). It is the task of the ruler to recognize and emulate the patterns of their interaction in his political agenda: he should always begin his actions with civility and generally attach a greater importance to it. Politics associated with martiality are to be employed only after civil measures have strengthened the state and the ruler's position. The texts are adamant that, when implemented in the correct proportion and order, the two principles will lead the ruler to domination over the world (Yates 1997, 63).

While the texts pay much attention to the principles of defensive war (shou 守) (Chen 2007, 63-64), they only mention righteous war when they discuss offensive strategies. Thus, "Benfa"本伐 (Fundamental Types of Attack; Shida jing 11), says,

All states that have armories and store weapons have a way of warfare. In our age, there are three ways of warfare: there are those [rulers] who engage in it for profit (li 利), those who engage in it for righteousness (yi 義), and those who engage in it out of anger (fen 忿).

Those who engage in it for profit, when seeing that … there is famine, that a state is not at leisure, and that superiors and inferiors are in discord, take up arms and punish that state.¹⁰ Although they gain no great profit, there is also no great harm from doing it.

Those who engage in it for righteousness, attack the disorderly and prohibit the violent,¹¹ promote the worthy and dismiss the inept.¹² This is called righteousness. [Righteousness] is what the masses [are willing to] die for (zhong zhi suosi 眾之所死). For that reason, individual states attack the [rest of the] world, and among the rulers of big states of ten thousand chariots… there are few who do not start [wars] from this [principle]. But few can ever bring them to conclusion. For unless they are persistent in their hearts, they exhaust themselves and return (or, suffer in turn).¹³

Those [rulers] who engage in war out of anger, when feeling anger in their hearts, they are unable to leave it at that, but have to act on it. This type of warfare cannot achieve success, because it is absurd from the very beginning. This is not the Way.

Actions that accord with the Way follow what has no alternative. Following what has no alternative, one will never exhaust oneself.¹⁴

While scholars generally agree that the "Benfa" lauds righteousness and condemns wars out of anger, they sometimes characterize the text's view on war for the sake of profit as condemning (Chen 2005, 93; Chen 2007; 302) and sometimes as neutral (Yates 1997, 30; van Els 2013, 24). I agree with the "condemning" view for the following reasons. First, the corpus vehemently rejects acting for the sake of profit, which is, inter alia, evident from "Wanglun" 亡論 (On the Ruin [of States]; Jingfa 7): "Whoever covets the profit of a state, will suffer a disaster proportionate to that state" (Guojia yanjiushi 1980, 55.64). Second, the "Benfa" discusses a profit-oriented war as a punitive expedition (zhu 誅) against a disorderly state with a starving population.

Both the mention of famine, which was often regarded as Heaven's punishment for inadequate government (Fraser 2016, 19), and the nomenclature chosen to describe this attack, i. e. in terms of punishment, presuppose the moral inferiority of the state under attack (Höckelmann 2010, 38). Against such an enemy, a military campaign is not only permissible, but necessary, provided the ruler of the attacking state is motivated by the right considerations.¹⁵ That the "Benfa" portrays the invader as not being able to fully realize his goals even against a severely weakened state shows that it deemed preoccupation with profit a bad starting point for offensive military operations.

When determining the position on righteous warfare, we likewise need to analyze it in the context of the entire corpus. Unlike other scholars who understand the "Benfa" as praising righteous war (Yates 1997, 30; Chen 2005, 93; Chen 2007, 302; van Els 2013, 24), I see the text as showing a rather critical attitude. Not only does its author see righteous war as the most common (and possibly the bloodiest)¹⁶ type in the contemporaneous world, he is also critical of the frequent use of righteousness as a pretext for starting military operations.

In addition, so-called righteous wars only rarely lead to success. For the most part, states claiming to start a fight for a righteous cause will suffer dire consequences. This is significantly different from the optimistic claims that a ruler who correctly carries out the principles of civility and martiality will necessary come to dominate the world. Clearly, being motivated by the wish to suppress the violent and promote the worthy alone is not sufficient to win an offensive war. Instead, the determining factor guaranteeing a clear triumph in military action—along with "persistence in the heart"—is compliance with the Way or, as the text has it, "following what has no alternative" (you budeyi 由不得已). This thought is also reiterated in the Cheng (Chen 2007, 357). We saw that, in the Laozi, the same dictum signaled the highest tolerable limit of deviation from the Way. But how did the authors of the Huangdi sijing understand this maxim and how, if at all, was it connected to righteousness? The following passage from "Bingrong" 兵容 (The Features of the Warfare; Shida jing 8) may help answer the first question.

If warfare does not take its form from Heaven, it cannot be initiated. If it does not take Earth as its model, warfare cannot be managed. If its form and model do not rely on Humanity, warfare cannot be brought to completion. …

Heaven and Earth form it, the sage responds and brings it to completion. Timeliness (shi 時) is what the sage uses in his tasks. He relies on the right moment (shi 時) and grasps it… For this reason, he inevitably achieves success.

(Guojia wenwuju 1980, 71.116-19; see translations in Yates 1998, 133; Chang and Yu 1998, 166)

Warfare thus can lead to success only when it complies with the principles of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity in a timely fashion. Heaven is best understood in the context of different demands that the seasonal change presents a head of state with. Following that, even actions motivated by the most altruistic and noble considerations will have disastrous consequences when undertaken at the wrong time.

The principle of Earth as used here implies that a ruler should exhibit a self-restrained, gentle, and yielding mode of behavior, also described as "the female tally" (cijie 雌節) (Yates 1997, 169). The application of the latter is especially crucial during armed conflicts, as exemplified in "Cixiong jie" 雌雄節 (The Female and Male Tally; Shida jing 7) (Chen 2007, 277-79).¹⁷

The factor of Humanity, third, connotes the great political significance of the people (min 民), to the effect that a ruler should always take their welfare into consideration. The support of the population is decisive in the outcome of military confrontations. Thus, a wise ruler, often called a sage (shengren 聖人), considers attacking another state only after securing the support of his subordinates, on the one hand, and making sure that his adversary has lost the backing of his people, on the other (Chen 2007, 256). All these factors seem to constitute the notion of "having no alternative" in the Huangdi sijing.

All this makes clear that the main discontent of the corpus with the conventional notion of righteous warfare is the lack of attention to considerations of timeliness and the right attitude and conduct. However, the corpus did not dismiss the given notion altogether, but instead provided its own definition that takes the previously ignored factors into account, as in the following passage from "Qiandao" 前道 (Putting the Way First; Shida jing 12),

When a sage initiates an affair, he harmonizes with Heaven and Earth, complies with the people, and receives a favorable response from the ghosts and spirits. He allows the people to share in his profit, so that myriad masses depend on him: this is called righteousness. (Guojia wenwuju 1980, 76.129-30; see Yates 1997, 143;

Chang and Yu 1998, 173)

Understood in this way, righteousness not only includes the support of the people (and the spirits), but also compliance with Heaven and Earth. Because the given definition appears immediately after the "Benfa," it seems that its main purpose is to define righteous war in terms congruous with the overall philosophical message of the text, especially when considering that outside of the discussions on warfare, righteousness plays almost no role in the Huangdi sijing. The unwillingness to discard this notion seems to suggest that the authors developed their ideas in a dialogue with other texts, for which righteousness was defining ideal warfare. Providing a new, more comprehensive definition of this important term, would enhance the position of the text and challenge the standpoints of others.

The Huangdi sijing establishes a high standard for righteous war by claiming that only a sage would be able to fulfill all the necessary requirements for conducting it. This alone would make most contemporaneous rulers who claimed to fight for righteous causes look like impostors. What is more, the corpus portrays the legendary Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝) as the epitome of a righteous warrior. To achieve victory over his "unrighteous" (buyi 不義) adversary Chiyou 蚩尤 (Wormy Rebel), he supposedly went through a prolonged period of introspection (Chen 2007, 237-38) and employed conduct associated with the "female tally" (Chen 2007, 253). His victory demonstrated that "the secret to success is to take up arms only when the moment and the cause are right" (Peerenboom 1993, 90).

In the Huangdi sijing, notably in the chapter "Liming"立命 (Establishing the Mandate; Shidajing 1), Chiyou is depicted not as a tyrant, but as a rebel attempting to undermine the Yellow Emperor's position as a counterpart of Heaven and a monarch over All-under-Heaven. Thus, in addition to the elements listed above, the Yellow Emperor's fight against him also amounts to the suppression of rebellions and the reunification of the empire. This is confirmed by the fact that the Huangdi sijing disapproves of any form of political overthrow (Chang and Yu 1998, 43).

Rejecting war motivated by profit and anger, the "Benfa" implicitly suggests that a righteous warrior cannot base his actions on related sentiments. Even if his fury about the misdeeds of certain rulers is genuine, he should not act upon it immediately but wait until his emotions subside and the right moment emerges. In fact, because waiting for the right moment might require years, the actions of a righteous warrior sometimes appear more like revenge than immediate humanitarian intervention. By confining the discussion of righteous war to offensive actions, the author seems to suggest that defending oneself is guided by other considerations than righteousness. I see it, however, as an indicator that the corpus had a certain kind of reader in mind, possibly a ruler preoccupied with offensive wars.

Rand holds that the Huangdi sijing's "syncretist view" provides "a new solution of the wen/wu problem that integrates the two elements into a single whole." Thus, martiality is also "an organic, natural constituent of the Way" (2017, 28).

Warfare in the Wenzi

The Wenzi probably goes back to the second century BCE.¹⁸ It is not considered a mainstream representative work of classical Daoism today, but historically—during the Eastern Han (25-220 CE) and maybe even earlier¹⁹—its eponymous author, Master Wen, was seen as a close disciple of Laozi.²⁰ The text is layered, some passages being more authentic than others. Many of its several lengthy discussions of warfare (Rand 1979, 188-91) have parallels in the Huainanzi, which provides sufficient reason to regard them as spurious, as recent studies have shown (van Els 2018, 107). The only passage on warfare with no Huainanzi parallels matches some fragments in the bamboo Wenzi, excavated at Dingxian 定縣 or Dingzhou 定州 in 1973 (Dingzhou 1981, 11-13; van Els 2018, 8-22). These fragments represent an earlier version that circulated before the received text was compiled in the first centuries CE.

This key passage on warfare in the received version is as follows—underlined passages are also found in the bamboo fragments, where the two protagonists are called King Ping (of Zhou) and, his advisor, Master Wen.

Master Wen [King Ping] asked: "How many ways to true kingship are there?"

Laozi [Master Wen] replied: "Only one!"

Master Wen [King Ping] said: "In ancient times, there were those who became true kings by means of the Way, and there were those who became true kings by means of arms. How can there be only one way?"

[Master Wen] answered: "To become a true king by means of the Way is a matter of virtue, and to become a true king by means of arms is also a matter of virtue. There are five ways to employ arms: righteous (yi 義), responding (ying 應), rancorous (fen 忿), covetous (tan 貪), and arrogant (jiao 驕) wars.

"To punish the violent and rescue the weak is called righteous. To use arms only when the enemies' invasion leaves one no alternative is called responding. To fight for petty reasons and lack control over one's mind is called rancorous. To covet others' land and desire others' wealth is called covetous. To exalt the size of one's country and praise the vastness of one's population, wishing to show one's superiority to adversary countries, is called arrogant.

"Righteous wars lead to kingship; responding wars lead to victory; rancorous wars lead to defeat; covetous wars lead to death; and arrogant wars lead to extinction. This is the Way of Heaven."

(Lau and Chen 1992, 5/26/18-23; see also Cleary 1992, 69-70; van Els 2013, 249)

The text here distinguishes between five different types of war, the first two—righteous and responding—receiving a positive assessment, while the latter three—rancorous, covetous, and arrogant—are met with categorical rejection. As the sole criterion for evaluating these types of war, the text names their conformity with the natural pattern, called the "Way of Heaven" (tian dao 天道).²¹ With regard to the latter, it says,

The sage emulates it [the Way of Heaven]. He lowers himself by means of humility (bei 卑), puts himself last by means of withdrawal (tui 退), makes himself small by means of frugality (jian 儉), and lessens himself by means of restriction (sun 損).

Being humble, he will be honored; being withdrawn, he will come to the fore, being frugal, he will become wide, and restricting himself, he will be great: this is what the Way of Heaven accomplishes.

(Lau and Chen 1992, 5/24/17-19; see also Cleary 1992, 62-63)

The sage, therefore, strives to imitate the Way by humbling and restricting himself, being frugal and withdrawn. His triumph then comes as the result of the basic congruity of such actions with the "Way of Heaven."

Another characteristic feature of the Wenzi is that, together with the Way and its "virtue" (de 德) or nourishing power, the classical Confucian virtues of benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness, and propriety (li 禮) are also regarded as constitutive elements of the universe, facilitating the growth and development of things (Ding 1999, 90). The text has,

Therefore, as regards living beings, the Way gives them life; virtue makes them grow; benevolence makes them love; righteousness makes them upright; and propriety makes them respectful.

Without nurturing and fostering, there can be no growth. Without kindness and love, there can be no completion. Without uprightness and correctness, there can be no endurance. Without respect and favors, there can be no importance.

Therefore, virtue is what people value; benevolence is what people embrace; righteousness is what people hold in awe; propriety is what people respect. These four represent compliance with civility and are the means whereby the sage steers the myriad beings.

If the gentleman has no virtue, his subordinates will be resentful (yuan 怨); if he has no benevolence, his subordinates will be contentious (zheng 爭); if he has no righteousness, his subordinates will be violent (bao 暴); if he has no propriety, his subordinates will be chaotic (luan 亂).

If the Four Warps (sijing 四經) are not established, it is called an absence of the Way (wudao 無道). Not perishing when the Way is absent is something that has never occurred.

(Lau and Chen 1992, 5/25/10-16; compare translation in Cleary 1992, 65-66)

The specific function of righteousness, therefore, is to render beings upright (zheng 正); its effect is to ensure that they endure (jiuchang 久長). Although the text falls short of showing how the four moral values develop from the Way on the cosmological level, it reaffirms their close connection when calling the state, in which the threads of the Four Warps are not established, "the absence of the Way." As one of the Warp threads, righteousness is also connected to the notion of civility, civilization, or cultivation (wen 文), a term whose original meaning was a weaving pattern with warps as its basis.

As I have argued elsewhere, the prominence of the notion of wen may suggest that the name of the main protagonist—as well as the title of the work—was chosen with this concept in mind (Fech 2012, 247-49). Presenting these constitutive powers of the universe, the text offers an utterly positive picture of the world (2012, 174): negativity is solely an (ethical) deviation from the Way. All this means is that the Wenzi's rationale for the existence and acceptability of war is significantly different from that of the Huangdi sijing as well as from other works that promote a "calendrical rationalization of combat" (Lewis 2006, 194; Höckelmann 2010, 34).²²

What, then is the Wenzi's understanding of warfare? The worst type it describes is caused by arrogance, which will inevitably lead not only to defeat, but even to extinction. It sees arrogant war as motivated by the "wish to show one's superiority to enemies" (yu xian xian yu di 欲見賢於 敵). This wish radically contradicts the text's ideal of basic congruity between the actions of a wise ruler and the principles of the Way, such as restraint and modesty. In this point, the Wenzi seems to follow Laozi 77, which concludes that a sage should not present himself in a favorable light (bu yu xian xian 不欲見賢). The inevitable extinction of the arrogant war-monger comes, thus, from his transgression of the Way of Heaven (Fech 2012, 264-66). The same can be also said with regard to the other types of warfare the text dismisses, i. e., covetous and rancorous. For both, the greed for material goods and the inability to control one's emotions represent violations of the Way of Heaven.

One of the approved types of war in the text, next, is responding, that is, defensive. Although generally held in high esteem in the Chinese cultural tradition, the Wenzi still stands out through its unabashed optimism regarding a positive outcome for the defending party. In this, it is contrary to other texts (e. g., the Huangdi sijing; Chen 2007, 155) that focus more on the difficulties of successful defense. The Wenzi also seems out of place in light of the events that took place in China during the centuries leading up to its compilation, when all the various states, except Qin, failed to defend themselves against aggression and were conquered by their enemies.²³ However, this highly optimistic standpoint is also embedded in the philosophical framework of the text. Particularly, it seems based on the tacit assumption that the target of an attack is always in a morally superior position—view already criticized in the Lüshi chunqiu (Knoblock and Riegel 2000, 182; Fraser 2016, 160), whereas the ag gressor is always enticed by one of the three reprehensible motives for warfare.²⁴

By identifying lack of alternatives as the specific characteristic of defensive warfare, the Wenzi seems to significantly loosen the criteria for the use of arms for the righteous cause, especially when compared to the Huangdi sijing's more stringent requirements. In fact, in doing so and by claiming that a subject of righteous war will by necessity become king, the Wenzi comes close to texts such as the Lüshi chunqiu and the Xunzi that were "too permissive in licensing punitive war and unrealistically optimistic about its consequences" (Fraser 2016, 172).²⁵ However, by contrasting righteous war with the three reprehensible types of warfare, the Wenzi at least rules out the possibility that the former could be motivated by arrogance, profit, or anger.

As it is the case with all other types of warfare, the Wenzi's particular assessment of righteous warfare is also connected to its broader philosophical views. Since righteousness is one of the Four Warps, constituting the Way, a righteous warrior does much more than just fight the perpetrators of violence and help the weak.²⁶ Through his actions, he brings the world back into accordance with the principles of the Way. It is for this reason that righteous war is given the highest esteem in the Wenzi and anyone who wages such a war is guaranteed to win and attain ultimate authority over the world.²⁷

According to Rand, the unearthed and received Wenzi show similar characteristics in their treatment of war. They "largely underscore views attributed to the Laozi. But this general alignment of views is modified by an admixture of compartmentalist and ethical ideas, blended with occasional statements reminiscent of Huang-Lao or syncretist viewpoints" (2017, 150). I contend that we cannot make such a claim, for not only is civility given primacy over martiality in the unearthed Wenzi, the latter is conceptualized as an integral part of the former, so that no effective distinction between the two can be made.

Warfare in the Huainanzi

The Huainanzi was compiled at the court of the King of Huainan, Liu An 劉安 (179-122 BCE), probably before 139 BCE (Le Blanc 1993, 189).²⁸ Gao You 高誘 (3^rd c. CE), the first major commentator, notes that its authors "discussed the Way and its virtue and synthesized and unified benevolence and righteousness to compose this work" (He 1998, 5). Despite their attempts to integrate the various notions into a single philosophical framework, benevolence and righteousness are never treated as equals to main Daoist concepts. In general, in this rather impressive compendium, "the conventional virtues are functional but not fundamental" (Major 2010, 266). What role, then, did righteous warfare play in the text, notably in its chapter "Binglüe" 兵略 (An Overview of the Military)? And how did its authors envision its relation to the principles of the Way?

Generally, the Huainanzi's treatment of the subject is highly sophisticated but provides no clear definitions, rendering the analysis rather difficult. However, its overall message is clear: the only reprehensible war is one caused by greed. "In antiquity, those who used the military did not value expanding territory (turang 土壤) or covet the possession of gold and jade" (Meyer 2010, 580). Only in later ages (wan shi 晚世) did people begin to raise weapons because they coveted others' material goods, especially land (di 地) and territory (rang 壤). The emergence of this type of warfare, therefore, signals the moral degradation of the world, while war itself becomes beset with multiple issues.²⁹ The text notes,

Those who attack do not do so to curtail violence or eliminate harm; they want to invade the land and expand their territory. For this reason, the bodies pile up and the blood flows. They face one another all day, yet the achievement of a hegemon does not appear in the age. It is because they act selfishly.

One who wars for territory cannot become a king;

One who wars for himself cannot establish his merit.

One who takes up a task on behalf of others will be aided by the multitude;

One who takes up a task on his own behalf will be discarded by the multitude.

One who is aided by the multitude must [be] strong even if he is weak;

One who is discarded by the multitude must perish even if he is great.

The military is weak when it loses the Way;

It is strong when it obtains the Way.

(He 1998, 1049; Meyer 2010, 583-84; see also Ryden 1998, 23)

According to this passage, annexations are the bloodiest kind of military confrontations when "the bodies pile up and the blood flows." However, in spite of heavy losses, launching a military campaign with the goal of expanding the territory of one's state will not lead to success, because a ruler fighting for a selfish cause (ziwei 自為) will be abandoned by the masses (zhong qu zhi 眾去之). Ultimately, the text maintains, military success comes about only through the support of the people, which itself can be secured only by obtaining the Way.

The fact that the Huainanzi treats seizing the territory of others as the most reprehensible reason for war may have political reasons, relevant at the time. But the text's dearth of unacceptable military behavior comes also from the fact that, as opposed to the previously discussed texts, it grants anger an important role in military activities, provided it is channeled in the right way: "One who is good at using the military stores anger. … When anger is stored, our awesomeness may be established" (Meyer 2010, 592).

When it comes to the only legitimate reason to raise arms, the text presents humanitarian interventions, in the course of which one ought to "curtail the violent and punish the disorderly" and "cast aside the un-righteous" to "restore the virtuous." Surprisingly, the text only once describes such an intervention as righteous warfare, creating the impression of a certain reluctance to use this particular nomenclature, especially when compared to the Lüshi chunqiu, where the expression appears on numerous occasions. I think that this feature underscores the understanding that righteous warfare was conceived as a justification for wars of unification, particularly those of the state of Qin (Lewis 2006, 189; Graf 2010, 202). After the unification of the empire, the need for such justification became less urgent, although the concept was occasionally used to defend military campaigns against the Xiongnu.³⁰

While annexations are presented as entailing large-scale destruction and death, righteous wars are portrayed as ideally completely bloodless affairs: "To conclude without battle is the ultimate of the righteous warfare," the text insists (He 1998, 1048). The reason for this optimistic assessment lies again in the support of the population, but this time it is the oppressed people of a tyrannical state who, unwilling to oppose a righteous invader, will welcome him by "opening their doors," "cooking rice for him," "only fearing that he will not come" (Meyer 2010, 583).³¹

As epitomes of righteous warfare, the Huainanzi mentions, among others, the dynastic founders Kings Tang 湯 (1675-1646 BCE) and Wu 武 王 (r. 1046-1043 BCE). This fact is noteworthy since they gained their kingship after rebelling against their sovereigns, because of the latters' alleged cruelties toward the people. Given Liu An's position as a "local lord" (zhuhou 諸侯), i. e. a vassal of the Han emperors, one wonders if he saw it as legitimate to direct righteous arms at his superiors once he deemed them unworthy of their position. I contend there is evidence in the Huainanzi conforming this suspicion, independent of the fact that Liu An was eventually accused of rebellion and executed or forced to commit suicide (Le Blanc 1985, 23). The text maintains that military power "must be wielded in due deference to the sacred position of the vassal houses in order to be effective" (Meyer 2012, 46). That is, only a kingdom "without the Way" (wudao guo 無道國) can become the target of a military assault by the central government. Otherwise, the aggressor will face dire consequences.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the text sees annexations as the worst type of warfare. Now, shortly after the establishment of the Han dynasty, local lords were confronted with a number of policies introduced by the central government curtailing their rights and territories (Lewis 2007, 20). The conflict between the two parties escalated in 154 BCE, not too long before the Huainanzi was completed. In this year, the "rebellion of the seven states" broke out, which ended in a crushing defeat for the local lords. In the aftermath of this rebellion, their territories were reduced even further (Loewe 1986, 141).

It stands to reason that the Huainanzi's focus on annexation wars was prompted by these events. Seeing these measures of the central government as acts of willful aggression, the authors may have been inclined to conceive actions protecting their interests as expressions of righteous warfare. Moreover, the fact that the local lords function in the Huainanzi as "a reliable sign of order or disorder" in the state (Vankeerberghen 2014, 334), that is, their actions are indicative of whether or not a ruler follows the Way, suggests that a rebellion against an "unworthy" monarch was indeed conceived as legitimate.³²

None of this is particularly Daoist, despite the text's emphasis on compliance with the Way of Heaven. More Daoist tenets come to the fore when the texts discusses the best possible military leaders and armies (Ryden 1998, 39-43). The ideal general is depicted as "empty and formless and moves in harmony with the Way" (Roth 2015, 360). Led by such a commander, an army will likewise obtain some characteristics of the Way:

Advancing and retreating, contracting and extending, none sees its form or outline.It alights like the halcyon and rises like the qilin.It flies like the phoenix and leaps like the dragon.It emerges like a gale and speeds like lightning.It beats death with life and overcomes decline with virility.It defeats torpor with speed and controls hunger with fullness.[It is] like water eradicating fire, like heat melting snow.Where can one go where it does not follow?Where can one move where it does not reach?

(He 1998, 1067-68; Meyer 2010, 594; see also Ryden 1998, 30)

This means that, in the Huainanzi, ideal warfare combines the right incentive for deploying arms (exemplifying the role of a sage monarch) with the exceptional efficacy of an army in compliance with the formless Way (Meyer 2012, 51-54). The two components seem to be at odds, because the text claims that following the right incentive will make the use of arms obsolete. This inconsistency shows the complex nature of the Huainanzi's account of warfare, which attempts to synthesize several independent elements into a harmonious whole. Thus, when characterizing the text's position, Rand calls it "syncretist," with "favorable words for the compartmentalist approach, along with an ethical emphasis and both metaphysical and pragmatic characteristics" (2017, 148). In spite of this complexity, the "calendrical rationalization of combat" is less apparent here than in the Huangdi sijing and the Lüshi chunqiu.

Conclusion

Several early Daoist politico-philosophical treatises that promulgate the cosmological notion of the Way as the origin of the world also incorporate the concept of righteous warfare in their system of thought. Different texts developed various strategies in this context. The Huangdi sijing amends the conventional notion of righteous warfare as humanitarian intervention with a new definition involving considerations of seasonal change and correct social conduct. Here righteousness is an exemplary human virtue, possessed only by a person of exceptional perspicacity and moral greatness. The Wenzi, on the other hand, posits righteousness as a constitutive aspect of the universe responsible for the longevity of beings. Accordingly, a righteous warrior does succeed because his actions are in agreement with the universal design. Finally, in the Huainanzi, righteousness, a rather second-tier virtue in the context of the entire text, was linked to an army embodying the Way to signify the highest form of warfare.

The political implications of righteous war were similarly different. In the Huangdi sijing, it was, at least in its earliest instance, directed at a renegade local lord, opposing the authority of the central government, while the Huainanzi claimed that a local lord's uprising against a tyrannical Son of Heaven could be righteous. This discrepancy most likely reflects different political circumstances, under which the respective works were compiled. However, it also shows that "Daoist" tenets could be borrowed to support radically different ideologies.

Despite these differences, the three texts are in fundamental agreement as they conceive righteous war as a form of humanitarian intervention, although each has a different emphasis. Several other ancient Chinese texts, part of a diverse range of philosophical traditions, hold similar views.³³ Even though military actions thus conceived take place in response to the cruelties of the other state's rulers—whether factual or alleged—the warfare in question is ultimately of the offensive kind, involving a proactive stance in the extermination of evil.

The three texts also share with other texts the conviction that the support of the people, achieved through the correct ethical attitude, is a decisive factor in warfare and that tactical considerations are of lesser importance. The main difference between them appears to lie in the notion that the ideal ruler, general, or army should exhibit some characteristics of the Way, such as femininity (nü 女; ci 雌) and softness (rou 柔) (Huangdi sijing), humility (bei 卑) and stillness (jing 靜) (Wenzi), as well as emptiness (xu 虛) and formlessness (wuxing 無形) (Huainanzi).³⁴

These characteristics all seem to go back to the Laozi. However, while in the latter they ultimately describe the central value of naturalness, it plays only a subordinate role in the three texts. The promulgation of naturalness has an effect on the overall non-dogmatic stance of the Laozi, which sees strict adherence to any sort of virtue, including righteousness, as an unsuitable guideline for actions in the world. However, extending humanitarian support for a suffering population appears to be something the Laozi would validate as long as the conduct of the rescuing party complied with the principle of naturalness.³⁵ Thus, the Laozi and the three texts show a similar understanding of idea warfare, suggesting also that their thought did not primarily aim at a return to more primitive forms of society. After all, the degree of organization and amount of expense needed for offensive military operations far exceed the limited resources of simple agricultural communities, the form of social organization commonly regarded as the ancient Daoist ideal.