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Forum: 100 Years Past, 100 Years Forward

Extending the American Century

Revisiting the Social Contract

Jahara Matissek, Travis Robison,
and Buddhika Jayamaha

As the guns fell silent at the end of World War I, the US could no longer deny its great power status. Though abdicating the responsibilities inherent to this status during the interwar years, the US eventually fought on a global scale again during World War II. The con-

clusion of this conflict ushered the beginning of the Cold War and what came to be called the “American Century.” The United States’ efforts during the Cold War focused on protecting itself and its allies without compromising America’s democratic system, values, and ideals.¹ The US was generally successful at achieving these ends.²

Following the Cold War, the US enjoyed a brief period of primacy. The US was the sole global hegemon and exerted its ideological, political, economic, and military might to expand the world order it created after World War II. Three decades after the Cold War ended, American primacy is eroding and its influence is contested by revisionist powers. America’s combat credibility is not in question, and rising powers could only threaten US leadership if American power is weakened on an absolute basis. The true challenge to continuing 21st-century American leadership therefore comes from within.

Americans today resent seemingly endless military deployments across the globe with no discernible security benefits, feel abandoned by the supposed economic benefits of globalization that have not accrued to a majority, and are suspicious of laissez-faire capitalism. A vocal minority of Americans actively oppose US foreign engagements

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and aim to tear down the global economic and military architecture their forbearers sacrificed to create.³ Americans are also electing representatives that espouse once fringe views that fundamentally undermine American economic and military global leadership. It would be erroneous and self-serving to interpret this shift as a “populist anomaly.” Instead, a more accurate perspective is that the shift is a democratic response to failed foreign and domestic policies and an indictment of policy elites.⁴

This article reflects on the history of US primacy and projects its uncertain future. We argue that the US role in world affairs is fundamentally shaped by its democratic system of governance. US foreign engagements historically depended on the government’s ability to maintain an implicit and explicit social contract with the American public that guaranteed domestic prosperity in exchange for supporting foreign policy goals. The social contract remained legitimate to the extent that the government fulfilled its obligation to pursue foreign goals that contributed to the public interest. When the government failed to do so, the public withdrew its support by demanding new policies and electing new leadership to act in accordance with the public’s will.⁵ We see this happening in America today.

This indictment of America’s foreign policy elites is the result of a fundamental breakdown of the social contract that undergirded the domestic legitimacy of American global engagement during the 20th century. The following sections highlight the nature of the social contract and explain how it frayed through decades of political neglect. We conclude by highlighting the need to reassess the social contract by suggesting that strategic retrenchment may provide an opportunity for reevaluation that will contribute to the strategic solvency necessary

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for maintaining American leadership in the 21st century.

Reluctant Great Power

Though the United States had become a leading economic power by the 1890s, few realized that it was taking the first steps toward defining the American Century. When American military forces landed in France in 1917, the American public did not seem to realize the United States’ great power status and was eager to “bring the boys home” after the war.⁶ When the Allied Powers emerged victorious, America’s economic and military power was comparable to Europe’s on a global scale. However, the US was not *the* preeminent European power—it played a *decisive* but not the *defining* role in the war.⁷ This became clear during the Paris Peace Conference when the war’s victors debated over key provisions of the postwar settlement.

President Wilson misread the situation and attempted to negotiate a settlement at odds with the will of the American public and its representatives. He sought to provide a liberal solution centered on a rules-based order that would check the European tradition of power politics. European powers outflanked Wilson’s idealism by crafting a postwar peace in favor of power arrangements with which they were familiar. They accomplished this because the US public did not support extensive engagement abroad

and rejected Wilson's proposals, thereby preventing America from becoming the defining arbiter of European affairs.⁸

The American public and its representatives were firmly entrenched in the Jeffersonian tradition of avoiding costly foreign engagements in favor of protecting American interests and democracy at home.⁹ They were deeply disdainful of European power politics and had no stomach to bear the costs of being the global policeman.¹⁰ Wilson's attempt to inaugurate a new American foreign policy tradition based on the protection of American democracy and values by actively promoting American ideals abroad ran counter to the dominant public sentiment at that time.¹¹ Wilson vigorously promoted his agenda, but US legislators, reflecting the democratic will of the electorate, rejected Wilson's policies. The existing social contract—predicated on the notion that America “goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy”—prevailed.¹²

America's foreign policy behavior during the interwar years reflected this deep-rooted reluctance to wield military power abroad for its own sake with no discernible returns.¹³ This did not mean the US refrained from engaging in political or economic diplomacy to advance its interests—in fact, it was quite active in European affairs.¹⁴ Public reluctance figured prominently into US preparations for World War II. By the summer of 1941, Nazi Germany controlled most of continental Europe and Francophone Africa, and the Pacific had largely fallen under Japanese imperial control. Despite the growing prospect of war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt could only provide war materials to Britain in utmost secrecy. When FDR requested an extension to the term of enlistment for draftees, the House of Representatives approved the measure by a *single vote*, 203–202.¹⁵

The reluctance of American politicians was not due to irresponsibility, naïveté, or provincial outlook. Opposition to intervention was due to the democratically elected Congress faithfully representing the dominant will of their constituents.¹⁶ American political and military leadership understood the growing risk of war. But they also understood that they needed domestic support to mobilize the level of resources necessary to simultaneously fight Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan.¹⁷ It took the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war on the US for most of the American public to rally in support of the war. Once committed, the American public was resolute in pursuing the unconditional surrender of their adversaries. More importantly, public support helped the Western liberal democracies mobilize human and material resources more effectively than their authoritarian rivals.¹⁸ America was on its way to becoming the preeminent world power—but it was contingent upon the public's willingness to leverage economic and military power to advance American interests abroad.¹⁹

The domestic economic boom enabled by full mobilization benefited most Americans and positioned the US as the economic world leader. War mobilization improved America's living standards and advanced racial and gender relations.²⁰ At the war's end, the US economy made up half of the world's gross product, and America held 60 percent of world's gold reserves.²¹ This rise to preeminence did not mean that Americans suddenly embraced a Wilsonian perspective or wanted to remake the world in their image. Instead, American citizens and their representatives reverted to their Jeffersonian tendencies and demanded demobilization. They wanted a return to pre-war normalcy to enjoy the fruits of their wartime

labor.²² With victory in 1945, there were no plans for a US grand strategy that required a global military presence. American leaders knew that no grand strategy could survive without buy-in from a public willing to bear associated costs and burdens.²³ Thus, with the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the US military rapidly demobilized from 12 million to about 2 million military personnel, sending a clear signal that the US would not maintain a global military presence.²⁴

Engaging in Hegemonic Competition

The American response to communism was the turning point for the social contract. After 1945, the Soviet Union (USSR) quickly imposed authoritarian systems throughout Eastern Europe, blockaded Berlin, supported proxy wars abroad, and engaged in covert campaigns to undermine Western democracies.²⁵ At this time, however, most Americans clung to the view that US interests resided at home rather than abroad. Policymakers had to not only overcome rising Soviet aggression, they had to convince the American people that countering the USSR was the best means to protect American interests. Instead of waiting for an attack to rouse the public, as happened in World War II, US leaders had to alter Americans' views to support a proactive response against the USSR. Soviet aggression in Europe and abroad provided the rationale American leaders needed. Convincing the public that this Soviet threat required an American response compelled policymakers to demonstrate to the citizenry that American security and prosperity was ineluctably bound with that of its allies.²⁶

In 1950, the US Department of State Policy Planning Staff completed a top-secret National Security Council (NSC) Paper, NSC-68, titled "United States Objectives

and Programs for National Security." The authors argued the post-World War II decline of Western European powers and Japan left the US and Soviets as the two remaining dominant powers. Therefore, the "hostile designs" of the Soviet Union represented one of the most pressing threats confronting the United States. NSC-68 outlined multiple courses of action to confront the threat, and settled on active containment and the buildup of American power as the preferred way to counter Soviet threat.²⁷

The US Cold War strategy rested on making the homeland secure and prosperous to demonstrate the appeal of democracy over communism, and it required helping friendly nations achieve the same. Such mutually assured cooperation meant that the success of the American-anchored system was dependent on protection and prosperity for all, so that the US and all allies would benefit. The strategy was intuitively simple but operationally complex. It required the US to prioritize its objectives and accordingly apportion its national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to undermine the appeal and strength of communism. This forced the US to view the world in overlapping circles of allies, partners, friends, and a necessary "pack of bastards" that would cooperate against the Soviet threat.²⁸ It also required a sustained effort to generate and retain enough public support to ensure US leaders could continue to engage in muscular diplomacy backed by substantial military force.

Militarily, America engaged in cold calculations of *realpolitik* to contain and counter communist threats.²⁹ Politically, the US supported democracy but made pragmatic exceptions for some dictators that enabled US grand strategy. Countries emerging from colonialism that sought American support were rewarded economically, militarily, and diplomatically. America became a lib-

eral hegemon vis-à-vis its allies, locking in institutional self-constraints so that its allies could expect US cooperation, not oppression of the kind Eastern European countries faced from the USSR.³⁰

Economically, the US built the financial architecture needed for global coordination (and dominance) of trade. This was manifested through incentives for international trade in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that complemented the Bretton Woods financial architecture. American allies and partners were subsidized, in the form of preferential access to the US economy, and in exchange these countries engaged in export-led growth that advanced their economies and undercut the appeal of communism. This strategy of economic liberalization rested upon a strong military foundation that allowed the US to take responsibility for protecting friendly nations, and the success of the liberal order was contingent on American hard power vis-à-vis a global military architecture to hold it together.³¹ The quid pro quo nature of the military and economic arrangements centered on the US framework in which mutual market access greatly benefitted allies, American corporations, and consumers. At the same time, it required domestic sacrifice on the American home front. Manufacturing in Europe and Japan were allowed to prosper at the expense of the average blue-collar American job because it supported the grand strategic aims of an American-led liberal world order.³²

American grand strategy, premised on an activist foreign policy, was predicated on a social contract necessitating an active discourse with the American public. As President Eisenhower explicitly stated, “We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength.”³³ American citizens were made aware of the explicit economic divi-

dend coming from an activist foreign policy. Though average Americans bore the brunt of the personalized cost of providing global public goods, such as security, the cost was framed as one Americans must bear to maintain continued prosperity for America and its closest allies. Continued domestic economic prosperity allowed the expansion of social reform and deepening of social safety nets. There were trials, errors, and catastrophes in operationalizing the strategy, but the US emerged victorious from the Cold War with the world’s most powerful military, largest economy, and strongest network of allies.

The Hubris of Victory and Fraying of the Social Contract

Americans were cautious about taking advantage of their strategic primacy at the end of the Cold War. This sense of discretion was ultimately displaced by a growing sense of strategic hubris.³⁴ After the September 11 attacks on the US, an improbable coalition of liberal interventionists and conservative hawks supplanted a grand strategy that balanced objectives and resources with an unbridled belief in the benefits of globalization, vigorous promotion of democracy and human rights, and a conceited view of the utility of force. This new foreign policy based on military activism to promote democracy and recast illiberal states in America’s image essentially invalidated the existing social contract. Americans were now being asked to bear foreign policy costs that benefited others with no discernable return for domestic prosperity. Political elites ignored this fact as the active measures necessary to maintain strategic solvency were replaced with *beliefs instead of coherent policies*.

The belief in globalization driving US economic policy was based on an assumption, not an empirical certainty, that when economies advanced and became glob-

ally integrated, governments and societies would adapt their behavior to America's preferred liberal democratic ideal.³⁵ Hope replaced strategy as there were neither incentives to change, nor penalties for bad behavior for states as long as they agreed to America's economic terms. Post–Cold War American leaders forgot that the US was a benign liberal hegemon only for its allies, while it remained a determined realist vis-à-vis its adversaries. As a result, authoritarian states like China took economic advantage of the American trade system while insulating themselves against liberal ideals to which China's leaders remained hostile.³⁶

In the meantime, America's activist foreign policy, based on neoconservative hubris and messianic liberalism, turned the US military into a "global discount security shop."³⁷ The US armed forces were deployed to fulfill security tasks, like Iraq and Libya, that had no direct strategic security interests and little return on the strategic investment.³⁸ These foreign military interventions, however eloquently justified, entrenched the reality that the US military was being used to subsidize global security regardless of the costs borne by American citizens.

Instead of renewing the social contract for the new reality, US decision makers either ignored the necessity of one or hoped to deceive the public that the old contract remained valid. For example, American leaders made a deliberate choice to finance US foreign policy through debt rather than raise taxes to pay for expanding security goals.³⁹ Increasing the national debt to fund wars and defense spending was pursued so Americans did not perceive the growing economic burden. Whereas former policy elites spoke of the necessity of economic solvency and maintained an active public discourse, present-day elites invalidated the social contact through expediency and political cynicism. Foreign military interventions

generate bills that eventually come due, yet US policy elites actively hide this fact from the American public through diversionary discourse on social issues (e.g., abortion, LGBT rights, etc.).

America's all-volunteer military created a professional force that relies on a small subset of Americans, which increases the civil-military divide and alters the public's sense of duty and civic obligation.⁴⁰ The civilian-military disconnect helps to insulate the public from the costs of activist foreign policy, but it cannot do so forever. Americans are beginning to feel the negative ramifications of globalization-induced structural shifts in the American economy coupled with the impacts of technological advances that affect wages and livelihoods. Instead of addressing globalization's negative externalities on the American public, political elites campaign for the masses and rule for the elite. This has led to regressive economic policies that contribute to increasing economic stagnation and inequalities for most of the American people.⁴¹ Over time, the traditional American virtues of economic and social mobility have become more difficult to achieve. Today, Americans on both sides of the political spectrum look suspiciously at US foreign military and economic policies that seemingly only benefit elites.⁴²

The civilian-military disconnect helps to insulate the public from the costs of activist foreign policy, but it cannot do so forever.

This bait-and-switch political formula became clear during the 2008 financial crisis, when Americans were forced to provide bailouts to the people responsible for the crisis. These bailouts violated axioms of the liberal economic model and made visible its

hollow assumptions. While the bailouts directly benefited the rich, the majority of citizens faced an uncertain financial future of home foreclosures and lost pensions.⁴³ Even more cynical, budget hawks sought “savings” by cutting social entitlements to protect increased defense spending.⁴⁴ The social contract was supplanted by politics of rhetorical expediency, which now faces popular backlash as the true cost of the profligacy of US foreign military and economic policies comes due.

Today, Americans on both sides of the political spectrum look suspiciously at US foreign military and economic policies that seemingly only benefit elites.

Revisiting the Social Contract

American elites have forgotten the fundamental principal necessary to maintain a resolute grand strategy in a democracy: citizen engagement and buy-in.⁴⁵ Three decades after the Cold War and more than seven decades since America stepped onto the global stage, Americans look inward as they see segments of their country abandoned by both political parties. They feel left out of globalization’s purported benefits, and ostensibly endless military deployments and national security threats entail real costs for intangible benefits. This leads many people to question the value of American leadership. An increasingly vocal minority of Americans oppose US global engagement and seek to dismantle American-built global institutions. However, as during the interwar years, it is tempting to see this isolationist segment of the public as merely “a voluble and vehement minority which on occasion [can] make its influence effective.”⁴⁶ Trends suggest that these sentiments are not a passing

phenomenon and will continue to spread if political elites do not revisit the social contract.

Sustainable foreign policy balances a state’s security commitments with its domestic resources—one of which is public support.⁴⁷ At times, however, rising foreign competition and declining political support unbalances a state’s foreign policy, constraining its power projection.⁴⁸ History shows that if these conditions persist, then leaders must respond or risk jeopardizing national security. A majority of the American public currently supports defense spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.⁴⁹ However, policymakers should not take this for granted. They must stem the growing sentiment of disengagement on both sides of the political spectrum by remembering their freedom of policy action relies on democratic support, and this political willpower translates directly into military strength and power projection.

US military and economic power remain unequalled for the near term. American soft power remains alluring despite recent domestic political turmoil. When catastrophes occur, those fleeing do not go to China, Russia, or Iran; they turn to the US and other Western democracies. America and the West remain beacons of hope that serve as an example worthy of emulation. China uses its economic might to co-opt, Russia uses violence to coerce, and Iran seeks a society based on conformity and subservience.⁵⁰ These actions provide them strategic space to maneuver but beget no primacy, regionally or globally. True primacy results when people identify with the ideals of a global power as if they were their own. Therefore, if the US wants to maintain its primacy in the face of an increasingly complex strategic environment, it must develop a coherent grand strategy that balances objectives with resources. Thus, a social contract must

be reestablished with the American people. The question is how to do so. One way is through strategic *retrenchment* and *reorientation*.⁵¹

Retrenchment is an effective response to relative decline, and it can provide US leaders with time and space to strategically reorient and rebuild the social contract.⁵² Ultimately, states implementing retrenchment have less active, ambitious, and burdensome foreign policies relative to the status quo.⁵³ By reducing the costs associated with US foreign policy, American decision-makers can work to generate public support by explaining how achieving the remaining goals will benefit the public.⁵⁴ Cost savings can also be redirected toward domestic priorities. This will require a fundamental reevaluation of how military power animates American strategy and the recognition that in most circumstances the use of military power is a means of last resort, not a first response. Revisiting the social contract will also require honest discourse about the costs of a grand strategy in terms of security expenses, risks, and burdens.⁵⁵ Retrenchment that reduces risks, shifts burdens, or economizes expenses will alleviate the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources” and provide American leaders with an opportunity to improve their political and strategic solvency.⁵⁶ Such actions are needed to rebuild the social contract with the American public.

Revisiting the social contract is needed to convince the public that sacrifices are necessary for continuing US global leadership in pursuit of advancing domestic prosperity. Without a renewed social contract, American leaders will increasingly find it difficult to garner domestic support for engagements abroad, thereby constraining diplomatic flexibility. The global rules-based economic, political, and security orders that served America and its allies so well now face inter-

nal and external threats. Confronting these threats to preserve and advance these orders will leave the US and its allies better off than if left to authoritarian strategic competitors upholding fundamentally contrasting principles. However, maintaining American primacy requires US political leadership to clearly outline the how and why of such ambitions, orienting public discourse on how they contribute to American prosperity. Anything less than this will likely generate a critical mass of citizens advocating for global disengagement and the end of the American Century.

Notes

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 50. We use the word “seek” intentionally. It is not the “veil” itself that is at issue but its political significance as an issue of individual freedom and choice. Manifesting authoritarian state power turns women’s bodies and choices into an ideational and political battle space. See Masih Alinejad and Roya Hakakian, “There Are Two Types of Hijabs. The Difference Is Huge,” *The Washington Post*, April 7, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/there-are-two-types-of-hijabs-the>

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